50 U.S.C. § 3352a — Reports and plans relating to security

Page 829 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 3352a tional Intelligence, the classification decision shall be made by the Principal Deputy Direc- tor of National Intelligence. (c) Reports Whenever the Director or the Principal Dep- uty Director makes a decision under subsection (b), the Director or the Principal Deputy Direc- tor, as the case may be, shall submit to the con- gressional intelligence committees a report de- tailing the reasons for the decision. (Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXIII, § 6310, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2190.) Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries DEFINITIONS For definitions of ‘‘intelligence community’’ and ‘‘congressional intelligence committees’’ as used in this section, see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title. § 3352. Definitions In this title: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com- mittees’’ means— (A) the congressional intelligence commit- tees; (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; (C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; (D) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate; (E) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives; (F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; (G) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives; and (H) the Committee on Oversight and Re- form of the House of Representatives. (2) Appropriate industry partner The term ‘‘appropriate industry partner’’ means a contractor, licensee, or grantee (as defined in section 101(a) of Executive Order No. 12829 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to Na- tional Industrial Security Program)) that is participating in the National Industrial Secu- rity Program established by such Executive order. (3) Continuous vetting The term ‘‘continuous vetting’’ has the meaning given such term in Executive Order No. 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to re- forming processes for determining suitability for government employment, fitness for con- tractor employees, and eligibility for access to classified national security information). (4) Council The term ‘‘Council’’ means the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council established pursuant to such Executive order, or any successor enti- ty. (5) Reciprocity The term ‘‘reciprocity’’ means reciprocal recognition by Federal departments and agen- cies of eligibility for access to classified infor- mation. (6) Security Executive Agent The term ‘‘Security Executive Agent’’ means the officer serving as the Security Ex- ecutive Agent pursuant to section 3162a of this title. (7) Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent The term ‘‘Suitability and Credentialing Ex- ecutive Agent’’ means the Director of the Of- fice of Personnel Management acting as the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent in accordance with Executive Order No. 13467 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note; relating to reforming processes related to suitability for Govern- ment employment, fitness for contractor em- ployees, and eligibility for access to classified national security information), or any suc- cessor entity. (Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXVI, § 6601, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2209.) Editorial Notes REFERENCES IN TEXT This title, referred to in text, means title LXVI of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, which enacted this section and sections 3162a and 3352a to 3352f of this title and amend- ed sections 3033, 3104, 3163, and 3164 of this title. For complete classification of title LXVI to the Code, see Tables. Executive Order No. 12829, referred to in par. (2), is Ex. Ord. No. 12829, Jan. 6, 1993, 58 F.R. 3479, which is set out as a note under section 3161 of this title. Executive Order No. 13467, referred to in pars. (3), (4), and (7), is Ex. Ord. No. 13467, June 30, 2008, 73 F.R. 38103, which is set out as a note under section 3161 of this title. Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries CHANGE OF NAME Committee on Oversight and Reform of House of Rep- resentatives changed to Committee on Oversight and Accountability of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 5, One Hundred Eighteenth Congress, Jan. 9, 2023. DEFINITIONS For definition of ‘‘congressional intelligence commit- tees’’ as used in this section, see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title. § 3352a. Reports and plans relating to security clearances and background investigations (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) ensuring the trustworthiness and secu- rity of the workforce, facilities, and informa- tion of the Federal Government is of the high- est priority to national security and public safety; (2) the President and Congress should prioritize the modernization of the personnel security framework to improve its efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability; (3) the current system for background inves- tigations for security clearances, suitability and fitness for employment, and credentialing Page 830 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 3352b lacks efficiencies and capabilities to meet the current threat environment, recruit and retain a trusted workforce, and capitalize on modern technologies; and (4) changes to policies or processes to im- prove this system should be vetted through the Council to ensure standardization, port- ability, and reciprocity in security clearances across the Federal Government. (b) Accountability plans and reports (1) Plans Not later than 90 days after December 20, 2019, the Council shall submit to the appro- priate congressional committees and make available to appropriate industry partners the following: (A) A plan, with milestones, to reduce the background investigation inventory to 200,000, or an otherwise sustainable steady- level, by the end of year 2020. Such plan shall include notes of any required changes in in- vestigative and adjudicative standards or re- sources. (B) A plan to consolidate the conduct of background investigations associated with the processing for security clearances in the most effective and efficient manner in the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency. Such plan shall address required funding, personnel, contracts, information technology, field office structure, policy, governance, schedule, transition costs, and effects on stakeholders. (2) Report on the future of personnel security (A) In general Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, the Chairman of the Council, in coordi- nation with the members of the Council, shall submit to the appropriate congres- sional committees and make available to ap- propriate industry partners a report on the future of personnel security to reflect changes in threats, the workforce, and tech- nology. (B) Contents The report submitted under subparagraph (A) shall include the following: (i) A risk framework for granting and re- newing access to classified information. (ii) A discussion of the use of tech- nologies to prevent, detect, and monitor threats. (iii) A discussion of efforts to address reciprocity and portability. (iv) A discussion of the characteristics of effective insider threat programs. (v) An analysis of how to integrate data from continuous vetting, insider threat programs, and human resources data. (vi) Recommendations on interagency governance. (3) Plan for implementation Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, the Chairman of the Council, in coordina- tion with the members of the Council, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com- mittees and make available to appropriate in- dustry partners a plan to implement the re- port’s framework and recommendations sub- mitted under paragraph (2)(A). (4) Congressional notifications Not less frequently than quarterly, the Secu- rity Executive Agent shall make available to the public a report regarding the status of the disposition of requests received from depart- ments and agencies of the Federal Govern- ment for a change to, or approval under, the Federal investigative standards, the national adjudicative guidelines, continuous vetting, or other national policy regarding personnel se- curity. (Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LXVI, § 6602, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2210.) Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries DEFINITIONS For definitions of ‘‘Council’’, ‘‘reciprocity’’, ‘‘appro- priate congressional committees’’, ‘‘appropriate indus- try partners’’, ‘‘continuous vetting’’, and ‘‘Security Ex- ecutive Agent’’, referred to in text, see section 3352 of this title. § 3352b. Improving the process for security clear- ances (a) Reviews Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, the Security Executive Agent, in coordina- tion with the members of the Council, shall sub- mit to the appropriate congressional commit- tees and make available to appropriate industry partners a report that includes the following: (1) A review of whether the information re- quested on the Questionnaire for National Se- curity Positions (Standard Form 86) and by the Federal Investigative Standards prescribed by the Suitability and Credentialing Execu- tive Agent and the Security Executive Agent appropriately supports the adjudicative guide- lines under Security Executive Agent Direc- tive 4 (known as the ‘‘National Security Adju- dicative Guidelines’’). Such review shall in- clude identification of whether any such infor- mation currently collected is unnecessary to support the adjudicative guidelines. (2) An assessment of whether such Question- naire, Standards, and guidelines should be re- vised to account for the prospect of a holder of a security clearance becoming an insider threat. (3) Recommendations to improve the back- ground investigation process by— (A) simplifying the Questionnaire for Na- tional Security Positions (Standard Form 86) and increasing customer support to appli- cants completing such Questionnaire; (B) using remote techniques and central- ized locations to support or replace field in- vestigation work; (C) using secure and reliable digitization of information obtained during the clearance process; (D) building the capacity of the back- ground investigation workforce; and (E) replacing periodic reinvestigations with continuous vetting techniques in all appropriate circumstances.