34 U.S.C. § 12371 — Grants authorized

Page 360 TITLE 34—CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT § 12371 1 So in original. The word ‘‘means’’ probably should appear after ‘‘(A)’’ below. motivated by gender (as defined in subsection (d)). (c) Cause of action A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus- tom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in sub- section (b) shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory re- lief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate. (d) Definitions For purposes of this section— (1) the term ‘‘crime of violence motivated by gender’’ means a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim’s gender; and (2) the term ‘‘crime of violence’’ means— 1 (A) an act or series of acts that would con- stitute a felony against the person or that would constitute a felony against property if the conduct presents a serious risk of phys- ical injury to another, and that would come within the meaning of State or Federal of- fenses described in section 16 of title 18, whether or not those acts have actually re- sulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States; and (B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in sub- paragraph (A) but for the relationship be- tween the person who takes such action and the individual against whom such action is taken. (e) Limitation and procedures (1) Limitation Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of action under subsection (c) for ran- dom acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a pre- ponderance of the evidence, to be motivated by gender (within the meaning of subsection (d)). (2) No prior criminal action Nothing in this section requires a prior criminal complaint, prosecution, or conviction to establish the elements of a cause of action under subsection (c). (3) Concurrent jurisdiction The Federal and State courts shall have con- current jurisdiction over actions brought pur- suant to this part. (4) Supplemental jurisdiction Neither section 1367 of title 28 nor subsection (c) of this section shall be construed, by rea- son of a claim arising under such subsection, to confer on the courts of the United States jurisdiction over any State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equi- table distribution of marital property, or child custody decree. (Pub. L. 103–322, title IV, § 40302, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1941.) Editorial Notes REFERENCES IN TEXT This part, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (e)(3), was in the original ‘‘this subtitle’’, meaning subtitle C of title IV of Pub. L. 103–322, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1941. For complete classification of subtitle C of title IV of Pub. L. 103–322 to the Code, see Short Title of 1994 Act note set out under section 10101 of this title and Tables. CODIFICATION Section was formerly classified to section 13981 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to edi- torial reclassification and renumbering as this section. Section is comprised of section 40302 of Pub. L. 103–322. Subsec. (e)(5) of section 40302 of Pub. L. 103–322 amended section 1445 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. CONSTITUTIONALITY For information regarding the constitutionality of this section, see the Table of Laws Held Unconstitu- tional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme Court on the Constitution Annotated website, constitu- tion.congress.gov. PART D—EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN IN COURTS SUBPART 1—EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL IN STATE COURTS § 12371. Grants authorized The State Justice Institute may award grants for the purpose of developing, testing, pre- senting, and disseminating model programs to be used by States (as defined in section 10701 of title 42) in training judges and court personnel in the laws of the States and by Indian tribes in training tribal judges and court personnel in the laws of the tribes on rape, sexual assault, do- mestic violence, dating violence, and other crimes of violence motivated by the victim’s gender. Nothing shall preclude the attendance of tribal judges and court personnel at programs funded under this section for States to train judges and court personnel on the laws of the States. (Pub. L. 103–322, title IV, § 40411, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1942; Pub. L. 106–386, div. B, title IV, § 1406(c)(2), (d)(1), Oct. 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 1516.) Editorial Notes CODIFICATION Section was formerly classified to section 13991 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to edi- torial reclassification and renumbering as this section. AMENDMENTS 2000—Pub. L. 106–386 inserted ‘‘dating violence,’’ after ‘‘domestic violence,’’ and ‘‘Nothing shall preclude the attendance of tribal judges and court personnel at pro- grams funded under this section for States to train judges and court personnel on the laws of the States.’’ at end. Page 361 TITLE 34—CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT § 12372 1 See References in Text note below. 2 So in original. Probably should be followed by ‘‘and’’. 3 So in original. The semicolon probably should be a period. Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries SHORT TITLE For short title of subtitle D of title IV of Pub. L. 103–322, which is classified to this part, as the ‘‘Equal Justice for Women in the Courts Act of 1994’’, see sec- tion 40401 of Pub. L. 103–322, set out as a Short Title of 1994 Act note under section 10101 of this title. § 12372. Training provided by grants Training provided pursuant to grants made under this part may include current informa- tion, existing studies, or current data on— (1) the nature and incidence of rape and sex- ual assault by strangers and nonstrangers, marital rape, and incest; (2) the underreporting of rape, sexual as- sault, and child sexual abuse; (3) the physical, psychological, and economic impact of rape and sexual assault on the vic- tim, the costs to society, and the implications for sentencing; (4) the psychology of sex offenders, their high rate of recidivism, and the implications for sentencing; (5) the historical evolution of laws and atti- tudes on rape and sexual assault; (6) sex stereotyping of female and male vic- tims of rape and sexual assault, racial stereo- typing of rape victims and defendants, and the impact of such stereotypes on credibility of witnesses, sentencing, and other aspects of the administration of justice; (7) application of rape shield laws and other limits on introduction of evidence that may subject victims to improper sex stereotyping and harassment in both rape and nonrape cases, including the need for sua sponte judi- cial intervention in inappropriate cross-exam- ination; (8) the use of expert witness testimony on rape trauma syndrome, child sexual abuse ac- commodation syndrome, post-traumatic stress syndrome, and similar issues; (9) the legitimate reasons why victims of rape, sexual assault, and incest may refuse to testify against a defendant; (10) the nature and incidence of domestic vi- olence and dating violence (as defined in sec- tion 10447 1 of this title); (11) the physical, psychological, and eco- nomic impact of domestic violence and dating violence on the victim, the costs to society, and the implications for court procedures and sentencing; (12) the psychology and self-presentation of batterers and victims and the implications for court proceedings and credibility of witnesses; (13) sex stereotyping of female and male vic- tims of domestic violence and dating violence, myths about presence or absence of domestic violence and dating violence in certain racial, ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic groups, and their impact on the administration of justice; (14) historical evolution of laws and atti- tudes on domestic violence; (15) proper and improper interpretations of the defenses of self-defense and provocation, and the use of expert witness testimony on battered woman syndrome; (16) the likelihood of retaliation, recidivism, and escalation of violence by batterers, and the potential impact of incarceration and other meaningful sanctions for acts of domes- tic violence including violations of orders of protection; (17) economic, psychological, social and in- stitutional reasons for victims’ inability to leave the batterer, to report domestic violence or dating violence or to follow through on complaints, including the influence of lack of support from police, judges, and court per- sonnel, and the legitimate reasons why vic- tims of domestic violence or dating violence may refuse to testify against a defendant; (18) the need for orders of protection, and the implications of mutual orders of protection, dual arrest policies, and mediation in domes- tic violence and dating violence cases; (19) recognition of and response to gender- motivated crimes of violence other than rape, sexual assault and domestic violence, such as mass or serial murder motivated by the gender of the victims; (20) the issues raised by domestic violence in determining custody and visitation, including how to protect the safety of the child and of a parent who is not a predominant aggressor of domestic violence, the legitimate reasons par- ents may report domestic violence, the ways domestic violence may relate to an abuser’s desire to seek custody, and evaluating expert testimony in custody and visitation deter- minations involving domestic violence; (21) the issues raised by child sexual assault in determining custody and visitation, includ- ing how to protect the safety of the child, the legitimate reasons parents may report child sexual assault, and evaluating expert testi- mony in custody and visitation determina- tions involving child sexual assault, including the current scientifically-accepted and empiri- cally valid research on child sexual assault; 2 (22) the extent to which addressing domestic violence and victim safety contributes to the efficient administration of justice; 3 (Pub. L. 103–322, title IV, § 40412, Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1943; Pub. L. 106–386, div. B, title IV, § 1406(a)(1), (d)(2), Oct. 28, 2000, 114 Stat. 1515, 1517.) Editorial Notes REFERENCES IN TEXT Section 10447 of this title, referred to in par. (10), was subsequently repealed and a new section 10447 enacted which does not define the terms ‘‘domestic violence’’ or ‘‘dating violence’’. However, such terms are defined in section 12291 of this title. CODIFICATION Section was formerly classified to section 13992 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to edi- torial reclassification and renumbering as this section. Some section numbers or references in amendment notes below reflect the classification of such sections or references prior to editorial reclassification.