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50 U.S.C. § 3242 — Annual reports on influence operations and campaigns in the United States by the Chinese Communist Party
Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) Requirement** On an annual basis, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the influence operations and campaigns in the United States conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
**(b) Contents** Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the organization of the United Front Work Department of the People’s Republic of China, or the successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links between the United Front Work Department and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
(2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations that are associated with or receive funding from the United Front Work Department, particularly such entities operating in the United States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of China.
(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front Work Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign populations, particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent.
(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy, consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chi
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Source file: Laws/federal/codes/united-states-code/title-50/section-3242-annual-reports-on-influence-operations-and-campaigns-in-the-united-state--ac4ce0bf3d.md
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Source location: Title 50, Chapter 44, § 3242; chapter-044-national-security.md
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**(a) Requirement** On an annual basis, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Security Agency, and any other relevant head of an element of the intelligence community, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the influence operations and campaigns in the United States conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
**(b) Contents** Each report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) A description of the organization of the United Front Work Department of the People’s Republic of China, or the successors of the United Front Work Department, and the links between the United Front Work Department and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
(2) An assessment of the degree to which organizations that are associated with or receive funding from the United Front Work Department, particularly such entities operating in the United States, are formally tasked by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of China.
(3) A description of the efforts by the United Front Work Department and subsidiary organizations of the United Front Work Department to target, coerce, and influence foreign populations, particularly those of ethnic Chinese descent.
(4) An assessment of attempts by the Chinese Embassy, consulates, and organizations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (including, at a minimum, the United Front Work Department) to influence the United States-based Chinese Student Scholar Associations.
(5) A description of the evolution of the role of the United Front Work Department under the leadership of the President of China.
(6) An assessment of the activities of the United Front Work Department designed to influence the opinions of elected leaders of the United States, or candidates for elections in the United States, with respect to issues of importance to the Chinese Communist Party.
(7) A listing of all known organizations affiliated with the United Front Work Department that are operating in the United States as of the date of the report.
(8) An identification of influence activities and operations employed by the Chinese Communist Party against the United States science and technology sectors, specifically employees of the United States Government, researchers, scientists, and students in the science and technology sector in the United States.
(9) A listing of all known Chinese talent recruitment programs operating in the United States as of the date of the report.
(10) A listing of provincial, municipal, or other law enforcement institutions, including police departments, in the People’s Republic of China associated with establishing or maintaining a Chinese police presence in the United States.
(11) A listing of colleges and universities in the People’s Republic of China that conduct military research or host dedicated military initiatives or laboratories.
(12) With respect to reports submitted after the first report, an assessment of the change in goals, tactics, techniques, and procedures of the influence operations and campaigns conducted by the Chinese Communist Party.
**(c) Form** Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) Definitions** In this section:
(1) **Appropriate congressional committees** — The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the House of Representatives.
(2) **Covered entity** — The term “covered entity” means any foreign company that either directly or indirectly develops, maintains, owns, operates, brokers, markets, sells, leases, licenses, or otherwise makes available spyware.
(3) **Foreign commercial spyware** — The term “foreign commercial spyware” means spyware that is developed (solely or in partnership with a foreign company), maintained, sold, leased, licensed, marketed, sourced (in whole or in part), or otherwise provided, either directly or indirectly, by a foreign company.
(4) **Foreign company** — The term “foreign company” means a company that is incorporated or domiciled outside of the United States, including any subsidiaries or affiliates wherever such subsidiaries or affiliates are domiciled or incorporated.
(5) **Spyware** — The term “spyware” means a tool or set of tools that operate as an end-to-end system of software to provide an unauthorized user remote access to information stored on or transiting through an electro
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 50 U.S.C. § 3237
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
**(a) Annual reports** On an annual basis through 2026, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the National Security Agency, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing information on foreign commercial providers and the cyber vulnerabilities procured by the intelligence community through foreign commercial providers.
**(b) Elements** Each report under subsection (a) shall include, with respect to the period covered by the report, the following:
(1) A description of each cyber vulnerability procured through a foreign commercial provider, including—
(A) a description of the vulnerability;
(B) the date of the procurement;
(C) whether the procurement consisted of only that vulnerability or included other vulnerabilities;
(D) the cost of the procurement;
(E) the identity of the commercial provider and, if the commercial provider was not the original supplier of the vulnerability, a description of the original supplier;
(F) the country of origin of the vulnerability; and
(G) an assessment of the ability of the intelligence community to use the vulnerability, including whether such use will be operational or for research and development, and the approximate timeline for such use.
(2) An assessment of foreign commercial providers that—
(A) pose a significant threat to the national security of the United States; or
(B) have provided cyber vulnerabilities to any foreign government that—
(i) has used the cyber vulnerabilities to target United States persons, the United States Government, journalists, or dissidents; or
(ii) has an established pattern or practice of violating human rights or suppressing dissent.
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 50 U.S.C. § 3004
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
Page 775
TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
§ 3242
1 See References in Text note below.
the date of the enactment of this Act,’’ in introductory
provisions and ‘‘, civil liberties, and civil rights’’ for
‘‘and civil liberties’’ in pars. (1) and (2).
§ 3241. Biennial reports on foreign biological
threats
(a) Reports
On a biennial basis until the date that is 10
years after March 15, 2022, the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence shall submit to the congres-
sional intelligence committees a comprehensive
report on the activities, prioritization, and re-
sponsibilities of the intelligence community
with respect to foreign biological threats ema-
nating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a
covered country.
(b) Matters included
Each report under subsection (a) shall include,
with respect to foreign biological threats ema-
nating from the territory of, or sponsored by, a
covered country, the following:
(1) A detailed description of all activities re-
lating to such threats undertaken by each ele-
ment of the intelligence community, and an
assessment of any gaps in such activities.
(2) A detailed description of all duties and
responsibilities relating to such threats ex-
plicitly authorized or otherwise assigned, ex-
clusively or jointly, to each element of the in-
telligence community, and an assessment of
any identified gaps in such duties or respon-
sibilities.
(3) A description of the coordination among
the relevant elements of the intelligence com-
munity with respect to the activities specified
in paragraph (1) and the duties and respon-
sibilities specified in paragraph (2).
(4) An inventory of the strategies, plans,
policies, and interagency agreements of the in-
telligence community relating to the collec-
tion, monitoring, analysis, mitiga
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