44 U.S.C. § 3551 — Purposes

Page 177 TITLE 44—PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS § 3551 EFFECTIVE DATE Section effective May 22, 1995, see section 4 of Pub. L. 104–13, set out as a note under section 3501 of this title. [§§ 3531 to 3549. Repealed. Pub. L. 113–283, § 2(a), Dec. 18, 2014, 128 Stat. 3073] Sections 3531 to 3538 comprised subchapter II of this chapter ‘‘INFORMATION SECURITY’’. Section 3531, added Pub. L. 107–296, title X, § 1001(b)(1), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2259, set forth purposes of sub- chapter II. See section 3551 of this title. A prior section 3531, added Pub. L. 106–398, § 1 [[div. A], title X, § 1061], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–266, set forth purposes of subchapter II prior to the general amendment of subchapter II by Pub. L. 107–296. Section 3532, added Pub. L. 107–296, title X, § 1001(b)(1), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2260, related to definitions appli- cable to subchapter II. See section 3552 of this title. A prior section 3532, added Pub. L. 106–398, § 1 [[div. A], title X, § 1061], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–266, related to definitions applicable to subchapter II prior to the general amendment of subchapter II by Pub. L. 107–296. Section 3533, added Pub. L. 107–296, title X, § 1001(b)(1), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2261, set forth authority and functions of the Director. See section 3553 of this title. A prior section 3533, added Pub. L. 106–398, § 1 [[div. A], title X, § 1061], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–266, set forth authority and functions of the Director prior to the general amendment of subchapter II by Pub. L. 107–296. Section 3534, added Pub. L. 107–296, title X, § 1001(b)(1), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2262, related to Federal agency responsibilities. See section 3554 of this title. A prior section 3534, added Pub. L. 106–398, § 1 [[div. A], title X, § 1061], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–268, related to Federal agency responsibilities prior to the general amendment of subchapter II by Pub. L. 107–296. Section 3535, added Pub. L. 107–296, title X, § 1001(b)(1), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2265; amended Pub. L. 108–177, title III, § 377(e), Dec. 13, 2003, 117 Stat. 2631, related to annual independent evaluation. See section 3555 of this title. A prior section 3535, added Pub. L. 106–398, § 1 [[div. A], title X, § 1061], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–271, related to annual independent evaluation prior to the general amendment of subchapter II by Pub. L. 107–296. Section 3536, added Pub. L. 107–296, title X, § 1001(b)(1), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2266, described responsibilities for the head of each agency operating or exercising control of a national security system. See section 3557 of this title. A prior section 3536, added Pub. L. 106–398, § 1 [[div. A], title X, § 1061], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–272; amended Pub. L. 107–314, div. A, title X, § 1052(a), Dec. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 2648, set forth expiration date of sub- chapter II prior to the general amendment of sub- chapter II by Pub. L. 107–296. Section 3537, added Pub. L. 107–296, title X, § 1001(b)(1), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2267, authorized appropriations for fiscal years 2003 through 2007. Section 3538, added Pub. L. 107–296, title X, § 1001(b)(1), Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2267, related to effect on existing law. See section 3558 of this title. Sections 3541 to 3549 comprised subchapter III of this chapter ‘‘INFORMATION SECURITY’’. Section 3541, added Pub. L. 107–347, title III, § 301(b)(1), Dec. 17, 2002, 116 Stat. 2946, set forth purposes of sub- chapter III. See section 3551 of this title. Section 3542, added Pub. L. 107–347, title III, § 301(b)(1), Dec. 17, 2002, 116 Stat. 2947, related to definitions appli- cable to subchapter III. See section 3552 of this title. Section 3543, added Pub. L. 107–347, title III, § 301(b)(1), Dec. 17, 2002, 116 Stat. 2947, set forth authority and functions of the Director. See section 3553 of this title. Section 3544, added Pub. L. 107–347, title III, § 301(b)(1), Dec. 17, 2002, 116 Stat. 2949, related to Federal agency responsibilities. See section 3554 of this title. Section 3545, added Pub. L. 107–347, title III, § 301(b)(1), Dec. 17, 2002, 116 Stat. 2952; amended Pub. L. 108–177, title III, § 377(e), Dec. 13, 2003, 117 Stat. 2631, related to annual independent evaluation. See section 3555 of this title. Section 3546, added Pub. L. 107–347, title III, § 301(b)(1), Dec. 17, 2002, 116 Stat. 2954, related to Federal informa- tion security incident center. See section 3556 of this title. Section 3547, added Pub. L. 107–347, title III, § 301(b)(1), Dec. 17, 2002, 116 Stat. 2954, described responsibilities for the head of each agency operating or exercising control of a national security system. See section 3557 of this title. Section 3548, added Pub. L. 107–347, title III, § 301(b)(1), Dec. 17, 2002, 116 Stat. 2954, authorized appropriations for fiscal years 2003 through 2007. Section 3549, added Pub. L. 107–347, title III, § 301(b)(1), Dec. 17, 2002, 116 Stat. 2955, related to effect on existing law and provided that subchapter II was not to apply while subchapter III was in effect. See section 3558 of this title. SUBCHAPTER II—INFORMATION SECURITY § 3551. Purposes The purposes of this subchapter are to— (1) provide a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of information secu- rity controls over information resources that support Federal operations and assets; (2) recognize the highly networked nature of the current Federal computing environment and provide effective governmentwide man- agement and oversight of the related informa- tion security risks, including coordination of information security efforts throughout the civilian, national security, and law enforce- ment communities; (3) provide for development and maintenance of minimum controls required to protect Fed- eral information and information systems; (4) provide a mechanism for improved over- sight of Federal agency information security programs, including through automated secu- rity tools to continuously diagnose and im- prove security; (5) acknowledge that commercially devel- oped information security products offer ad- vanced, dynamic, robust, and effective infor- mation security solutions, reflecting market solutions for the protection of critical infor- mation infrastructures important to the na- tional defense and economic security of the nation that are designed, built, and operated by the private sector; and (6) recognize that the selection of specific technical hardware and software information security solutions should be left to individual agencies from among commercially developed products. (Added Pub. L. 113–283, § 2(a), Dec. 18, 2014, 128 Stat. 3073.) Editorial Notes PRIOR PROVISIONS Provisions similar to this section were contained in sections 3531 and 3541 of this title prior to repeal by Pub. L. 113–283. Page 178 TITLE 44—PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS § 3551 Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries CYBERSECURITY IMPROVEMENTS TO AGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEMS Pub. L. 114–4, title V, § 547, Mar. 4, 2015, 129 Stat. 69, provided that: ‘‘(a) Of the amounts made available by this Act [Pub. L. 114–4, see Tables for classification] for ‘National Pro- tection and Programs Directorate, Infrastructure Pro- tection and Information Security’, $140,525,000 for the Federal Network Security program, project, and activ- ity shall be used to deploy on Federal systems tech- nology to improve the information security of agency information systems covered by [former] section 3543(a) of title 44, United States Code [see now 44 U.S.C. 3553]: Provided, That funds made available under this section shall be used to assist and support Government-wide and agency-specific efforts to provide adequate, risk- based, and cost-effective cybersecurity to address esca- lating and rapidly evolving threats to information se- curity, including the acquisition and operation of a continuous monitoring and diagnostics program, in col- laboration with departments and agencies, that in- cludes equipment, software, and Department of Home- land Security supplied services: