Browse Arkansas Code titles and sections
50 U.S.C. § 2538a — Plutonium pit production capacity
Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
Page 447
TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
§ 2538a
Pub. L. 113–66, § 3146(a)(2)(D)(i), struck out ‘‘Joint’’
before ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Council’’.
Pub. L. 112–239, § 3164(b)(2), (4), substituted ‘‘national
security laboratory’’ for ‘‘nuclear weapons laboratory’’
and ‘‘nuclear weapons production facility’’ for ‘‘nuclear
weapons production plant’’.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3146(c)(10)(B), redesig-
nated subsec. (g) as (f). Former subsec. (f) redesignated
(e).
Pub. L. 112–239, § 3164(a)(4), amended subsec. (f) gen-
erally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: ‘‘A
representative of the President may not take any ac-
tion against, or otherwise constrain, a director of a nu-
clear weapons laboratory or a nuclear weapons produc-
tion plant, a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons
Council, or the Commander of United States Strategic
Command for presenting individual views to the Presi-
dent, the National Security Council, or Congress re-
garding the safety, security, effectiveness, and reli-
ability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.’’
Subsec. (f)(1). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3146(a)(2)(D)(ii), struck
out ‘‘established under section 179 of title 10’’ after
‘‘Nuclear Weapons Council’’ in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3146(c)(10)(B), redesig-
nated subsec. (g) as (f).
Pub. L. 112–239, § 3164(b)(5), amended subsec. (g) gen-
erally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (g) set out defini-
tions.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and li-
abilities of the advanced scientific computing research
program and activities at Lawrence Livermore Na-
tional Laboratory, including the functions of the Sec-
retary of Energy relating thereto, to the Secretary of
Homeland Security, see sec
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Page 447
TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
§ 2538a
Pub. L. 113–66, § 3146(a)(2)(D)(i), struck out ‘‘Joint’’
before ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Council’’.
Pub. L. 112–239, § 3164(b)(2), (4), substituted ‘‘national
security laboratory’’ for ‘‘nuclear weapons laboratory’’
and ‘‘nuclear weapons production facility’’ for ‘‘nuclear
weapons production plant’’.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3146(c)(10)(B), redesig-
nated subsec. (g) as (f). Former subsec. (f) redesignated
(e).
Pub. L. 112–239, § 3164(a)(4), amended subsec. (f) gen-
erally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: ‘‘A
representative of the President may not take any ac-
tion against, or otherwise constrain, a director of a nu-
clear weapons laboratory or a nuclear weapons produc-
tion plant, a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons
Council, or the Commander of United States Strategic
Command for presenting individual views to the Presi-
dent, the National Security Council, or Congress re-
garding the safety, security, effectiveness, and reli-
ability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.’’
Subsec. (f)(1). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3146(a)(2)(D)(ii), struck
out ‘‘established under section 179 of title 10’’ after
‘‘Nuclear Weapons Council’’ in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 113–66, § 3146(c)(10)(B), redesig-
nated subsec. (g) as (f).
Pub. L. 112–239, § 3164(b)(5), amended subsec. (g) gen-
erally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (g) set out defini-
tions.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS
For transfer of functions, personnel, assets, and li-
abilities of the advanced scientific computing research
program and activities at Lawrence Livermore Na-
tional Laboratory, including the functions of the Sec-
retary of Energy relating thereto, to the Secretary of
Homeland Security, see sections 183(1), 551(d), 552(d),
and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of No-
vember 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under
section 542 of Title 6.
All national security functions and activities per-
formed immediately before Oct. 5, 1999, by nuclear
weapons laboratories and production plants defined in
this section, transferred to the Administrator for Nu-
clear Security of the National Nuclear Security Admin-
istration of the Department of Energy, see section 2481
of this title.
NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN REGULATIONS THAT IMPACT
THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Pub. L. 118–159, div. C, title XXXI, § 3125, Dec. 23, 2024,
138 Stat. 2302, provided that:
‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—If a director of a national security
laboratory of the National Nuclear Security Adminis-
tration determines that a Federal regulation could in-
hibit the ability of the Administrator for Nuclear Secu-
rity to maintain the safety, security, or effectiveness of
the nuclear weapons stockpile without engaging in ex-
plosive nuclear testing, such director, not later than 15
days after making such determination, shall submit to
Congress a notification of such determination.
‘‘(b) FORM.—Each notification required by subsection
(a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
clude a classified annex.’’
