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50 U.S.C. § 3237 — Measures to mitigate counterintelligence threats from proliferation and use of foreign commercial spyware
Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) Definitions** In this section:
(1) **Appropriate congressional committees** — The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.
(2) **Covered entity** — The term “covered entity” means any foreign company that either directly or indirectly develops, maintains, owns, operates, brokers, markets, sells, leases, licenses, or otherwise makes available spyware.
(3) **Foreign commercial spyware** — The term “foreign commercial spyware” means spyware that is developed (solely or in partnership with a foreign company), maintained, sold, leased, licensed, marketed, sourced (in whole or in part), or otherwise provided, either directly or indirectly, by a foreign company.
(4) **Foreign company** — The term “foreign company” means a company that is incorporated or domiciled outside of the United States, including any subsidiaries or affiliates wherever such subsidiaries or affiliates are domiciled or incorporated.
(5) **Spyware** — The term “spyware” means a tool or set of tools that operate as an end-to-end system of software to provide an unauthorized user remote access to information stored on or transiting through an electro
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Stable record: federal_law:legal_authorities:record_usc_2f5330a2d3cc415e6312de06
Source file: Laws/federal/codes/united-states-code/title-50/section-3237-measures-to-mitigate-counterintelligence-threats-from-proliferation-and--3944e2def0.md
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Source location: Title 50, Chapter 44, § 3237; chapter-044-national-security.md
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**(a) Definitions** In this section:
(1) **Appropriate congressional committees** — The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.
(2) **Covered entity** — The term “covered entity” means any foreign company that either directly or indirectly develops, maintains, owns, operates, brokers, markets, sells, leases, licenses, or otherwise makes available spyware.
(3) **Foreign commercial spyware** — The term “foreign commercial spyware” means spyware that is developed (solely or in partnership with a foreign company), maintained, sold, leased, licensed, marketed, sourced (in whole or in part), or otherwise provided, either directly or indirectly, by a foreign company.
(4) **Foreign company** — The term “foreign company” means a company that is incorporated or domiciled outside of the United States, including any subsidiaries or affiliates wherever such subsidiaries or affiliates are domiciled or incorporated.
(5) **Spyware** — The term “spyware” means a tool or set of tools that operate as an end-to-end system of software to provide an unauthorized user remote access to information stored on or transiting through an electronic device connected to the Internet and not owned or operated by the unauthorized user, including end-to-end systems that—
(A) allow an unauthorized user to remotely infect electronic devices with malicious software, including without any action required by the user of the device;
(B) can record telecommunications or other audio captured on a device not owned by the unauthorized user;
(C) undertake geolocation, collect cell site location information, or otherwise track the location of a device or person using the internal sensors of an electronic device not owned by the unauthorized user;
(D) allow an unauthorized user access to and the ability to retrieve information on the electronic device, including text messages, files, e-mails, transcripts of chats, contacts, photos, and browsing history; or
(E) any additional criteria described in publicly available documents published by the Director of National Intelligence, such as whether the end-to-end system is used outside the context of a codified lawful intercept system.
**(b) Annual assessments of counterintelligence threats**
(1) **Requirement** — Not later than 90 days after December 23, 2022, and annually thereafter for seven years, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report with an accompanying classified annex containing an assessment of the counterintelligence threats and other risks to the national security of the United States posed by the proliferation of foreign commercial spyware. The assessment shall incorporate all credible data, including open-source information.
(2) **Elements** — Each report under paragraph (1) shall include the following, if known:
(A) A list of the most significant covered entities.
(B) A description of the foreign commercial spyware marketed by the covered entities identified under subparagraph (A) and an assessment by the intelligence community of the foreign commercial spyware.
(C) An assessment of the counterintelligence risk to the intelligence community or personnel of the intelligence community posed by foreign commercial spyware.
(D) For each covered entity identified in subparagraph (A), details of any subsidiaries, resellers, or other agents acting on behalf of the covered entity.
(E) Details of where each covered entity identified under subparagraphs (A) and (D) is domiciled.