Provided further, That continuous monitoring and diagnostics software pro- cured by the funds made available by this section shall not transmit to the Department of Homeland Security any personally identifiable information or content of network communications of other agencies’ users: Pro- vided further, That such software shall be installed, maintained, and operated in accordance with all appli- cable privacy laws and agency-specific policies regard- ing network content. ‘‘(b) Funds made available under this section may not be used to supplant funds provided for any such system within an agency budget. ‘‘(c) Not later than July 1, 2015, the heads of all Fed- eral agencies shall submit to the Committees on Appro- priations of the Senate and the House of Representa- tives expenditure plans for necessary cybersecurity im- provements to address known vulnerabilities to infor- mation systems described in subsection (a). ‘‘(d) Not later than October 1, 2015, and semiannually thereafter, the head of each Federal agency shall sub- mit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget a report on the execution of the expenditure plan for that agency required by subsection (c): Pro- vided, That the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall summarize such execution reports and annually submit such summaries to Congress in con- junction with the annual progress report on implemen- tation of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107–347) [see Tables for classification], as required by section 3606 of title 44, United States Code. ‘‘(e) This section shall not apply to the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government and shall apply to all Federal agencies within the executive branch except for the Department of Defense, the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.’’ Similar provisions were contained in the following prior appropriation acts: Pub. L. 113–76, div. F, title V, § 554, Jan. 17, 2014, 128 Stat. 278. Pub. L. 113–6, div. D, title V, § 558, Mar. 26, 2013, 127 Stat. 377. Executive Documents EX. ORD. NO. 14028. IMPROVING THE NATION’S CYBERSECURITY Ex. Ord. No. 14028, May 12, 2021, 86 F.R. 26633, pro- vided: By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows: SECTION 1. Policy. The United States faces persistent and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber cam- paigns that threaten the public sector, the private sec- tor, and ultimately the American people’s security and privacy. The Federal Government must improve its ef- forts to identify, deter, protect against, detect, and re- spond to these actions and actors. The Federal Govern- ment must also carefully examine what occurred dur- ing any major cyber incident and apply lessons learned. But cybersecurity requires more than government ac- tion. Protecting our Nation from malicious cyber ac- tors requires the Federal Government to partner with the private sector. The private sector must adapt to the continuously changing threat environment, ensure its products are built and operate securely, and partner with the Federal Government to foster a more secure cyberspace. In the end, the trust we place in our digital infrastructure should be proportional to how trust- worthy and transparent that infrastructure is, and to the consequences we will incur if that trust is mis- placed. Incremental improvements will not give us the secu- rity we need; instead, the Federal Government needs to make bold changes and significant investments in order to defend the vital institutions that underpin the American way of life. The Federal Government must bring to bear the full scope of its authorities and re- sources to protect and secure its computer systems, whether they are cloud-based, on-premises, or hybrid. The scope of protection and security must include sys- tems that process data (information technology (IT)) and those that run the vital machinery that ensures our safety (operational technology (OT)). It is the policy of my Administration that the pre- vention, detection, assessment, and remediation of cyber incidents is a top priority and essential to na- tional and economic security. The Federal Government must lead by example. All Federal Information Sys- tems should meet or exceed the standards and require- ments for cybersecurity set forth in and issued pursu- ant to this order. SEC. 2. Removing Barriers to Sharing Threat Informa- tion. (a) The Federal Government contracts with IT and OT service providers to conduct an array of day-to-day functions on Federal Information Systems. These serv- ice providers, including cloud service providers, have unique access to and insight into cyber threat and inci- dent information on Federal Information Systems. At the same time, current contract terms or restrictions may limit the sharing of such threat or incident infor- mation with executive departments and agencies (agen- cies) that are responsible for investigating or remedi- ating cyber incidents, such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation (FBI), and other elements of the Intelligence Community (IC). Removing these contrac- tual barriers and increasing the sharing of information about such threats, incidents, and risks are necessary steps to accelerating incident deterrence, prevention, and response efforts and to enabling more effective de- fense of agencies’ systems and of information collected, processed, and maintained by or for the Federal Gov- ernment. (b) Within 60 days of the date of this order [May 12, 2021], the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Home- land Security, and the Director of National Intel- ligence, shall review the Federal Acquisition Regula- tion (FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regu- lation Supplement contract requirements and language for contracting with IT and OT service providers and recommend updates to such requirements and language to the FAR Council and other appropriate agencies. The recommendations shall include descriptions of con- tractors to be covered by the proposed contract lan- guage. (c) The recommended contract language and require- ments described in subsection (b) of this section shall be designed to ensure that: (i) service providers collect and preserve data, infor- mation, and reporting relevant to cybersecurity event Page 179 TITLE 44—PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS § 3551 prevention, detection, response, and investigation on all information systems over which they have control, including systems operated on behalf of agencies, con- sistent with agencies’ requirements; (ii) service providers share such data, information, and reporting, as they relate to cyber incidents or po- tential incidents relevant to any agency with which they have contracted, directly with such agency and any other agency that the Director of OMB, in con- sultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, deems appropriate, consistent with applicable privacy laws, regulations, and policies; (iii) service providers collaborate with Federal cybersecurity or investigative agencies in their inves- tigations of and responses to incidents or potential in- cidents on Federal Information Systems, including by implementing technical capabilities, such as moni- toring networks for threats in collaboration with agen- cies they support, as needed; and (iv) service providers share cyber threat and incident information with agencies, doing so, where possible, in industry-recognized formats for incident response and remediation. (d) Within 90 days of receipt of the recommendations described in subsection (b) of this section, the FAR Council shall review the proposed contract language and conditions and, as appropriate, shall publish for public comment proposed updates to the FAR. (e) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Homeland Security and the Director of OMB shall take appropriate steps to ensure to the greatest extent possible that service providers share data with agencies, CISA, and the FBI as may be necessary for the Federal Government to respond to cyber threats, incidents, and risks. (f) It is the policy of the Federal Government that: (i) information and communications technology (ICT) service providers entering into contracts with agencies must promptly report to such agencies when they dis- cover a cyber incident involving a software product or service provided to such agencies or involving a support system for a software product or service provided to such agencies; (ii) ICT