§ 2538a. Plutonium pit production capacity
(a) Requirement
Consistent with the requirements of the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy shall
ensure that the nuclear security enterprise—
(1) during 2021, begins production of quali-
fication plutonium pits;
(2) during 2024, produces not less than 10 war
reserve plutonium pits;
(3) during 2025, produces not less than 20 war
reserve plutonium pits;
(4) during 2026, produces not less than 30 war
reserve plutonium pits; and
(5) during 2030, produces not less than 80 war
reserve plutonium pits.
(b) Annual certification
Not later than March 1, 2015, and each year
thereafter through 2030, the Secretary of Energy
shall certify to the congressional defense com-
mittees and the Secretary of Defense that the
programs and budget of the Secretary of Energy
will enable the nuclear security enterprise to
meet the requirements under subsection (a).
(c) Plan
If the Secretary of Energy does not make a
certification under subsection (b) by March 1 of
any year in which a certification is required
under that subsection, by not later than May 1
of such year, the Chairman of the Nuclear Weap-
ons Council shall submit to the congressional
defense committees a plan to enable the nuclear
security enterprise to meet the requirements
under subsection (a). Such plan shall include
identification of the resources of the Depart-
ment of Energy that the Chairman determines
should be redirected to support the plan to meet
such requirements.
(d) Certifications on plutonium enterprise
(1) Requirement
Not later than 30 days after the date on
which a covered project achieves a critical de-
cision milestone, the Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management and the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs shall
jointly certify to the congressional defense
committees that the operations, infrastruc-
ture, and workforce of such project are ade-
quate to carry out the delivery and disposal of
planned waste shipments relating to the pluto-
nium enterprise, as outlined in the critical de-
cision memoranda of the Department of En-
ergy with respect to such project.
(2) Failure to certify
If the Assistant Secretary for Environ-
mental Management and the Deputy Adminis-
trator for Defense Programs fail to make a
certification under paragraph (1) by the date
specified in such paragraph with respect to a
covered project achieving a critical decision
milestone, the Assistant Secretary and the
Deputy Administrator shall jointly submit to
the congressional defense committees, by not
later than 30 days after such date, a plan to
ensure that the operations, infrastructure, and
workforce of such project will be adequate to
carry out the delivery and disposal of planned
waste shipments described in such paragraph.
(e) Reports
(1) Requirement
Not later than March 1 of each year during
the period beginning on the date on which the
first covered project achieves critical decision
2 in the acquisition process and ending on the
date on which the second project achieves crit-
ical decision 4 and begins operations, the Ad-
ministrator for Nuclear Security shall submit
to the congressional defense committees a re-
port on the planned production goals of both
Page 448
TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
§ 2538a
covered projects during the first 10 years of
the operation of the projects.
(2) Elements
Each report under paragraph (1) shall in-
clude—
(A) the number of war reserve plutonium
pits planned to be produced during each
year, including the associated warhead type;
(B) a description of risks and challenges to
meeting the performance baseline for the
covered projects, as approved in critical de-
cision 2 in the acquisition process;
(C) options available to the Administrator
to balance scope, costs, and production re-
quirements at the projects to decrease over-
all risk to the plutonium enterprise and en-
during plutonium pit requirements; and
(D) an explanation of any changes to the
production goals or requirements as com-
pared to the report submitted during the
previous year.
(f) Prohibition on ARIES expansion before
achievement of 30 pit-per-year base capa-
bility
(1) In general
Until the date on which the Administrator
certifies to the congressional defense commit-
tees that the base capability to produce not
less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits per
year has been established at Los Alamos Na-
tional Laboratory, the Administrator may
not—
(A) carry out a project to expand the pit
disassembly and processing capability of the
spaces at PF–4 occupied by ARIES as of De-
cember 22, 2023; or
(B) otherwise expand such spaces.
(2) Exceptions
Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect
to—
(A) ongoing or planned small projects to
sustain or improve the efficiency of pluto-
nium oxide production, provided that such
projects do not expand the spaces at PF–4
occupied by ARIES as of December 22, 2023;
(B) the planning and design of an addi-
tional ARIES capability at a location other
than PF–4; or
(C) the transfer of the ARIES capability to
a location other than PF–4.
(3) Definitions
In this subsection:
(A) The term ‘‘ARIES’’ means the Ad-
vanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction
System method, developed and piloted at
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Ala-
mos, New Mexico, for disassembling surplus
defense plutonium pits and converting the
plutonium from such pits into plutonium
oxide.
