22 U.S.C. § 8601 — Findings

Page 2104 TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE § 8575 (D) interference by the People’s Republic of China with attempts by the United States to investigate or enforce sanctions on illicit Iranian petroleum product exports; (E) the effectiveness of the use of sanc- tions with respect to insurers of entities that own or operate vessels involved in smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum prod- ucts; (F) the personnel and resources needed to enforce sanctions with respect to Iranian-or- igin petroleum products; and (G) the impact of smuggled illicit Iranian- origin petroleum products on global energy markets. (c) Form The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in- clude a classified index. (Pub. L. 118–50, div. J, § 5, Apr. 24, 2024, 138 Stat. 967.) Editorial Notes CODIFICATION Section was enacted as part of the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act, also known as the SHIP Act, and not as part of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 which com- prises this chapter. § 8575. Definitions In this subchapter: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com- mittees’’ means— (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Com- mittee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate. (2) Covered family member The term ‘‘covered family member’’, with re- spect to a foreign person who is an individual, means a spouse, adult child, parent, or sibling of the person who engages in the sanctionable activity described under section 8572 of this title or who demonstrably benefits from such activity. (Pub. L. 118–50, div. J, § 6, Apr. 24, 2024, 138 Stat. 969.) Editorial Notes CODIFICATION Section was enacted as part of the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act, also known as the SHIP Act, and not as part of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 which com- prises this chapter. CHAPTER 93—UNITED STATES-ISRAEL COOPERATION Sec. 8601. Findings. 8602. Statement of policy. Sec. 8603. United States actions to assist in the defense of Israel and protect United States inter- ests. 8604. Reports required. 8605. Definitions. 8606. United States-Israel cooperation on energy, water, homeland security, agriculture, and alternative fuel technologies. 8607. Other matters of cooperation. § 8601. Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) Since 1948, United States Presidents and both houses of Congress, on a bipartisan basis and supported by the American people, have repeatedly reaffirmed the special bond be- tween the United States and Israel, based on shared values and shared interests. (2) The Middle East is undergoing rapid change, bringing with it hope for an expansion of democracy but also great challenges to the national security of the United States and our allies in the region, particularly to our most important ally in the region, Israel. (3) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is continuing its decades-long pattern of seeking to foment instability and promote extremism in the Middle East, particularly in this time of dramatic political transition. (4) At the same time, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to enrich uranium in defiance of multiple United Na- tions Security Council resolutions. (5) A nuclear-weapons capable Iran would fundamentally threaten vital United States interests, encourage regional nuclear pro- liferation, further empower Iran, the world’s leading state sponsor of terror, and pose a seri- ous and destabilizing threat to Israel and the region. (6) Over the past several years, with the as- sistance of the Governments of the Islamic Re- public of Iran and Syria, Hizbollah and Hamas have increased their stockpile of rockets, with more than 60,000 now ready to be fired at Israel. The Government of the Islamic Repub- lic of Iran continues to add to its arsenal of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, which threaten Iran’s neighbors, Israel, and United States Armed Forces in the region. (7) As a result, Israel is facing a fundamen- tally altered strategic environment. (8) Pursuant to chapter 5 of title 1 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropria- tions Act, 2003 (Public Law 108–11; 117 Stat. 576), the authority to make available loan guarantees to Israel is currently set to expire on September 30, 2012. (Pub. L. 112–150, § 2, July 27, 2012, 126 Stat. 1146.) Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries SHORT TITLE OF 2014 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 113–296, § 1, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 4075, pro- vided that: ‘‘This Act [enacting section 8606 of this title, amending sections 2321h and 2776 of this title and section 17337 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, enacting provisions set out as notes under this section and sections 8602, 8603, and 8606 of this title, and amend- ing provisions set out as a note under section 2776 of this title] may be cited as the ‘United States-Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014’.’’ Page 2105 TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE § 8601 SHORT TITLE Pub. L. 112–150, § 1, July 27, 2012, 126 Stat. 1146, pro- vided that: ‘‘This Act [enacting this chapter and amending section 2321h of this title] may be cited as the ‘United States-Israel Enhanced Security Coopera- tion Act of 2012’.’’ ISRAEL RELATIONS NORMALIZATION Pub. L. 117–103, div. Z, Mar. 15, 2022, 136 Stat. 1059, provided that: ‘‘SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE. ‘‘This division may be cited as the ‘Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022’. ‘‘SEC. 102. FINDINGS. ‘‘Congress makes the following findings: ‘‘(1) Support for peace between Israel and its neigh- bors has longstanding bipartisan support in Congress. ‘‘(2) For decades, Congress has promoted Israel’s ac- ceptance among Arab and other relevant countries and regions by passing numerous laws opposing ef- forts to boycott, isolate, and stigmatize America’s ally, Israel. ‘‘(3) The recent peace and normalization agree- ments between Israel and several Arab states—the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Mo- rocco—have the potential to fundamentally trans- form the security, diplomatic, and economic environ- ment in the Middle East and North Africa and ad- vance vital United States national security interests. ‘‘(4) These historic agreements could help advance peace between and among Israel, the Arab states, and other relevant countries and regions, further diplo- matic openings, and enhance efforts towards a nego- tiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict re- sulting in two states—a democratic Jewish state of Israel and a viable, democratic Palestinian state—liv- ing side by side in peace, security, and mutual rec- ognition. ‘‘(5) These agreements build upon the decades-long leadership of the United States Government in help- ing Israel broker peace treaties with Egypt and Jor- dan and promoting peace talks between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. ‘‘(6) These agreements also build on decades of pri- vate diplomatic and security engagement between Israel and countries in the region. ‘‘(7) These normalization and peace agreements could begin to transform the region by spurring eco- nomic growth, investment, and tourism, enhancing technological innovation, promoting security co- operation, bolstering water security and sustainable development, advancing understanding, and forging closer people-to-people relations. ‘‘SEC. 103. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COM- MITTEES DEFINED. ‘‘In this division, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af- fairs of the House of Representatives. ‘‘SEC. 104. STATEMENT OF POLICY. ‘‘It is the policy of the United States— ‘‘(1) to expand and strengthen the Abraham Accords to encourage other nations to normalize relations with Israel and ensure that existing agreements reap tangible security and economic benefits for the citi- zens of those countries; ‘‘(2) to develop and implement a regional strategy to encourage economic cooperation between and among Israel, Arab states, and the Palestinians to en- hance the prospects for peace, respect for human rights, transparent governance, and for cooperation to address water scarcity, climate solutions, health care, sustainable development, and other areas that result in benefits for residents of those countries and regions; ‘‘(3) to develop and implement a regional security strategy that recognizes the shared threat posed by Iran and violent extremist organizations, ensures suf- ficient United States deterrence in the region, builds partner capacity to address shared threats, and ex- plores multilateral security arrangements built around like-minded partners; ‘‘(4) to support and encourage government-to-gov- ernment and grassroots initiatives aimed at normal- izing ties with the state of Israel and promoting peo- ple-to-people contact between Israelis, Arabs, and residents of other relevant countries and regions, in- cluding by expanding and enhancing the Abraham Ac- cords; ‘‘(5) to support a negotiated solution to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict resulting in two states living side by side in peace, security, and mutual recogni- tion; ‘‘(6) to implement the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act [of 2020] (title VIII of divi- sion K of Public Law 116–260) [22 U.S.C. 2346d note], which will support economic development and peacebuilding efforts among Israelis and Palestin- ians, in a manner which encourages regional allies to become international donors to these efforts; ‘‘(7) to oppose efforts to delegitimize the state of Israel and legal barriers to normalization with Israel; and ‘‘(8) to work to combat anti-Semitism and support normalization with Israel, including by countering anti-Semitic narratives on social media and state media and pressing for curricula reform in education. ‘‘SEC. 105. UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE ABRAHAM AC- CORDS AND OTHER RELATED NORMALIZATION AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL. ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Mar. 15, 2022], and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in con- sultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall develop and submit to the appropriate congres- sional committees a strategy on expanding and strengthening the Abraham Accords. ‘‘(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub- section (a) shall include the following elements: ‘‘(1) An assessment of future staffing and resourcing requirements of entities within the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and other appropriate Federal depart- ments and agencies with responsibility to coordinate United States efforts to expand and strengthen the Abraham Accords. ‘‘(2) An assessment of opportunities to further pro- mote bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Israel, Arab states, and other relevant countries and in the economic, social, cultural, scientific, tech- nical, educational, and health fields and an assess- ment of roadblocks to increased cooperation. ‘‘(3) An assessment of bilateral and multilateral se- curity cooperation between Israel, the United States, Arab states, and other relevant countries and regions that have normalized relations with Israel, including an assessment of potential roadblocks to increased security cooperation, interoperability, and informa- tion sharing. ‘‘(4) An assessment of the likelihood of additional Arab and other relevant countries and regions to nor- malize relations with Israel. ‘‘(5) An assessment of opportunities created by nor- malization agreements with Israel to advance pros- pects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians[.] ‘‘(6) A detailed description of how the United States Government will leverage diplomatic lines of effort and resources from other stakeholders (including from foreign governments, international donors, and multilateral institutions) to encourage normaliza- tion, economic development, and people-to-people programming. ‘‘(7) Identification of existing investment funds that support Israel-Arab state cooperation and rec- Page 2106 TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE § 8601 ommendations for how such funds could be used to support normalization and increase prosperity for all relevant stakeholders. ‘‘(8) A proposal for how the United States Govern- ment and others can utilize the scholars and Arabic language resources of the United States Holocaust Museum to counter Holocaust denial and anti-Semi- tism. ‘‘(9) An assessment for creating an Abrahamic Cen- ter for Pluralism to prepare educational materials, convene international seminars, promote tolerance and pluralism, and bring together scholars as a means of advancing religious tolerance and coun- tering political and religious extremism. ‘‘(10) Recommendations to improve Department of State cooperation and coordination, particularly be- tween the Special Envoy to Monitor Anti-Semitism and the Ambassador at Large for International Reli- gious Freedom, and the Office of International Reli- gious Freedom, to combat racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism, which hinder im- provement of relations between Israel, Arab states, and other relevant countries and regions. ‘‘(11) An assessment on the value and feasibility of Federal support for inter-parliamentary exchange programs for Members of Congress, Knesset, and par- liamentarians from Arab and other relevant coun- tries and regions, including through existing Federal programs that support such exchanges. ‘‘(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classi- fied annex. ‘‘SEC. 106. BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO NOR- MALIZATION WITH ISRAEL. ‘‘(a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the ‘Strengthening Reporting of Actions Taken Against the Normalization of Relations with Israel Act of 2022’. ‘‘(b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find- ings: ‘‘(1) The Arab League, an organization comprising 22 Middle Eastern and African countries and entities, has maintained an official boycott of Israeli compa- nies and Israeli-made goods since the founding of Israel in 1948. ‘‘(2) Longstanding United States policy has encour- aged Arab League states to normalize their relations with Israel and has long prioritized funding coopera- tive programs that promote normalization between Arab League States and Israel, including the Middle East Regional Cooperation program, which promotes Arab-Israeli scientific cooperation. ‘‘(3) While some Arab League governments are sig- naling enhanced cooperation with the state of Israel on the government-to-government level, most con- tinue to persecute their own citizens who establish people-to-people relations with Israelis in nongovern- mental fora, through a combination of judicial and extrajudicial retribution. ‘‘(4) Some Arab League states maintain draconian anti-normalization laws that punish their citizens for people-to-people relations with Israelis, with punish- ments, including imprisonment, revocation of citi- zenship, and execution. Extrajudicial punishments by these and other Arab states include summary impris- onment, accusations of ‘treason’ in government-con- trolled media, and professional blacklisting. ‘‘(5) Anti-normalization laws, together with the other forms of retribution, effectively condemn these societies to mutual estrangement and, by extension, reduce the possibility of conciliation and com- promise. ‘‘(6) Former