50 U.S.C. § 2524a — Repealed. Pub. L. 111–84, div. C, title

Page 437 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 2525 Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2003 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 108–136, div. C, title XXXI, § 3111, Nov. 24, 2003, 117 Stat. 1743, provided that the amendment made by section 3111 is effective December 31, 2004. § 2524a. Repealed. Pub. L. 111–84, div. C, title XXXI, § 3113(a)(1), Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2704 Section, Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4204A, formerly § 4204a, as added Pub. L. 109–163, div. C, title XXXI, § 3111(a), Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat. 3539; renumbered § 4204A, Pub. L. 110–181, div. C, title XXXI, § 3117(1), Jan. 28, 2008, 122 Stat. 578, related to the Reliable Replace- ment Warhead program. § 2525. Annual assessments and reports to the President and Congress regarding the condi- tion of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile (a) Annual assessments required For each nuclear weapon type in the stockpile of the United States, each official specified in subsection (b) on an annual basis shall, to the extent such official is directly responsible for the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness of that nuclear weapon type, com- plete an assessment of the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness (as the case may be) of that nuclear weapon type. (b) Covered officials The officials referred to in subsection (a) are the following: (1) The head of each national security lab- oratory. (2) The Commander of the United States Strategic Command. (c) Dual validation teams in support of assess- ments In support of the assessments required by sub- section (a), the Administrator may establish teams, known as ‘‘dual validation teams’’, to provide each national security laboratory re- sponsible for weapons design with independent evaluations of the condition of each warhead for which such laboratory has lead responsibility. A dual validation team established by the Admin- istrator shall— (1) be comprised of weapons experts from the laboratory that does not have lead responsi- bility for fielding the warhead being evalu- ated; (2) have access to all surveillance and under- ground test data for all stockpile systems for use in the independent evaluations; (3) use all relevant available data to conduct independent calculations; and (4) pursue independent experiments to sup- port the independent evaluations. (d) Use of teams of experts for assessments The head of each national security laboratory shall establish and use one or more teams of ex- perts, known as ‘‘red teams’’, to assist in the as- sessments required by subsection (a). Each such team shall include experts from both of the other national security laboratories. Each such team for a national security laboratory shall— (1) review both the matters covered by the assessments under subsection (a) performed by the head of that laboratory and any inde- pendent evaluations conducted by a dual vali- dation team under subsection (c); (2) subject such matters to challenge; and (3) submit the results of such review and challenge, together with the findings and rec- ommendations of such team with respect to such review and challenge, to the head of that laboratory. (e) Report on assessments Not later than December 1 of each year, each official specified in subsection (b) shall submit to the Secretary concerned, and to the Nuclear Weapons Council, a report on the assessments that such official was required by subsection (a) to complete. The report shall include the fol- lowing: (1) The results of each such assessment. (2)(A) Such official’s determination as to whether or not one or more underground nu- clear tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified in the assessments and, if so— (i) an identification of the specific under- ground nuclear tests that are necessary to resolve such issues; and (ii) a discussion of why options other than an underground nuclear test are not avail- able or would not resolve such issues. (B) An identification of the specific under- ground nuclear tests which, while not nec- essary, might have value in resolving any such issues and a discussion of the anticipated value of conducting such tests. (C) Such official’s determination as to the readiness of the United States to conduct the underground nuclear tests identified under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B), if directed by the President to do so. (3) In the case of a report submitted by the head of a national security laboratory— (A) a concise statement regarding the ade- quacy of the science-based tools and meth- ods, including with respect to cyber assur- ance, being used to determine the matters covered by the assessments; (B) a concise statement regarding the ade- quacy of the tools and methods employed by the manufacturing infrastructure required by section 2532 of this title to identify and fix any inadequacy with respect to the mat- ters covered by the assessments, and the confidence of the head in such tools and methods; (C) a concise summary of the findings and recommendations of any teams under sub- section (d) that relate to the assessments, together with a discussion of those findings and recommendations; (D) a concise summary of the results of any independent evaluation conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c); and (E) a concise summary of any significant finding investigations initiated or active during the previous year for which the head of the national security laboratory has full or partial responsibility. (4) In the case of a report submitted by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command—