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10 U.S.C. § 918 — Art. 118. Murder
Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
Page 821
TITLE 10—ARMED FORCES
§ 918
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
any broadcast or distribution of the intimate
visual image or visual image of sexually ex-
plicit conduct;
(3) who knows or reasonably should have
known that the broadcast or distribution of
the intimate visual image or visual image of
sexually explicit conduct is likely—
(A) to cause harm, harassment, intimida-
tion, emotional distress, or financial loss for
the person depicted in the intimate visual
image or visual image of sexually explicit
conduct; or
(B) to harm substantially the depicted per-
son with respect to that person’s health,
safety, business, calling, career, financial
condition, reputation, or personal relation-
ships; and
(4) whose conduct, under the circumstances,
had a reasonably direct and palpable connec-
tion to a military mission or military environ-
ment,
is guilty of wrongful distribution of intimate
visual images or visual images of sexually ex-
plicit conduct and shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1)
BROADCAST.—The
term
‘‘broadcast’’
means to electronically transmit a visual
image with the intent that it be viewed by a
person or persons.
(2)
DISTRIBUTE.—The
term
‘‘distribute’’
means to deliver to the actual or constructive
possession of another person, including trans-
mission by mail or electronic means.
(3) INTIMATE VISUAL IMAGE.—The term ‘‘inti-
mate visual image’’ means a visual image that
depicts a private area of a person.
(4) PRIVATE AREA.—The term ‘‘private area’’
means the naked or underwear-clad genitalia,
anus, buttocks, or female areola or nipple.
(5) REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.—
The term ‘‘reasonable expectation of privacy’’
means circumstances in which a reaso
Source: Supplied 2024 U.S. Code historical extraction · 10 U.S.C. § 918
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Stable record: federal_law:legal_authorities:usc2024-3faa139a8e262d4dc47e375a
Source file: Laws/federal/codes/united-states-code-2024/title-10/section-918-art-118-murder--aacad2fa8e.md
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Source location: USCODE-2024-title10-subtitleA-partII-chap47-subchapX-sec918.pdf
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Page 821
TITLE 10—ARMED FORCES
§ 918
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding
any broadcast or distribution of the intimate
visual image or visual image of sexually ex-
plicit conduct;
(3) who knows or reasonably should have
known that the broadcast or distribution of
the intimate visual image or visual image of
sexually explicit conduct is likely—
(A) to cause harm, harassment, intimida-
tion, emotional distress, or financial loss for
the person depicted in the intimate visual
image or visual image of sexually explicit
conduct; or
(B) to harm substantially the depicted per-
son with respect to that person’s health,
safety, business, calling, career, financial
condition, reputation, or personal relation-
ships; and
(4) whose conduct, under the circumstances,
had a reasonably direct and palpable connec-
tion to a military mission or military environ-
ment,
is guilty of wrongful distribution of intimate
visual images or visual images of sexually ex-
plicit conduct and shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.
(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
(1)
BROADCAST.—The
term
‘‘broadcast’’
means to electronically transmit a visual
image with the intent that it be viewed by a
person or persons.
(2)
DISTRIBUTE.—The
term
‘‘distribute’’
means to deliver to the actual or constructive
possession of another person, including trans-
mission by mail or electronic means.
(3) INTIMATE VISUAL IMAGE.—The term ‘‘inti-
mate visual image’’ means a visual image that
depicts a private area of a person.
(4) PRIVATE AREA.—The term ‘‘private area’’
means the naked or underwear-clad genitalia,
anus, buttocks, or female areola or nipple.
(5) REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.—
The term ‘‘reasonable expectation of privacy’’
means circumstances in which a reasonable
person would believe that a private area of the
person, or sexually explicit conduct involving
the person, would not be visible to the public.