Israeli President Shimon Peres said in 2008 at the United Nations that Israel agrees with the Arab Peace Initiative that a military solution to the conflict ‘will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties’. ‘‘(7) Despite the risk of retaliatory action, a rising tide of Arab civic actors advocate direct engagement with Israeli citizens and residents. These include the Arab Council for Regional Integration, a group of 32 public figures from 15 Arab countries who oppose the boycott of Israel on the grounds that the boycott has denied Arabs the benefits of partnership with Israelis, has blocked Arabs from helping to bridge the Israeli- Palestinian divide, and inspired divisive intra-Arab boycotts among diverse sects and ethnic groups. ‘‘(8) On February 11, 2020, a delegation of the Arab Council to the French National Assembly in Paris testified to the harmful effects of ‘anti-normalization laws’, called on the Assembly to enact a law instruct- ing the relevant French authorities to issue an an- nual report on instances of Arab government retribu- tion for any of their citizens or residents who call for peace with Israel or engage in direct civil relations with Israeli citizens, and requested democratic legis- latures to help defend the region’s civil peacemakers. ‘‘(9) On May 11, 2020, 85 leaders in France published an endorsement of the Arab Council’s proposal, call- ing on France and other democratic governments to ‘protect Arabs who engage in dialogue with Israeli citizens’ and proposing ‘the creation of a study group in the National Assembly as well as in the Senate whose mission would be to ensure a legal and tech- nical monitoring of the obstacles which Arab pro- ponents of dialogue with Israelis face’. ‘‘(10) Arab-Israeli cooperation provides significant symbiotic benefit to the security and economic pros- perity of the region. ‘‘(c) ADDITIONAL REPORTING.— ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Mar. 15, 2022], and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the status of efforts to pro- mote normalization of relations with Israel and other countries. ‘‘(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under para- graph (1) shall include the following information: ‘‘(A) The status of ‘anti-normalization laws’ in countries comprising the Arab League, including efforts within each country to sharpen existing laws, enact new or additional ‘anti-normalization legislation’, or repeal such laws. ‘‘(B) Instances of the use of state-owned or state- operated media outlets to promote anti-Semitic propaganda, the prosecution of citizens or residents of Arab countries for calling for peace with Israel, visiting the state of Israel, or engaging Israeli citi- zens in any way. ‘‘(C) Instances of extrajudicial retribution by Arab governments or government-controlled insti- tutions against citizens or residents of Arab coun- tries for any of the same actions referred to in sub- paragraph (B). ‘‘SEC. 107. SUNSET. ‘‘This division shall cease to be effective on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act [Mar. 15, 2022].’’ FINDINGS Pub. L. 113–296, § 2, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 4075, pro- vided that: ‘‘Congress makes the following findings: ‘‘(1) The people and the Governments of the United States and of Israel share a deep and unbreakable bond, forged by over 60 years of shared interests and shared values. ‘‘(2) Today, the people and Governments of the United States and of Israel are facing a dynamic and rapidly changing security environment in the Middle East and North Africa, necessitating deeper coopera- tion on a range of defense, security, and intelligence matters. ‘‘(3) From Gaza, Hamas continues to deny Israel’s right to exist and persists in firing rockets indis- criminately at population centers in Israel. ‘‘(4) Hezbollah—with support from Iran—continues to stockpile rockets and may be seeking to exploit the tragic and volatile security situation within Syria. Page 2107 TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE § 8603 ‘‘(5) The Government of Iran continues to pose a grave threat to the region and the world at large with its reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons. ‘‘(6) Given these challenges, it is imperative that the United States continues to deepen cooperation with allies like Israel in pursuit of shared policy ob- jectives.’’ § 8602. Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States: (1) To reaffirm our unwavering commitment to the security of the State of Israel as a Jew- ish state. As President Barack Obama stated on December 16, 2011, ‘‘America’s commitment and my commitment to Israel and Israel’s se- curity is unshakeable.’’ And as President George W. Bush stated before the Israeli Knesset on May 15, 2008, on the 60th anniver- sary of the founding of the State of Israel, ‘‘The alliance between our governments is un- breakable, yet the source of our friendship runs deeper than any treaty.’’