service providers must also directly report to CISA whenever they report under subsection (f)(i) of this section to Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) Agencies, and CISA must centrally collect and manage such information; and (iii) reports pertaining to National Security Systems, as defined in section 10(h) of this order, must be re- ceived and managed by the appropriate agency as to be determined under subsection (g)(i)(E) of this section. (g) To implement the policy set forth in subsection (f) of this section: (i) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense acting through the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), the Attorney Gen- eral, and the Director of OMB, shall recommend to the FAR Council contract language that identifies: (A) the nature of cyber incidents that require re- porting; (B) the types of information regarding cyber inci- dents that require reporting to facilitate effective cyber incident response and remediation; (C) appropriate and effective protections for pri- vacy and civil liberties; (D) the time periods within which contractors must report cyber incidents based on a graduated scale of severity, with reporting on the most severe cyber in- cidents not to exceed 3 days after initial detection; (E) National Security Systems reporting require- ments; and (F) the type of contractors and associated service providers to be covered by the proposed contract lan- guage. (ii) Within 90 days of receipt of the recommendations described in subsection (g)(i) of this section, the FAR Council shall review the recommendations and publish for public comment proposed updates to the FAR. (iii) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Defense acting through the Director of the NSA, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence shall jointly develop procedures for ensuring that cyber incident reports are promptly and appropriately shared among agencies. (h) Current cybersecurity requirements for unclassi- fied system contracts are largely implemented through agency-specific policies and regulations, including cloud-service cybersecurity requirements. Standard- izing common cybersecurity contractual requirements across agencies will streamline and improve compli- ance for vendors and the Federal Government. (i) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Homeland Security acting through the Direc- tor of CISA, in consultation with the Secretary of De- fense acting through the Director of the NSA, the Di- rector of OMB, and the Administrator of General Serv- ices, shall review agency-specific cybersecurity re- quirements that currently exist as a matter of law, pol- icy, or contract and recommend to the FAR Council standardized contract language for appropriate cybersecurity requirements. Such recommendations shall include consideration of the scope of contractors and associated service providers to be covered by the proposed contract language. (j) Within 60 days of receiving the recommended con- tract language developed pursuant to subsection (i) of this section, the FAR Council shall review the rec- ommended contract language and publish for public comment proposed updates to the FAR. (k) Following any updates to the FAR made by the FAR Council after the public comment period described in subsection (j) of this section, agencies shall update their agency-specific cybersecurity requirements to re- move any requirements that are duplicative of such FAR updates. (l) The Director of OMB shall incorporate into the an- nual budget process a cost analysis of all recommenda- tions developed under this section. SEC. 3. Modernizing Federal Government Cybersecurity. (a) To keep pace with today’s dynamic and increasingly sophisticated cyber threat environment, the Federal Government must take decisive steps to modernize its approach to cybersecurity, including by increasing the Federal Government’s visibility into threats, while protecting privacy and civil liberties. The Federal Gov- ernment must adopt security best practices; advance toward Zero Trust Architecture; accelerate movement to secure cloud services, including Software as a Serv- ice (SaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), and Plat- form as a Service (PaaS); centralize and streamline ac- cess to cybersecurity data to drive analytics for identi- fying and managing cybersecurity risks; and invest in both technology and personnel to match these mod- ernization goals. (b) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the head of each agency shall: (i) update existing agency plans to prioritize re- sources for the adoption and use of cloud technology as outlined in relevant OMB guidance; (ii) develop a plan to implement Zero Trust Architec- ture, which shall incorporate, as appropriate, the mi- gration steps that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) within the Department of Com- merce has outlined in standards and guidance, describe any such steps that have already been completed, iden- tify activities that will have the most immediate secu- rity impact, and include a schedule to implement them; and (iii) provide a report to the Director of OMB and the Assistant to the President and National Security Advi- sor (APNSA) discussing the plans required pursuant to subsection (b)(i) and (ii) of this section. (c) As agencies continue to use cloud technology, they shall do so in a coordinated, deliberate way that allows the Federal Government to prevent, detect, as- Page 180 TITLE 44—PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS § 3551 sess, and remediate cyber incidents. To facilitate this approach, the migration to cloud technology shall adopt Zero Trust Architecture, as practicable. The CISA shall modernize its current cybersecurity pro- grams, services, and capabilities to be fully functional with cloud-computing environments with Zero Trust Architecture. The Secretary of Homeland Security act- ing through the Director of CISA, in consultation with the Administrator of General Services acting through the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Pro- gram (FedRAMP) within the General Services Adminis- tration, shall develop security principles governing Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) for incorporation into agency modernization efforts. To facilitate this work: (i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Direc- tor of OMB, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the Director of CISA, and the Administrator of General Services acting through FedRAMP, shall develop a Federal cloud-secu- rity strategy and provide guidance to agencies accord- ingly. Such guidance shall seek to ensure that risks to the FCEB from using cloud-based services are broadly understood and effectively addressed, and that FCEB Agencies move closer to Zero Trust Architecture. (ii) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Homeland Security acting through the Direc- tor of CISA, in consultation with the Director of OMB and the Administrator of General Services acting through FedRAMP, shall develop and issue, for the FCEB, cloud-security technical reference architecture documentation that illustrates recommended ap- proaches to cloud migration and data protection for agency data collection and reporting. (iii) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Homeland Security acting through the Direc- tor of CISA shall develop and issue, for FCEB Agencies, a cloud-service governance framework. That frame- work shall identify a range of services and protections available to agencies based on incident severity. That framework shall also identify data and processing ac- tivities associated with those services and protections. (iv) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the heads of FCEB Agencies, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the Director of CISA, shall evaluate the types and sensitivity of their respective agency’s unclassified data, and shall provide to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the Di- rector of CISA and to the Director of OMB a report based on such evaluation. The evaluation shall prioritize identification of the unclassified data consid- ered by the agency to be the most sensitive and under the greatest threat, and appropriate processing and storage solutions for those data. (d) Within 180 days of the date of this order, agencies shall adopt multi-factor authentication and encryption for data at rest and in transit, to the maximum extent consistent with Federal