(F) A description of how each covered entity identified under subparagraphs (A) and (D) is financed, where the covered entity acquired its capital, and the organizations and individuals having substantial investments or other equities in the covered entity.
(G) An assessment by the intelligence community of any relationship between each covered entity identified in subparagraphs (A) and (D) and any foreign government, including any export controls and processes to which the covered entity is subject.
(H) A list of the foreign customers of each covered entity identified in subparagraphs (A) and (D), including the understanding by the intelligence community of the organizations and end-users within any foreign government.
(I) With respect to each foreign customer identified under subparagraph (H), an assessment by the intelligence community regarding how the foreign customer is using the spyware, including whether the foreign customer has targeted personnel of the intelligence community.
(J) With respect to the first report required under paragraph (1), a mitigation plan to reduce the exposure of personnel of the intelligence community to foreign commercial spyware.
(K) With respect to each report following the first report required under paragraph (1), details of steps taken by the intelligence community since the previous report to implement measures to reduce the exposure of personnel of the intelligence community to foreign commercial spyware.
(3) **Classified annex** — In submitting the report under paragraph (1), the Director shall also include an accompanying but separate classified annex, providing a watchlist of companies selling, leasing, or otherwise providing foreign commercial spyware that the Director determines are engaged in activities that pose a counterintelligence risk to personnel of the intelligence community.
(4) **Form** — Each report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.
(5) **Dissemination** — The Director of National Intelligence shall separately distribute each report under paragraph (1) and each annex under paragraph (3) to the President, the heads of all elements of the intelligence community, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Cyber Director, and the heads of any other departments or agencies the Director of National Intelligence determines appropriate.
**(c) Authority to prohibit purchase or use by intelligence community**
(1) **Foreign commercial spyware**
(A) *In general* — The Director of National Intelligence may prohibit any element of the intelligence community from procuring, leasing, or otherwise acquiring on the commercial market, or extending or renewing a contract to procure, lease, or otherwise acquire, foreign commercial spyware.
(B) *Considerations* — In determining whether and how to exercise the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director of National Intelligence shall consider—
(i) the assessment of the intelligence community of the counterintelligence threats or other risks to the United States posed by foreign commercial spyware;
(ii) the assessment of the intelligence community of whether the foreign commercial spyware has been used to target United States Government personnel;
(iii) whether the original owner or developer retains any of the physical property or intellectual property associated with the foreign commercial spyware;
(iv) whether the original owner or developer has verifiably destroyed all copies of the data collected by or associated with the foreign commercial spyware;
(v) whether the personnel of the original owner or developer retain any access to data collected by or associated with the foreign commercial spyware;
(vi) whether the use of the foreign commercial spyware requires the user to connect to an information system of the original owner or developer or information system of a foreign government; and
(vii) whether the foreign commercial spyware poses a counterintelligence risk to the United States or any other threat to the national security of the United States.
(2) **Company that has acquired foreign commercial spyware**
(A) *Authority* — The Director of National Intelligence may prohibit any element of the intelligence community from entering into any contract or other agreement for any purpose with a company that has acquired, in whole or in part, any foreign commercial spyware.
(B) *Considerations* — In considering whether and how to exercise the authority under subparagraph (A), the Director of National Intelligence shall consider—
(i) whether the original owner or developer of the foreign commercial spyware retains any of the physical property or intellectual property associated with the spyware;
(ii) whether the original owner or developer of the foreign commercial spyware has verifiably destroyed all data, and any copies thereof, collected by or associated with the spyware;
(iii) whether the personnel of the original owner or developer of the foreign commercial spyware retain any access to data collected by or associated with the foreign commercial spyware;
(iv) whether the use of the foreign commercial spyware requires the user to connect to an information system of the original owner or developer or information system of a foreign government; and
(v) whether the foreign commercial spyware poses a counterintelligence risk to the United States or any other threat to the national security of the United States.
