28 U.S.C. § 2243 — Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision

Page 519 TITLE 28—JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE § 2244 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its States or territories. ‘‘(b) GENEVA CONVENTIONS DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘Geneva Conventions’ means— ‘‘(1) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3114); ‘‘(2) the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3217); ‘‘(3) the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316); and ‘‘(4) the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done at Geneva Au- gust 12, 1949 (6 UST 3516).’’ § 2242. Application Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone act- ing in his behalf. It shall allege the facts concerning the appli- cant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by vir- tue of what claim or authority, if known. It may be amended or supplemented as pro- vided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions. If addressed to the Supreme Court, a justice thereof or a circuit judge it shall state the rea- sons for not making application to the district court of the district in which the applicant is held. (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 965.) HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 454 (R.S. § 754). Words ‘‘or by someone acting in his behalf’’ were added. This follows the actual practice of the courts, as set forth in United States ex rel. Funaro v. Watchorn, C.C. 1908, 164 F. 152; Collins v. Traeger, C.C.A. 1928, 27 F.2d 842, and cases cited. The third paragraph is new. It was added to conform to existing practice as approved by judicial decisions. See Dorsey v. Gill (App.D.C.) 148 F.2d 857, 865, 866. See also Holiday v. Johnston, 61 S.Ct. 1015, 313 U.S. 342, 85 L.Ed. 1392. Changes were made in phraseology. § 2243. Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision A court, justice or judge entertaining an appli- cation for a writ of habeas corpus shall forth- with award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person de- tained is not entitled thereto. The writ, or order to show cause shall be di- rected to the person having custody of the per- son detained. It shall be returned within three days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding twenty days, is allowed. The person to whom the writ or order is di- rected shall make a return certifying the true cause of the detention. When the writ or order is returned a day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause additional time is allowed. Unless the application for the writ and the re- turn present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained. The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts. The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, by leave of court, before or after being filed. The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require. (June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 965.) HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., §§ 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, and 461 (R.S. §§ 755–761). Section consolidates sections 455–461 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. The requirement for return within 3 days ‘‘unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding 20 days is al- lowed’’ in the second paragraph, was substituted for the provision of such section 455 which allowed 3 days for return if within 20 miles, 10 days if more than 20 but not more than 100 miles, and 20 days if more than 100 miles distant. Words ‘‘unless for good cause additional time is al- lowed’’ in the fourth paragraph, were substituted for words ‘‘unless the party petitioning requests a longer time’’ in section 459 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. The fifth paragraph providing for production of the body of the detained person at the hearing is in con- formity with Walker v. Johnston, 1941, 61 S.Ct. 574, 312 U.S. 275, 85 L.Ed. 830. Changes were made in phraseology. § 2244. Finality of determination (a) No circuit or district judge shall be re- quired to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior applica- tion for a writ of habeas corpus, except as pro- vided in section 2255. (b)(1) A claim presented in a second or succes- sive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. (2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless— (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made ret- roactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavail- able; or (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitu- tional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the under- lying offense.