records laws and other applica- ble laws. To that end: (i) Heads of FCEB Agencies shall provide reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the Direc- tor of CISA, the Director of OMB, and the APNSA on their respective agency’s progress in adopting multi- factor authentication and encryption of data at rest and in transit. Such agencies shall provide such reports every 60 days after the date of this order until the agency has fully adopted, agency-wide, multi-factor au- thentication and data encryption. (ii) Based on identified gaps in agency implementa- tion, CISA shall take all appropriate steps to maximize adoption by FCEB Agencies of technologies and proc- esses to implement multifactor authentication and encryption for data at rest and in transit. (iii) Heads of FCEB Agencies that are unable to fully adopt multi-factor authentication and data encryption within 180 days of the date of this order shall, at the end of the 180-day period, provide a written rationale to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the Direc- tor of CISA, the Director of OMB, and the APNSA. (e) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Homeland Security acting through the Direc- tor of CISA, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, and the Administrator of Gen- eral Services acting through the Director of FedRAMP, shall establish a framework to collaborate on cybersecurity and incident response activities related to FCEB cloud technology, in order to ensure effective information sharing among agencies and between agen- cies and CSPs. (f) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Ad- ministrator of General Services, in consultation with the Director of OMB and the heads of other agencies as the Administrator of General Services deems appro- priate, shall begin modernizing FedRAMP by: (i) establishing a training program to ensure agencies are effectively trained and equipped to manage FedRAMP requests, and providing access to training materials, including videos-on-demand; (ii) improving communication with CSPs through au- tomation and standardization of messages at each stage of authorization. These communications may in- clude status updates, requirements to complete a ven- dor’s current stage, next steps, and points of contact for questions; (iii) incorporating automation throughout the lifecycle of FedRAMP, including assessment, author- ization, continuous monitoring, and compliance; (iv) digitizing and streamlining documentation that vendors are required to complete, including through online accessibility and pre-populated forms; and (v) identifying relevant compliance frameworks, map- ping those frameworks onto requirements in the FedRAMP authorization process, and allowing those frameworks to be used as a substitute for the relevant portion of the authorization process, as appropriate. SEC. 4. Enhancing Software Supply Chain Security. (a) The security of software used by the Federal Govern- ment is vital to the Federal Government’s ability to perform its critical functions. The development of com- mercial software often lacks transparency, sufficient focus on the ability of the software to resist attack, and adequate controls to prevent tampering by mali- cious actors. There is a pressing need to implement more rigorous and predictable mechanisms for ensuring that products function securely, and as intended. The security and integrity of ‘‘critical software’’—software that performs functions critical to trust (such as af- fording or requiring elevated system privileges or di- rect access to networking and computing resources)—is a particular concern. Accordingly, the Federal Govern- ment must take action to rapidly improve the security and integrity of the software supply chain, with a pri- ority on addressing critical software. (b) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Commerce acting through the Director of NIST shall solicit input from the Federal Government, private sector, academia, and other appropriate actors to identify existing or develop new standards, tools, and best practices for complying with the standards, procedures, or criteria in subsection (e) of this section. The guidelines shall include criteria that can be used to evaluate software security, include criteria to evaluate the security practices of the developers and suppliers themselves, and identify innovative tools or methods to demonstrate conformance with secure practices. (c) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Di- rector of NIST shall publish preliminary guidelines, based on the consultations described in subsection (b) of this section and drawing on existing documents as practicable, for enhancing software supply chain secu- rity and meeting the requirements of this section. (d) Within 360 days of the date of this order, the Di- rector of NIST shall publish additional guidelines that include procedures for periodic review and updating of the guidelines described in subsection (c) of this sec- tion. (e) Within 90 days of publication of the preliminary guidelines pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of NIST, in consultation with the heads of such agen- cies as the Director of NIST deems appropriate, shall Page 181 TITLE 44—PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS § 3551 issue guidance identifying practices that enhance the security of the software supply chain. Such guidance may incorporate the guidelines published pursuant to subsections (c) and (i) of this section. Such guidance shall include standards, procedures, or criteria regard- ing: (i) secure software development environments, in- cluding such actions as: (A) using administratively separate build environ- ments; (B) auditing trust relationships; (C) establishing multi-factor, risk-based authen- tication and conditional access across the enterprise; (D) documenting and minimizing dependencies on enterprise products that are part of the environments used to develop, build, and edit software; (E) employing encryption for data; and (F) monitoring operations and alerts and respond- ing to attempted and actual cyber incidents; (ii) generating and, when requested by a purchaser, providing artifacts that demonstrate conformance to the processes set forth in subsection (e)(i) of this sec- tion; (iii) employing automated tools, or comparable proc- esses, to maintain trusted source code supply chains, thereby ensuring the integrity of the code; (iv) employing automated tools, or comparable proc- esses, that check for known and potential vulnerabilities and remediate them, which shall oper- ate regularly, or at a minimum prior to product, version, or update release; (v) providing, when requested by a purchaser, arti- facts of the execution of the tools and processes de- scribed in subsection (e)(iii) and (iv) of this section, and making publicly available summary information on completion of these actions, to include a summary de- scription of the risks assessed and mitigated; (vi) maintaining accurate and up-to-date data, prove- nance (i.e., origin) of software code or components, and controls on internal and third-party software compo- nents, tools, and services present in software develop- ment processes, and performing audits and enforcement of these controls on a recurring basis; (vii) providing a purchaser a Software Bill of Mate- rials (SBOM) for each product directly or by publishing it on a public website; (viii) participating in a vulnerability disclosure pro- gram that includes a reporting and disclosure process; (ix) attesting to conformity with secure software de- velopment practices; and (x) ensuring and attesting, to the extent practicable, to the integrity and provenance of open source software used within any portion of a product. (f) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Commerce, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information and the Administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, shall publish min- imum elements for an SBOM. (g) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense acting through the Director of the NSA, the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the Director of CISA, the Director of OMB, and the Director of Na- tional Intelligence, shall publish a definition of the term ‘‘critical software’’ for inclusion in the guidance issued pursuant to subsection (e) of this section. That definition shall reflect the level of privilege or access required to function, integration and dependencies with other