(B) The term ‘‘PF–4’’ means the Plutonium
Facility at Technical Area 55 located at Los
Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos,
New Mexico.
(g) Covered project defined
In this subsection, the term ‘‘covered project’’
means—
(1) the Savannah River Plutonium Proc-
essing Facility, Savannah River Site, Aiken,
South Carolina (Project 21–D–511); or
(2) the Plutonium Pit Production Project,
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos,
New Mexico (Project 21–D–512).
(h) Management of plutonium modernization
program
Not later than 570 days after December 22,
2023, the Administrator for Nuclear Security
shall ensure that the plutonium modernization
program established by the Office of Defense
Programs of the National Nuclear Security Ad-
ministration, or any subsequently developed
program designed to meet the requirements
under subsection (a), is managed in accordance
with the best practices for schedule development
and cost estimating of the Government Ac-
countability Office.
(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLII, § 4219, as
added Pub. L. 113–291, div. C, title XXXI,
§ 3112(b)(1), Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3886; amended
Pub. L. 116–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3116(b), Dec.
20, 2019, 133 Stat. 1952; Pub. L. 117–81, div. C, title
XXXI, § 3111(a), Dec. 27, 2021, 135 Stat. 2219; Pub.
L. 118–31, div. C, title XXXI, §§ 3116, 3117, Dec. 22,
2023, 137 Stat. 790, 791.)
Editorial Notes
REFERENCES IN TEXT
December 22, 2023, referred to in subsec. (f)(1)(A),
(2)(A), was in the original ‘‘the date of the enactment
of this Act’’ and was translated as referring to the date
of enactment of Pub. L. 118–31, which enacted subsec.
(f).
AMENDMENTS
2023—Subsecs. (f), (g). Pub. L. 118–31, § 3116, added sub-
sec. (f) and redesignated former subsec. (f) as (g).
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 118–31, § 3117, added subsec. (h).
2021—Subsecs. (d) to (f). Pub. L. 117–81 added subsecs.
(d) to (f).
2019—Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 116–92, § 3116(b)(1), added
par. (5) and struck out former par. (5) which read as fol-
lows: ‘‘during a pilot period of not less than 90 days
during 2027 (subject to subsection (b)), demonstrates
the capability to produce war reserve plutonium pits at
a rate sufficient to produce 80 pits per year.’’
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 116–92, § 3116(b)(2)–(4), redesig-
nated subsec. (c) as (b), substituted ‘‘2030’’ for ‘‘2027 (or,
if the authority under subsection (b) is exercised,
2029)’’, and struck out former subsec. (b) which author-
ized a two-year delay of the demonstration require-
ment.
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 116–92, § 3116(b)(3), (5), redesig-
nated subsec. (d) as (c) and substituted ‘‘subsection (b)’’
for ‘‘subsection (c)’’. Former subsec. (c) redesignated
(b).
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 116–92, § 3116(b)(3), redesignated
subsec. (d) as (c).
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF MILESTONES WITH
RESPECT TO PLUTONIUM PIT AGING
Pub. L. 117–263, div. C, title XXXI, § 3124, Dec. 23, 2022,
136 Stat. 3057, provided that:
‘‘(a) REQUIREMENT.—The Administrator for Nuclear
Security shall complete the milestones on plutonium
pit aging identified in the report entitled ‘Research
Program Plan for Plutonium and Pit Aging’, published
by the National Nuclear Security Administration in
September 2021.
Page 449
TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
§ 2538b
‘‘(b) ASSESSMENTS.—The Administrator shall—
‘‘(1) acting through the Defense Programs Advisory
Committee, conduct biennial reviews during the pe-
riod beginning not later than one year after the date
of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 23, 2022] and ending
December 31, 2030, regarding the progress achieved to-
ward completing the milestones described in sub-
section (a); and
‘‘(2) seek to enter into an arrangement with the pri-
vate scientific advisory group known as JASON to
conduct, not later than 2030, an assessment of pluto-
nium pit aging.
‘‘(c) BRIEFINGS.—During the period beginning not
later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act and ending December 31, 2030, the Adminis-
trator shall provide to the congressional defense com-
mittees [Committees on Armed Services and Appro-
priations of the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives] biennial briefings on—
‘‘(1) the progress achieved toward completing the
milestones described in subsection (a); and
‘‘(2) the results of the assessments described in sub-
section (b).