. (2) To help the Government of Israel pre- serve its qualitative military edge amid rapid and uncertain regional political trans- formation. (3) To veto any one-sided anti-Israel resolu- tions at the United Nations Security Council. (4) To support Israel’s inherent right to self- defense. (5) To pursue avenues to expand cooperation with the Government of Israel both in defense and across the spectrum of civilian sectors, in- cluding high technology, agriculture, medi- cine, health, pharmaceuticals, and energy. (6) To assist the Government of Israel with its ongoing efforts to forge a peaceful, nego- tiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that results in two states living side- by-side in peace and security, and to encour- age Israel’s neighbors to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. (7) To encourage further development of ad- vanced technology programs between the United States and Israel given current trends and instability in the region. (Pub. L. 112–150, § 3, July 27, 2012, 126 Stat. 1147.) Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries STATEMENT OF POLICY ENSURING ISRAEL’S DEFENSE Pub. L. 118–159, div. A, title XII, § 1211, Dec. 23, 2024, 138 Stat. 2099, provided that: ‘‘It is the policy of the United States to work with Israel to ensure adequate stocks of interceptors and weapons system components to defend Israel against air and missile threats from Iran and Iranian military proxies, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, if the transfer of such interceptors and weapons system components are in the national security inter- ests of the United States.’’ STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNITED STATES- ISRAEL STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP Pub. L. 113–296, § 3, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 4075, pro- vided that: ‘‘It is the policy of the United States— ‘‘(1) to reaffirm the unwavering support of the peo- ple and the Government of the United States for the security of Israel as a Jewish state; ‘‘(2) to reaffirm the principles and objectives en- shrined in the United States-Israel Enhanced Secu- rity Cooperation Act of 2012 (Public Law 112–150) [22 U.S.C. 8601 et seq.] and ensure its implementation to the fullest extent; ‘‘(3) to reaffirm the importance of the 2007 United States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding on United States assistance to Israel and the semi-an- nual Strategic Dialogue between the United States and Israel; ‘‘(4) to pursue every opportunity to deepen coopera- tion with Israel on a range of critical issues including defense, homeland security, energy, and cybersecurity; ‘‘(5) to continue to provide Israel with robust secu- rity assistance, including for the procurement of the Iron Dome Missile Defense System; and ‘‘(6) to support the Government of Israel in its on- going efforts to reach a negotiated political settle- ment with the Palestinian people that results in two states living side-by-side in peace and security.’’ STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE VISA WAIVER PROGRAM Pub. L. 113–296, § 9, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 4077, pro- vided that: ‘‘It shall be the policy of the United States to include Israel in the list of countries that partici- pate in the visa waiver program under section 217 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1187) when Israel satisfies, and as long as Israel continues to sat- isfy, the requirements for inclusion in such program specified in such section.’’ § 8603. United States actions to assist in the de- fense of Israel and protect United States in- terests It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should take the following actions to assist in the defense of Israel: (1) Seek to enhance the capabilities of the Governments of the United States and Israel to address emerging common threats, increase security cooperation, and expand joint mili- tary exercises. (2) Provide the Government of Israel such support as may be necessary to increase devel- opment and production of joint missile defense systems, particularly such systems that de- fend against the urgent threat posed to Israel and United States forces in the region. (3) Provide the Government of Israel assist- ance specifically for the production and pro- curement of the Iron Dome defense system for purposes of intercepting short-range missiles, rockets, and projectiles launched against Israel. (4) Provide the Government of Israel defense articles and defense services through such mechanisms as appropriate, to include air re- fueling tankers, missile defense capabilities, and specialized munitions. (5) Provide the Government of Israel addi- tional excess defense articles, as appropriate, in the wake of the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq. (6) Examine ways to strengthen existing and ongoing efforts, including the Gaza Counter Arms Smuggling Initiative, aimed at pre- venting weapons smuggling into Gaza pursu- ant to the 2009 agreement following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, as well as measures to protect against weapons smuggling and ter- rorist threats from the Sinai Peninsula. (7) Offer the Air Force of Israel additional training and exercise opportunities in the United States to compensate for Israel’s lim- ited air space. (8) Work to encourage an expanded role for Israel with the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-