software, direct access to networking and com- puting resources, performance of a function critical to trust, and potential for harm if compromised. (h) Within 30 days of the publication of the definition required by subsection (g) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the Director of CISA, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of NIST, shall identify and make available to agencies a list of categories of soft- ware and software products in use or in the acquisition process meeting the definition of critical software issued pursuant to subsection (g) of this section. (i) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Commerce acting through the Director of NIST, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the Director of CISA and with the Director of OMB, shall publish guidance outlining security measures for critical software as defined in subsection (g) of this section, including applying prac- tices of least privilege, network segmentation, and proper configuration. (j) Within 30 days of the issuance of the guidance de- scribed in subsection (i) of this section, the Director of OMB acting through the Administrator of the Office of Electronic Government within OMB shall take appro- priate steps to require that agencies comply with such guidance. (k) Within 30 days of issuance of the guidance de- scribed in subsection (e) of this section, the Director of OMB acting through the Administrator of the Office of Electronic Government within OMB shall take appro- priate steps to require that agencies comply with such guidelines with respect to software procured after the date of this order. (l) Agencies may request an extension for complying with any requirements issued pursuant to subsection (k) of this section. Any such request shall be considered by the Director of OMB on a case-by-case basis, and only if accompanied by a plan for meeting the under- lying requirements. The Director of OMB shall on a quarterly basis provide a report to the APNSA identi- fying and explaining all extensions granted. (m) Agencies may request a waiver as to any require- ments issued pursuant to subsection (k) of this section. Waivers shall be considered by the Director of OMB, in consultation with the APNSA, on a case-by-case basis, and shall be granted only in exceptional circumstances and for limited duration, and only if there is an accom- panying plan for mitigating any potential risks. (n) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Direc- tor of OMB, and the Administrator of the Office of Electronic Government within OMB, shall recommend to the FAR Council contract language requiring sup- pliers of software available for purchase by agencies to comply with, and attest to complying with, any re- quirements issued pursuant to subsections (g) through (k) of this section. (o) After receiving the recommendations described in subsection (n) of this section, the FAR Council shall re- view the recommendations and, as appropriate and con- sistent with applicable law, amend the FAR. (p) Following the issuance of any final rule amending the FAR as described in subsection (o) of this section, agencies shall, as appropriate and consistent with ap- plicable law, remove software products that do not meet the requirements of the amended FAR from all indefinite delivery indefinite quantity contracts; Fed- eral Supply Schedules; Federal Government-wide Ac- quisition Contracts; Blanket Purchase Agreements; and Multiple Award Contracts. (q) The Director of OMB, acting through the Adminis- trator of the Office of Electronic Government within OMB, shall require agencies employing software devel- oped and procured prior to the date of this order (leg- acy software) either to comply with any requirements issued pursuant to subsection (k) of this section or to provide a plan outlining actions to remediate or meet those requirements, and shall further require agencies seeking renewals of software contracts, including leg- acy software, to comply with any requirements issued pursuant to subsection (k) of this section, unless an ex- tension or waiver is granted in accordance with sub- section (l) or (m) of this section. (r) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Commerce acting through the Director of NIST, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense acting through the Director of the NSA, shall publish guidelines recommending minimum standards for ven- Page 182 TITLE 44—PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS § 3551 dors’ testing of their software source code, including identifying recommended types of manual or auto- mated testing (such as code review tools, static and dy- namic analysis, software composition tools, and pene- tration testing). (s) The Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of NIST, in coordination with representatives of other agencies as the Director of NIST deems appro- priate, shall initiate pilot programs informed by exist- ing consumer product labeling programs to educate the public on the security capabilities of internet-of-Things (IoT) devices and software development practices, and shall consider ways to incentivize manufacturers and developers to participate in these programs. (t) Within 270 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Commerce acting through the Director of NIST, in coordination with the Chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and representatives of other agencies as the Director of NIST deems appropriate, shall identify IoT cybersecurity criteria for a consumer labeling program, and shall consider whether such a consumer labeling program may be operated in con- junction with or modeled after any similar existing government programs consistent with applicable law. The criteria shall reflect increasingly comprehensive levels of testing and assessment that a product may have undergone, and shall use or be compatible with ex- isting labeling schemes that manufacturers use to in- form consumers about the security of their products. The Director of NIST shall examine all relevant infor- mation, labeling, and incentive programs and employ best practices. This review shall focus on ease of use for consumers and a determination of what measures can be taken to maximize manufacturer participation. (u) Within 270 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Commerce acting through the Director of NIST, in coordination with the Chair of the FTC and representatives from other agencies as the Director of NIST deems appropriate, shall identify secure software development practices or criteria for a consumer soft- ware labeling program, and shall consider whether such a consumer software labeling program may be operated in conjunction with or modeled after any similar exist- ing government programs, consistent with applicable law. The criteria shall reflect a baseline level of secure practices, and if practicable, shall reflect increasingly comprehensive levels of testing and assessment that a product may have undergone. The Director of NIST shall examine all relevant information, labeling, and incentive programs, employ best practices, and iden- tify, modify, or develop a recommended label or, if practicable, a tiered software security rating system. This review shall focus on ease of use for consumers and a determination of what measures can be taken to maximize participation. (v) These pilot programs shall be conducted in a man- ner consistent with OMB Circular A–119 and NIST Spe- cial Publication 2000–02 (Conformity Assessment Con- siderations for Federal Agencies). (w) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Direc- tor of NIST shall conduct a review of the pilot pro- grams, consult with the private sector and relevant agencies to assess the effectiveness of the programs, de- termine what improvements can be made going for- ward, and submit a summary report to the APNSA. (x) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Commerce, in consultation with the heads of other agencies as the Secretary of Commerce deems ap- propriate, shall provide to the President, through the APNSA, a report that reviews the progress made under this section and outlines additional steps needed to se- cure the software supply chain. SEC. 5. Establishing a Cyber Safety Review Board. (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish the Cyber Safety Review Board (Board), pursuant to section 871 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 451). (b) The Board shall review and assess, with respect