(3) **Notifications of prohibition** — Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director of National Intelligence exercises the authority to issue a prohibition under subsection (c), the Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence committees of such exercise of authority. Such notice shall include—
(A) a description of the circumstances under which the prohibition was issued;
(B) an identification of the company or product covered by the prohibition;
(C) any information that contributed to the decision of the Director of National Intelligence to exercise the authority, including any information relating to counterintelligence or other risks to the national security of the United States posed by the company or product, as assessed by the intelligence community; and
(D) an identification of each element of the intelligence community to which the prohibition has been applied.
(4) **Waiver authority**
(A) *In general* — The head of an element of the intelligence community may request from the Director of National Intelligence the waiver of a prohibition made under paragraph (1) or (2).
(B) *Director of National Intelligence determination* — The Director of National Intelligence, upon receiving the waiver request in subparagraph (A), may issue a waiver for a period not to exceed one year in response to the request from the head of an element of the intelligence community if such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States.
(C) *Notice* — Not later than 30 days after approving a waiver request pursuant to subparagraph (B), the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives a written notification. The notification shall include—
(i) an identification of the head of the element of the intelligence community that requested the waiver;
(ii) the details of the waiver request, including the national security interests of the United States;
(iii) the rationale and basis for the determination that the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States;
(iv) the considerations that informed the ultimate determination of the Director of National Intelligence to issue the waiver; and
(v) and any other considerations contributing to the determination, made by the Director of National Intelligence.
(D) *Waiver termination* — The Director of National Intelligence may revoke a previously granted waiver at any time. Upon revocation of a waiver, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a written notification to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives not later than 30 days after making a revocation determination.
(5) **Termination of prohibition** — The Director of National Intelligence may terminate a prohibition made under paragraph (1) or (2) at any time. Upon termination of a prohibition, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit a notification of the termination to the congressional intelligence committees, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives not later than 30 days after terminating a prohibition, detailing the basis for the termination, including any United States national security interests that may be affected by such termination.
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a)** For the purpose of this title, “employee”, except as otherwise provided by this section or when specifically modified, means an officer and an individual who is—
(1) appointed in the civil service by one of the following acting in an official capacity—
(A) the President;
(B) a Member or Members of Congress, or the Congress;
(C) a member of a uniformed service;
(D) an individual who is an employee under this section;
(E) the head of a Government controlled corporation; or
(F) an adjutant general designated by the Secretary concerned under [section 709(c) of title 32](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title32-section709/c&num=0&edition=prelim);
(2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of law or an Executive act; and
(3) subject to the supervision of an individual named by paragraph (1) of this subsection while engaged in the performance of the duties of his position.
**(b)** An individual who is employed at the United States Naval Academy in the midshipmen’s laundry, the midshipmen’s tailor shop, the midshipmen’s cobbler and barber shops, and the midshipmen’s store, except an individual employed by the Academy dairy (if any), and whose employment in such a position began before October 1, 1996, and has been uninterrupted in such a position since that date is deemed an employee.
**(c)** An employee paid from nonappropriated funds of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Ships Stores Program, Navy exchanges, Marine Corps exchanges, Coast Guard exchanges, and other instrumentalities of the United States under the jurisdiction of the armed forces conducted for the comfort, pleasure, contentment, and mental and physical improvement of personnel of the armed forces is deemed not an emp
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 5 U.S.C. § 2105
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) In General.—** The Council shall perform functions that include the following:
(1) Identifying and recommending development by the National Institute of Standards and Technology of supply chain risk management standards, guidelines, and practices for executive agencies to use when assessing and developing mitigation strategies to address supply chain risks, particularly in the acquisition and use of covered articles under [section 1326(a) of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title41-section1326/a&num=0&edition=prelim).
(2) Identifying or developing criteria for sharing information with executive agencies, other Federal entities, and non-Federal entities with respect to supply chain risk, including information related to the exercise of authorities provided under this section and sections 1326 and 4713 of this title. At a minimum, such criteria shall address—
(A) the content to be shared;
(B) the circumstances under which sharing is mandated or voluntary; and
(C) the circumstances under which it is appropriate for an executive agency to rely on information made available through such sharing in exercising the responsibilities and authorities provided under this section and [section 4713 of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title41-section4713&num=0&edition=prelim).