‘‘(d) CERTIFICATION OF COMPLETION OF MILESTONES.—
Not later than October 1, 2031, the Administrator
shall—
‘‘(1) certify to the congressional defense commit-
tees whether the milestones described in subsection
(a) have been achieved; and
‘‘(2) if the milestones have not been achieved, sub-
mit to such committees a report—
‘‘(A) describing the reasons such milestones have
not been achieved;
‘‘(B) including, if the Administrator determines
the Administration will not be able to meet one of
such milestones, an explanation for that determina-
tion; and
‘‘(C) specifying new dates for the completion of
the milestones the Administrator anticipates the
Administration will meet.’’
AUTHORIZATION
OF
WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT
AND
TRAINING PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS WITHIN NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Pub. L. 117–263, div. C, title XXXI, § 3126, Dec. 23, 2022,
136 Stat. 3058, provided that:
‘‘(a) AUTHORITY.—The Administrator for Nuclear Se-
curity may authorize management and operating con-
tractors at covered facilities to develop and implement
workforce development and training partnership pro-
grams to further the education and training of employ-
ees or prospective employees of such management and
operating contractors to meet the requirements of sec-
tion 4219 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C.
2538a).
‘‘(b) CAPACITY.—To carry out subsection (a), a man-
agement and operating contractor at a covered facility
may provide funding through grants or other means to
cover the costs of the development and implementation
of a workforce development and training partnership
program authorized under such subsection, including
costs relating to curriculum development, hiring of
teachers, procurement of equipment and machinery,
use of facilities or other properties, and provision of
scholarships and fellowships.
‘‘(c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
‘‘(1) The term ‘covered facility’ means—
‘‘(A) Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Ala-
mos, New Mexico; or
‘‘(B) the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Caro-
lina.
‘‘(2) The term ‘prospective employee’ means an in-
dividual who has applied (or who, based on their field
of study and experience, is likely to apply) for a posi-
tion of employment with a management and oper-
ating contractor to support plutonium pit production
at a covered facility.’’
SENSE
OF
CONGRESS
RELATED
TO
MODIFICATION
TO
CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO PLUTONIUM PIT
PRODUCTION CAPACITY
Pub. L. 116–92, div. C, title XXXI, § 3116(a), Dec. 20,
2019, 133 Stat. 1951, provided that: ‘‘It is the sense of
Congress that—
‘‘(1) rebuilding a robust plutonium pit production
infrastructure with a capacity of up to 80 pits per
year is critical to maintaining the viability of the nu-
clear weapons stockpile;
‘‘(2) that effort will require cooperation from ex-
perts across the nuclear security enterprise; and
‘‘(3) any further delay to achieving a plutonium
sustainment capability to support the planned stock-
pile life extension programs will result in an unac-
ceptable capability gap to our deterrent posture.’’
§ 2538b. Stockpile responsiveness program
(a) Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States to iden-
tify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and contin-
ually exercise all capabilities required to con-
ceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, cer-
tify, produce, and deploy nuclear weapons to en-
sure the nuclear deterrent of the United States
remains safe, secure, reliable, credible, and re-
sponsive.
(b) Program required
The Secretary of Energy, acting through the
Administrator and in consultation with the Sec-
retary of Defense, shall carry out a stockpile re-
sponsiveness program, along with the stockpile
stewardship program under section 2521 of this
title and the stockpile management program
under section 2524 of this title, to identify, sus-
tain, enhance, integrate, and continually exer-
cise all capabilities required to conceptualize,
study,
design,
develop,
engineer,
certify,
produce, and deploy nuclear weapons.
(c) Objectives
The program under subsection (b) shall have
the following objectives:
(1) Identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and
continually exercise all of the capabilities, in-
frastructure, tools, and technologies across
the science, engineering, design, certification,
and manufacturing cycle required to carry out
all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life
cycle process, with respect to both the nuclear
security enterprise and relevant elements of
the Department of Defense.
(2) Identify, enhance, and transfer knowl-
edge, skills, and direct experience with respect
to all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life
cycle process from one generation of nuclear
weapon designers and engineers to the fol-
lowing generation.
(3) Periodically demonstrate stockpile re-
sponsiveness throughout the range of capabili-
ties as required, such as through the use of
prototypes, flight testing, and development of
plans for certification without the need for nu-
clear explosive testing.
(4) Shorten design, certification, and manu-
facturing cycles and timelines to minimize the
amount of time and costs leading to an engi-
neering prototype and production.
(5) Continually exercise processes for the in-
tegration and coordination of all relevant ele-
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