to significant cyber incidents (as defined under Presi- dential Policy Directive 41 of July 26, 2016 (United States Cyber Incident Coordination) (PPD–41)) affect- ing FCEB Information Systems or non-Federal sys- tems, threat activity, vulnerabilities, mitigation ac- tivities, and agency responses. (c) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall con- vene the Board following a significant cyber incident triggering the establishment of a Cyber Unified Coordi- nation Group (UCG) as provided by section V(B)(2) of PPD–41; at any time as directed by the President act- ing through the APNSA; or at any time the Secretary of Homeland Security deems necessary. (d) The Board’s initial review shall relate to the cyber activities that prompted the establishment of a UCG in December 2020, and the Board shall, within 90 days of the Board’s establishment, provide rec- ommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security for improving cybersecurity and incident response practices, as outlined in subsection (i) of this section. (e) The Board’s membership shall include Federal of- ficials and representatives from private-sector entities. The Board shall comprise representatives of the De- partment of Defense, the Department of Justice, CISA, the NSA, and the FBI, as well as representatives from appropriate private-sector cybersecurity or software suppliers as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. A representative from OMB shall participate in Board activities when an incident under review in- volves FCEB Information Systems, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary of Homeland Security may invite the participation of oth- ers on a case-by-case basis depending on the nature of the incident under review. (f) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall bienni- ally designate a Chair and Deputy Chair of the Board from among the members of the Board, to include one Federal and one private-sector member. (g) The Board shall protect sensitive law enforce- ment, operational, business, and other confidential in- formation that has been shared with it, consistent with applicable law. (h) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide to the President through the APNSA any advice, infor- mation, or recommendations of the Board for improv- ing cybersecurity and incident response practices and policy upon completion of its review of an applicable incident. (i) Within 30 days of completion of the initial review described in subsection (d) of this section, the Sec- retary of Homeland Security shall provide to the Presi- dent through the APNSA the recommendations of the Board based on the initial review. These recommenda- tions shall describe: (i) identified gaps in, and options for, the Board’s composition or authorities; (ii) the Board’s proposed mission, scope, and respon- sibilities; (iii) membership eligibility criteria for private-sector representatives; (iv) Board governance structure including interaction with the executive branch and the Executive Office of the President; (v) thresholds and criteria for the types of cyber inci- dents to be evaluated; (vi) sources of information that should be made avail- able to the Board, consistent with applicable law and policy; (vii) an approach for protecting the information pro- vided to the Board and securing the cooperation of af- fected United States individuals and entities for the purpose of the Board’s review of incidents; and (viii) administrative and budgetary considerations re- quired for operation of the Board. (j) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consulta- tion with the Attorney General and the APNSA, shall review the recommendations provided to the President through the APNSA pursuant to subsection (i) of this section and take steps to implement them as appro- priate. (k) Unless otherwise directed by the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall extend the life of Page 183 TITLE 44—PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS § 3551 the Board every 2 years as the Secretary of Homeland Security deems appropriate, pursuant to section 871 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. SEC. 6. Standardizing the Federal Government’s Play- book for Responding to Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Incidents. (a) The cybersecurity vulnerability and inci- dent response procedures currently used to identify, re- mediate, and recover from vulnerabilities and incidents affecting their systems vary across agencies, hindering the ability of lead agencies to analyze vulnerabilities and incidents more comprehensively across agencies. Standardized response processes ensure a more coordi- nated and centralized cataloging of incidents and tracking of agencies’ progress toward successful re- sponses. (b) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Homeland Security acting through the Direc- tor of CISA, in consultation with the Director of OMB, the Federal Chief Information Officers Council, and the Federal Chief Information Security Council, and in co- ordination with the Secretary of Defense acting through the Director of the NSA, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall develop a standard set of operational procedures (playbook) to be used in planning and conducting a cybersecurity vul- nerability and incident response activity respecting FCEB Information Systems. The playbook shall: (i) incorporate all appropriate NIST standards; (ii) be used by FCEB Agencies; and (iii) articulate progress and completion through all phases of an incident response, while allowing flexi- bility so it may be used in support of various response activities. (c) The Director of OMB shall issue guidance on agen- cy use of the playbook. (d) Agencies with cybersecurity vulnerability or inci- dent response procedures that deviate from the play- book may use such procedures only after consulting with the Director of OMB and the APNSA and dem- onstrating that these procedures meet or exceed the standards proposed in the playbook. (e) The Director of CISA, in consultation with the Di- rector of the NSA, shall review and update the play- book annually, and provide information to the Director of OMB for incorporation in guidance updates. (f) To ensure comprehensiveness of incident response activities and build confidence that unauthorized cyber actors no longer have access to FCEB Information Sys- tems, the playbook shall establish, consistent with ap- plicable law, a requirement that the Director of CISA review and validate FCEB Agencies’ incident response and remediation results upon an agency’s completion of its incident response. The Director of CISA may rec- ommend use of another agency or a third-party inci- dent response team as appropriate. (g) To ensure a common understanding of cyber inci- dents and the cybersecurity status of an agency, the playbook shall define key terms and use such terms consistently with any statutory definitions of those terms, to the extent practicable, thereby providing a shared lexicon among agencies using the playbook. SEC. 7. Improving Detection of Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Incidents on Federal Government Net- works. (a) The Federal Government shall employ all ap- propriate resources and authorities to maximize the early detection of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and in- cidents on its networks. This approach shall include in- creasing the Federal Government’s visibility into and detection of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats to agency networks in order to bolster the Federal Gov- ernment’s cybersecurity efforts. (b) FCEB Agencies shall deploy an Endpoint Detec- tion and Response (EDR) initiative to support proactive detection of cybersecurity incidents within Federal Government infrastructure, active cyber hunt- ing, containment and remediation, and incident re- sponse. (c) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Homeland Security acting through the Direc- tor of CISA shall provide to the Director of OMB rec- ommendations on options for implementing an EDR initiative, centrally located to support host-level visi- bility, attribution, and response regarding FCEB Infor- mation Systems. (d) Within 90 days of receiving the recommendations described in subsection (c) of this section, the Director of OMB, in consultation with Secretary of Homeland Security, shall issue requirements for FCEB Agencies to adopt Federal Government-wide EDR approaches. Those requirements