(3) Identifying an appropriate executive agency to—
(A) accept information submitted by executive agencies based on the criteria established under paragraph (2);
(B) facilitate the sharing of information received under subparagraph (A) to support supply chain risk analyses under [section 1326 of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title41-section1326&num=0&edition=prelim),
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 41 U.S.C. § 1323
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) In general** Beginning on the transfer date, under regulations prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence, the President of the National Intelligence University may, upon the recommendation of the faculty of the University, confer appropriate degrees upon graduates who meet the degree requirements.
**(b) Limitation** A degree may not be conferred under this section unless—
(1) the Secretary of Education has recommended approval of the degree in accordance with the Federal Policy Governing Granting of Academic Degrees by Federal Agencies; and
(2) the University is accredited by the appropriate academic accrediting agency or organization to award the degree, as determined by the Secretary of Education.
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 50 U.S.C. § 3232a
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) Reports** On a biennial basis until the date that is 10 years after March 15, 2022, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a comprehensive report on the activities, prioritization, and responsibilities of the intelligence community with respect to foreign biological threats emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country.
**(b) Matters included** Each report under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to foreign biological threats emanating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a covered country, the following:
(1) A detailed description of all activities relating to such threats undertaken by each element of the intelligence community, and an assessment of any gaps in such activities.
(2) A detailed description of all duties and responsibilities relating to such threats explicitly authorized or otherwise assigned, exclusively or jointly, to each element of the intelligence community, and an assessment of any identified gaps in such duties or responsibilities.
(3) A description of the coordination among the relevant elements of the intelligence community with respect to the activities specified in paragraph (1) and the duties and responsibilities specified in paragraph (2).
(4) An inventory of the strategies, plans, policies, and interagency agreements of the intelligence community relating to the collection, monitoring, analysis, mitigation, and attribution of such threats, and an assessment of any identified gaps therein.
(5) A description of the coordination and interactions among the relevant elements of the intelligence community and non-intelligence community partners.
(6) An assessment of foreign malign influence efforts relating to such threats, including any foreign
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 50 U.S.C. § 3003
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) Authorization** The Director may, with or without reimbursement, obligate or expend amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for covered workforce activities for the purpose of supporting a covered workforce activity of an element of the intelligence community.
**(b) Notification** Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director exercises the authority in subsection (a), the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate written notification of such exercise.
**(c) Covered workforce activity defined** In this section, the term “covered workforce activity” means an activity relating to—
(1) recruitment or retention of the intelligence community workforce; or
(2) diversity, equality, inclusion, or accessibility, with respect to such workforce.
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 50 U.S.C. § 3231
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) Definitions** In this section:
(1) **Covered element of the intelligence community** — The term “covered element of the intelligence community” means an element of the intelligence community that is not an element of the Department of Defense.
(2) **National security satellite** — The term “national security satellite” means a satellite weighing over 400 pounds whose principle purpose is to support the national security or intelligence needs of the United States Government.
(3) **United States** — The term “United States” means the several States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the United States.
**(b) Requirement** Beginning January 1, 2021, except as provided in subsection (c), a covered element of the intelligence community may not award a contract for a national security satellite if the satellite uses a star tracker that is not produced in the United States, including with respect to both the software and the hardware of the star tracker.
**(c) Exception** The head of a covered element of the intelligence community may waive the requirement under subsection (b) if, on a case-by-case basis, the head certifies in writing to the congressional intelligence committees that—
(1) there is no available star tracker produced in the United States that meets the mission and design requirements of the national security satellite for which the star tracker will be used;
(2) the cost of a star tracker produced in the United States is unreasonable, based on a market survey; or
(3) such waiver is necessary for the national security interests of the United States based on an urgent and compelling need.
