28 U.S.C. § 2266 — Limitation periods for determining appli-

Page 585 TITLE 28—JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE § 2266 cation of sections 2262, 2263, 2264, and 2266 of this title to State unitary review procedures, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 109–177, title V, § 507(c)(1), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 250. Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries EFFECTIVE DATE Section applicable to cases pending on or after Mar. 9, 2006, with special rule for certain cases pending on that date, see section 507(d) of Pub. L. 109–177, set out as an Effective Date of 2006 Amendment note under sec- tion 2251 of this title. § 2266. Limitation periods for determining appli- cations and motions (a) The adjudication of any application under section 2254 that is subject to this chapter, and the adjudication of any motion under section 2255 by a person under sentence of death, shall be given priority by the district court and by the court of appeals over all noncapital matters. (b)(1)(A) A district court shall render a final determination and enter a final judgment on any application for a writ of habeas corpus brought under this chapter in a capital case not later than 450 days after the date on which the application is filed, or 60 days after the date on which the case is submitted for decision, which- ever is earlier. (B) A district court shall afford the parties at least 120 days in which to complete all actions, including the preparation of all pleadings and briefs, and if necessary, a hearing, prior to the submission of the case for decision. (C)(i) A district court may delay for not more than one additional 30-day period beyond the pe- riod specified in subparagraph (A), the rendering of a determination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus if the court issues a written order making a finding, and stating the reasons for the finding, that the ends of justice that would be served by allowing the delay outweigh the best interests of the public and the applicant in a speedy disposition of the application. (ii) The factors, among others, that a court shall consider in determining whether a delay in the disposition of an application is warranted are as follows: (I) Whether the failure to allow the delay would be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice. (II) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unrea- sonable to expect adequate briefing within the time limitations established by subparagraph (A). (III) Whether the failure to allow a delay in a case that, taken as a whole, is not so un- usual or so complex as described in subclause (II), but would otherwise deny the applicant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would un- reasonably deny the applicant or the govern- ment continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the applicant or the government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. (iii) No delay in disposition shall be permis- sible because of general congestion of the court’s calendar. (iv) The court shall transmit a copy of any order issued under clause (i) to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for inclusion in the report under para- graph (5). (2) The time limitations under paragraph (1) shall apply to— (A) an initial application for a writ of habeas corpus; (B) any second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus; and (C) any redetermination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus following a remand by the court of appeals or the Supreme Court for further proceedings, in which case the lim- itation period shall run from the date the re- mand is ordered. (3)(A) The time limitations under this section shall not be construed to entitle an applicant to a stay of execution, to which the applicant would otherwise not be entitled, for the purpose of litigating any application or appeal. (B) No amendment to an application for a writ of habeas corpus under this chapter shall be per- mitted after the filing of the answer to the ap- plication, except on the grounds specified in sec- tion 2244(b). (4)(A) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a time limitation under this section shall not be a ground for granting relief from a judg- ment of conviction or sentence. (B) The State may enforce a time limitation under this section by petitioning for a writ of mandamus to the court of appeals. The court of appeals shall act on the petition for a writ of mandamus not later than 30 days after the filing of the petition. (5)(A) The Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall submit to Congress an an- nual report on the compliance by the district courts with the time limitations under this sec- tion. (B) The report described in subparagraph (A) shall include copies of the orders submitted by the district courts under paragraph (1)(B)(iv). (c)(1)(A) A court of appeals shall hear and render a final determination of any appeal of an order granting or denying, in whole or in part, an application brought under this chapter in a capital case not later than 120 days after the date on which the reply brief is filed, or if no reply brief is filed, not later than 120 days after the date on which the answering brief is filed. (B)(i) A court of appeals shall decide whether to grant a petition for rehearing or other re- quest for rehearing en banc not later than 30 days after the date on which the petition for re- hearing is filed unless a responsive pleading is required, in which case the court shall decide whether to grant the petition not later than 30 days after the date on which the responsive pleading is filed. (ii) If a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc is granted, the court of appeals shall hear and render a final determination of the appeal not later