shall support a capability of the Secretary of Homeland Secretary, acting through the Director of CISA, to engage in cyber hunt, detection, and response activities. (e) The Director of OMB shall work with the Sec- retary of Homeland Security and agency heads to en- sure that agencies have adequate resources to comply with the requirements issued pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. (f) Defending FCEB Information Systems requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the Director of CISA have access to agency data that are relevant to a threat and vulnerability analysis, as well as for assessment and threat-hunting purposes. Within 75 days of the date of this order, agen- cies shall establish or update Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) with CISA for the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program to ensure object level data, as de- fined in the MOA, are available and accessible to CISA, consistent with applicable law. (g) Within 45 days of the date of this order, the Direc- tor of the NSA as the National Manager for National Security Systems (National Manager) shall recommend to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) appropriate actions for improving de- tection of cyber incidents affecting National Security Systems, to the extent permitted by applicable law, in- cluding recommendations concerning EDR approaches and whether such measures should be operated by agen- cies or through a centralized service of common con- cern provided by the National Manager. (h) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Defense, the Director of National Intel- ligence, and the CNSS shall review the recommenda- tions submitted under subsection (g) of this section and, as appropriate, establish policies that effectuate those recommendations, consistent with applicable law. (i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Direc- tor of CISA shall provide to the Director of OMB and the APNSA a report describing how authorities granted under section 1705 of Public Law 116–283 [amending 44 U.S.C. 3553], to conduct threat-hunting activities on FCEB networks without prior authorization from agen- cies, are being implemented. This report shall also rec- ommend procedures to ensure that mission-critical sys- tems are not disrupted, procedures for notifying system owners of vulnerable government systems, and the range of techniques that can be used during testing of FCEB Information Systems. The Director of CISA shall provide quarterly reports to the APNSA and the Direc- tor of OMB regarding actions taken under section 1705 of Public Law 116–283. (j) To ensure alignment between Department of De- fense Information Network (DODIN) directives and FCEB Information Systems directives, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of OMB, shall: (i) within 60 days of the date of this order, establish procedures for the Department of Defense and the De- partment of Homeland Security to immediately share with each other Department of Defense Incident Re- sponse Orders or Department of Homeland Security Emergency Directives and Binding Operational Direc- tives applying to their respective information net- works; (ii) evaluate whether to adopt any guidance con- tained in an Order or Directive issued by the other De- partment, consistent with regulations concerning shar- ing of classified information; and Page 184 TITLE 44—PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS § 3551 (iii) within 7 days of receiving notice of an Order or Directive issued pursuant to the procedures established under subsection (j)(i) of this section, notify the APNSA and Administrator of the Office of Electronic Government within OMB of the evaluation described in subsection (j)(ii) of this section, including a determina- tion whether to adopt guidance issued by the other De- partment, the rationale for that determination, and a timeline for application of the directive, if applicable. SEC. 8. Improving the Federal Government’s Investigative and Remediation Capabilities. (a) Information from net- work and system logs on Federal Information Systems (for both on-premises systems and connections hosted by third parties, such as CSPs) is invaluable for both investigation and remediation purposes. It is essential that agencies and their IT service providers collect and maintain such data and, when necessary to address a cyber incident on FCEB Information Systems, provide them upon request to the Secretary of Homeland Secu- rity through the Director of CISA and to the FBI, con- sistent with applicable law. (b) Within 14 days of the date of this order, the Sec- retary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Administrator of the Office of Electronic Government within OMB, shall provide to the Director of OMB recommendations on requirements for logging events and retaining other relevant data within an agency’s systems and networks. Such rec- ommendations shall include the types of logs to be maintained, the time periods to retain the logs and other relevant data, the time periods for agencies to enable recommended logging and security require- ments, and how to protect logs. Logs shall be protected by cryptographic methods to ensure integrity once col- lected and periodically verified against the hashes throughout their retention. Data shall be retained in a manner consistent with all applicable privacy laws and regulations. Such recommendations shall also be con- sidered by the FAR Council when promulgating rules pursuant to section 2 of this order. (c) Within 90 days of receiving the recommendations described in subsection (b) of this section, the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Secretary of Com- merce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall formulate policies for agencies to establish require- ments for logging, log retention, and log management, which shall ensure centralized access and visibility for the highest level security operations center of each agency. (d) The Director of OMB shall work with agency heads to ensure that agencies have adequate resources to comply with the requirements identified in sub- section (c) of this section. (e) To address cyber risks or incidents, including po- tential cyber risks or incidents, the proposed rec- ommendations issued pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall include requirements to ensure that, upon request, agencies provide logs to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the Director of CISA and to the FBI, consistent with applicable law. These re- quirements should be designed to permit agencies to share log information, as needed and appropriate, with other Federal agencies for cyber risks or incidents. SEC. 9. National Security Systems. (a) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense acting through the National Manager, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the CNSS, and in consultation with the APNSA, shall adopt Na- tional Security Systems requirements that are equiva- lent to or exceed the cybersecurity requirements set forth in this order that are otherwise not applicable to National Security Systems. Such requirements may provide for exceptions in circumstances necessitated by unique mission needs. Such requirements shall be codi- fied in a National Security Memorandum (NSM). Until such time as that NSM is issued, programs, standards, or requirements established pursuant to this order shall not apply with respect to National Security Sys- tems. (b) Nothing in this order shall alter the authority of the National Manager with respect to National Secu- rity Systems as defined in National Security Directive 42 of July 5, 1990 (National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Informa- tion Systems) (NSD–42). The FCEB network shall con- tinue to be within the authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the Director of CISA. SEC. 10. Definitions. For purposes of this order: (a) the term ‘‘agency’’ has the meaning ascribed to it under 44 U.S.C. 3502. (b) the term ‘‘auditing trust relationship’’ means an agreed-upon relationship between two or more system elements that is governed by criteria for secure inter- action, behavior, and outcomes relative to the protec- tion of assets. (c) the term ‘‘cyber incident’’ has the meaning as- cribed to an ‘‘incident’’ under 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(2). (d) the term ‘‘Federal Civilian Executive Branch Agencies’’ or ‘‘FCEB Agencies’’ includes