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 50 U.S.C. § 3001
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) List of covered contractors** Not later than 30 days after December 27, 2021, the Secretary, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and other appropriate Federal agencies as determined jointly by the Secretary and the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop or maintain, as the case may be, and update as frequently as the Secretary determines appropriate, a list of covered contractors with respect to which the Department should seek to avoid entering into contracts. Not later than 30 days after the initial development of the list under this subsection, any update thereto, and annually thereafter for 5 years after such initial 30 day period, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a copy of such list.
**(b) Covered contractor defined** In this section, the term “covered contractor” means a provider of telecommunications, telecommunications equipment, or information technology equipment, including hardware, software, or services, that has knowingly assisted or facilitated a cyber attack or conducted surveillance, including passive or active monitoring, carried out against—
(1) the United States by, or on behalf of, any government, or persons associated with such government, listed as a cyber threat actor in the intelligence community’s 2017 assessment of worldwide threats to United States national security or any subsequent worldwide threat assessment of the intelligence community; or
(2) individuals, including activists, journalists, opposition politicians, or other individuals for the purposes of suppressing dissent or intimidating critics, on behalf of a country included in the annual country reports on human rights practices of the Department for systematic acts of political repression, including arbi
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 22 U.S.C. § 2679e
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) Establishment** There shall be a National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
**(b) Head of Center** The Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be the head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
**(c) Location of Center** The National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be located in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
**(d) Mission** The mission of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall include organizing and leading strategic planning for counterintelligence activities of the United States Government by integrating instruments of national power as needed to counter foreign intelligence activities.
**(e) Functions** Subject to the direction and control of the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, the functions of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center shall be as follows:
(1) **National threat identification and prioritization assessment** — Subject to subsection (f), in consultation with appropriate department and agencies of the United States Government, and private sector entities, to produce a strategic planning assessment of the counterintelligence requirements of the United States to be known as the National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment.
(2) **National Counterintelligence Strategy**
(A) *Requirement to produce* — Subject to subsection (f), in consultation with appropriate department and agencies of the United States Government, and private sector entities, and based on the most current National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment under paragraph (1), to produce a strategy for the counterintelligence programs and activities of the United States Government to be known as
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 50 U.S.C. § 3383
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) Requirement** On an annual basis, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the influence operations and campaigns in the United States conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
**(b) Contents** Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the organization of the United Front Work Department of the People’s Republic of China, or the successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links between the United Front Work Department and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
(2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations that are associated with or receive funding from the United Front Work Department, particularly such entities operating in the United States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of China.
(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front Work Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign populations, particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent.
(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy, consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chi
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 50 U.S.C. § 3242
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
Page 772
TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
§ 3237
(C) Chairperson
(i) In general
Except as provided in clause (ii), the
chairperson of any panel convened under
this subsection shall be the Inspector Gen-
eral of the Intelligence Community.
(ii) Conflicts of interest
If the Inspector General of the Intel-
ligence Community finds cause to recuse
himself or herself from a panel convened
under this subsection, the Inspector Gen-
eral of the Intelligence Community shall—
(I) select a chairperson from inspectors
general of the elements listed under sub-
paragraph (A)(ii) whom the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community
considers appropriate; and
(II) notify the congressional intel-
ligence committees of such selection.
(3) Period of review
Each external review panel convened under
this subsection to review a claim shall com-
plete review of the claim no later than 270
days after the date on which the Inspector
General convenes the external review panel.
(d) Remedies
(1) Panel recommendations
If an external review panel convened under
subsection (c) determines, pursuant to a re-
view of a claim submitted by an individual
under subsection (a), that the individual was
the subject of a personnel action prohibited
under section 3234 of this title or was sub-
jected to a reprisal prohibited by section
3341(j)(1) of this title, the panel may rec-
ommend that the agency head take corrective
action—
(A) in the case of an employee or former
employee—
(i) to return the employee or former em-
ployee, as nearly as practicable and rea-
sonable, to the position such employee or
former employee would have held had the
reprisal not occurred; or
(ii) reconsider the employee’s or former
employee’s eligibility for access to classi-
fied information consiste
Source: Supplied 2024 U.S. Code historical extraction · 50 U.S.C. § 3237
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