than 120 days after the date on which the order granting rehearing or rehearing en banc is entered. (2) The time limitations under paragraph (1) shall apply to— (A) an initial application for a writ of habeas corpus; Page 586 TITLE 28—JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE [§§ 2281, 2282 1 So in original. Does not conform to section catchline. (B) any second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus; and (C) any redetermination of an application for a writ of habeas corpus or related appeal following a remand by the court of appeals en banc or the Supreme Court for further pro- ceedings, in which case the limitation period shall run from the date the remand is ordered. (3) The time limitations under this section shall not be construed to entitle an applicant to a stay of execution, to which the applicant would otherwise not be entitled, for the purpose of litigating any application or appeal. (4)(A) The failure of a court to meet or comply with a time limitation under this section shall not be a ground for granting relief from a judg- ment of conviction or sentence. (B) The State may enforce a time limitation under this section by applying for a writ of man- damus to the Supreme Court. (5) The Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall submit to Congress an an- nual report on the compliance by the courts of appeals with the time limitations under this section. (Added Pub. L. 104–132, title I, § 107(a), Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1224; amended Pub. L. 109–177, title V, § 507(e), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 251.) Editorial Notes AMENDMENTS 2006—Subsec. (b)(1)(A). Pub. L. 109–177 substituted ‘‘450 days after the date on which the application is filed, or 60 days after the date on which the case is sub- mitted for decision, whichever is earlier’’ for ‘‘180 days after the date on which the application is filed’’. Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2006 AMENDMENT Amendment by Pub. L. 109–177 applicable to cases pending on or after Mar. 9, 2006, with special rule for certain cases pending on that date, see section 507(d) of Pub. L. 109–177, set out as a note under section 2251 of this title. EFFECTIVE DATE Section applicable to cases pending on or after Apr. 24, 1996, see section 107(c) of Pub. L. 104–132, set out as a note under section 2261 of this title. CHAPTER 155—INJUNCTIONS; THREE-JUDGE COURTS Sec. [2281. Repealed.] [2282. Repealed.] 2283. Stay of State court proceedings. 2284. Three-judge district court; when required; composition; procedure.1 Editorial Notes AMENDMENTS 1976—Pub. L. 94–381, § 4, Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1119, struck out item 2281 ‘‘Injunction against enforcement of State statute; three-judge court required’’, item 2282 ‘‘Injunction against enforcement of Federal statute; three-judge court required’’, and inserted ‘‘when re- quired’’ after ‘‘district court’’ in item 2284. [§§ 2281, 2282. Repealed. Pub. L. 94–381, §§ 1, 2, Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1119] Section 2281, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968, provided that an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of a State statute on grounds of unconstitutionality should not be granted unless the application has been heard and determined by a three-judge district court. Section 2282, act June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968, provided that an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any Act of Congress on grounds of unconstitutionality should not be granted unless the application therefor has been heard and determined by a three-judge district court. Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries EFFECTIVE DATE OF REPEAL Repeal not applicable to any action commenced on or before Aug. 12, 1976, see section 7 of Pub. L. 94–381 set out as an Effective Date of 1976 Amendment note under section 2284 of this title. § 2283. Stay of State court proceedings A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Con- gress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdic- tion, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 968.) HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 379 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162). An exception as to acts of Congress relating to bank- ruptcy was omitted and the general exception sub- stituted to cover all exceptions. The phrase ‘‘in aid of its jurisdiction’’ was added to conform to section 1651 of this title and to make clear the recognized power of the Federal courts to stay pro- ceedings in State cases removed to the district courts. The exceptions specifically include the words ‘‘to pro- tect or ‘‘effectuate its judgments,’’ for lack of which the Supreme Court held that the Federal courts are without power to enjoin relitigation of cases and con- troversies fully adjudicated by such courts. (See Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 62 S.Ct. 139, 314 U.S. 118, 86 L.Ed. 100. A vigorous dissenting opinion (62 S.Ct. 148) notes that at the time of the 1911 revision of the Judi- cial Code, the power of the courts, of the United States to protect their judgments was unquestioned and that the revisers of that code noted no change and Congress intended no change). Therefore the revised section restores the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision. Changes were made in phraseology. § 2284. Three-judge court; when required; com- position; procedure (a) A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body. (b) In any action required to be heard and de- termined by a district court of three judges under subsection (a) of this section, the com- position and procedure of the court shall be as follows: (1) Upon the filing of a request for three judges, the judge to whom the request is pre-