all agencies except for the Department of Defense and agencies in the Intelligence Community. (e) the term ‘‘Federal Civilian Executive Branch In- formation Systems’’ or ‘‘FCEB Information Systems’’ means those information systems operated by Federal Civilian Executive Branch Agencies, but excludes Na- tional Security Systems. (f) the term ‘‘Federal Information Systems’’ means an information system used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency or by another organiza- tion on behalf of an agency, including FCEB Informa- tion Systems and National Security Systems. (g) the term ‘‘Intelligence Community’’ or ‘‘IC’’ has the meaning ascribed to it under 50 U.S.C. 3003(4). (h) the term ‘‘National Security Systems’’ means in- formation systems as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(6), 3553(e)(2), and 3553(e)(3). (i) the term ‘‘logs’’ means records of the events occur- ring within an organization’s systems and networks. Logs are composed of log entries, and each entry con- tains information related to a specific event that has occurred within a system or network. (j) the term ‘‘Software Bill of Materials’’ or ‘‘SBOM’’ means a formal record containing the details and sup- ply chain relationships of various components used in building software. Software developers and vendors often create products by assembling existing open source and commercial software components. The SBOM enumerates these components in a product. It is analogous to a list of ingredients on food packaging. An SBOM is useful to those who develop or manufacture software, those who select or purchase software, and those who operate software. Developers often use avail- able open source and third-party software components to create a product; an SBOM allows the builder to make sure those components are up to date and to re- spond quickly to new vulnerabilities. Buyers can use an SBOM to perform vulnerability or license analysis, both of which can be used to evaluate risk in a product. Those who operate software can use SBOMs to quickly and easily determine whether they are at potential risk of a newly discovered vulnerability. A widely used, ma- chine-readable SBOM format allows for greater benefits through automation and tool integration. The SBOMs gain greater value when collectively stored in a reposi- tory that can be easily queried by other applications and systems. Understanding the supply chain of soft- ware, obtaining an SBOM, and using it to analyze known vulnerabilities are crucial in managing risk. (k) the term ‘‘Zero Trust Architecture’’ means a se- curity model, a set of system design principles, and a coordinated cybersecurity and system management strategy based on an acknowledgement that threats exist both inside and outside traditional network boundaries. The Zero Trust security model eliminates implicit trust in any one element, node, or service and instead requires continuous verification of the oper- ational picture via real-time information from mul- tiple sources to determine access and other system re- sponses. In essence, a Zero Trust Architecture allows users full access but only to the bare minimum they Page 185 TITLE 44—PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS § 3552 need to perform their jobs. If a device is compromised, zero trust can ensure that the damage is contained. The Zero Trust Architecture security model assumes that a breach is inevitable or has likely already oc- curred, so it constantly limits access to only what is needed and looks for anomalous or malicious activity. Zero Trust Architecture embeds comprehensive secu- rity monitoring; granular risk-based access controls; and system security automation in a coordinated man- ner throughout all aspects of the infrastructure in order to focus on protecting data in real-time within a dynamic threat environment. This data-centric secu- rity model allows the concept of least-privileged access to be applied for every access decision, where the an- swers to the questions of who, what, when, where, and how are critical for appropriately allowing or denying access to resources based on the combination of sever. SEC. 11. General Provisions. (a) Upon the appointment of the National Cyber Director (NCD) and the establish- ment of the related Office within the Executive Office of the President, pursuant to section 1752 of Public Law 116–283 [enacting 6 U.S.C. 1500], portions of this order may be modified to enable the NCD to fully execute its duties and responsibilities. (b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) the authority granted by law to an executive de- partment or agency, or the head thereof; or (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Man- agement and Budget relating to budgetary, administra- tive, or legislative proposals. (c) This order shall be implemented in a manner con- sistent with applicable law and subject to the avail- ability of appropriations. (d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforce- able at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. (e) Nothing in this order confers authority to inter- fere with or to direct a criminal or national security investigation, arrest, search, seizure, or disruption op- eration or to alter a legal restriction that requires an agency to protect information learned in the course of a criminal or national security investigation. J.R. BIDEN, JR. § 3552. Definitions (a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under subsection (b), the definitions under section 3502 shall apply to this subchapter. (b) ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS.—As used in this subchapter: (1) The term ‘‘binding operational directive’’ means a compulsory direction to an agency that— (A) is for purposes of safeguarding Federal information and information systems from a known or reasonably suspected information security threat, vulnerability, or risk; (B) shall be in accordance with policies, principles, standards, and guidelines issued by the Director; and (C) may be revised or repealed by the Di- rector if the direction issued on behalf of the Director is not in accordance with policies and principles developed by the Director. (2) The term ‘‘incident’’ means an occur- rence that— (A) actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, the integrity, con- fidentiality, or availability of information or an information system; or (B) constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of law, security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use poli- cies. (3) The term ‘‘information security’’ means protecting information and information sys- tems from unauthorized access, use, disclo- sure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide— (A) integrity, which means guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring infor- mation nonrepudiation and authenticity; (B) confidentiality, which means pre- serving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary informa- tion; and (C) availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of in- formation. (4) The term ‘‘information technology’’ has the meaning given that term in section 11101 of title 40. (5) The term ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). (6)(A) The term ‘‘national security system’’ means any information system (including any telecommunications system) used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency— (i) the function, operation, or use of which— (I) involves intelligence activities; (II) involves cryptologic activities re- lated to national security; (III) involves command and control of military forces; (IV) involves equipment that is an inte- gral part of a weapon or weapons system; or (V) subject to subparagraph (B), is crit- ical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions; or (ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information that have been specifically authorized under criteria estab- lished by an Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. (B) Subparagraph (A)(i)(V) does not include a system that is to be used for routine admin- istrative and business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel man- agement applications). (7) The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means the Sec- retary of Homeland Security. (Added Pub. L. 113–283, § 2(a), Dec. 18, 2014, 128 Stat. 3074.) Editorial Notes PRIOR PROVISIONS Provisions similar to this section were contained in sections 3532 and 3542 of this title prior to repeal by Pub. L. 113–283.