(6) SEXUALLY EXPLICIT CONDUCT.—The term
‘‘sexually explicit conduct’’ means actual or
simulated genital-genital contact, oral-genital
contact, anal-genital contact, or oral-anal
contact, whether between persons of the same
or opposite sex, bestiality, masturbation, or
sadistic or masochistic abuse.
(7) VISUAL IMAGE.—The term ‘‘visual image’’
means the following:
(A) Any developed or undeveloped photo-
graph, picture, film, or video.
(B) Any digital or computer image, pic-
ture, film, or video made by any means, in-
cluding those transmitted by any means, in-
cluding streaming media, even if not stored
in a permanent format.
(C) Any digital or electronic data capable
of conversion into a visual image.
(Added Pub. L. 115–91, div. A, title V, § 533(a),
Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1389.)
§ 918. Art. 118. Murder
Any person subject to this chapter who, with-
out justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a
human being, when such person—
(1) has a premeditated design to kill;
(2) intends to kill or inflict great bodily
harm;
(3) is engaged in an act which is inherently
dangerous to another and evinces a wanton
disregard of human life; or
(4) is engaged in the perpetration or at-
tempted perpetration of burglary, rape, rape of
a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a
child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse
of a child, robbery, or aggravated arson;
is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punish-
ment as a court-martial may direct, except that
if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), such per-
son shall suffer death or imprisonment for life
as a court-martial may direct, unless such per-
son is otherwise sentenced in accordance with a
plea agreement entered into between the parties
under section 853a of this title (article 53a).
(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 72; Pub. L.
102–484, div. A, title X, § 1066(b), Oct. 23, 1992, 106
Stat. 2506; Pub. L. 109–163, div. A, title V, § 552(d),
Jan. 6, 2006, 119 Stat. 3263; Pub. L. 112–81, div. A,
title V, § 541(d)(2), Dec. 31, 2011, 125 Stat. 1410;
Pub. L. 113–291, div. A, title V, § 531(d)(2)(B), Dec.
19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3364; Pub. L. 114–328, div. E,
title LX, § 5428, Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2949; Pub.
L. 118–31, div. A, title V, § 531(a), Dec. 22, 2023, 137
Stat. 257.)
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
Revised
section
Source (U.S. Code)
Source (Statutes at Large)
918 ..........
50:712.
May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1
(Art. 118), 64 Stat. 140.
The words ‘‘of this section’’ are omitted as surplus-
age.
Editorial Notes
AMENDMENTS
2023—Pub. L. 118–31 substituted ‘‘such person’’ for
‘‘he’’ in introductory and concluding provisions and
substituted ‘‘direct, unless such person is otherwise
sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement entered
into between the parties under section 853a of this title
(article 53a).’’ for ‘‘ direct.’’ in concluding provisions.
2016—Par. (4). Pub. L. 114–328 struck out ‘‘forcible sod-
omy,’’ after ‘‘burglary,’’.
2014—Par. (4). Pub. L. 113–291 substituted ‘‘forcible
sodomy’’ for ‘‘sodomy’’.
2011—Par. (4). Pub. L. 112–81 substituted ‘‘sexual as-
sault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual con-
tact, sexual abuse of a child,’’ for ‘‘aggravated sexual
assault, aggravated sexual assault of a child, aggra-
vated sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse of a
child, aggravated sexual contact with a child,’’.
2006—Par. (4). Pub. L. 109–163 substituted ‘‘rape, rape
of a child, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated sexual
assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, aggra-
vated sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual con-
tact with a child,’’ for ‘‘rape,’’.
1992—Par. (3). Pub. L. 102–484 substituted ‘‘another’’
for ‘‘others’’.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2016 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 114–328 effective on Jan. 1,
2019, as designated by the President, with imple-
Page 822
TITLE 10—ARMED FORCES
§ 919
menting regulations and provisions relating to applica-
bility to various situations, see section 5542 of Pub. L.
114–328 and Ex. Ord. No. 13825, set out as notes under
section 801 of this title.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2011 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 112–81 effective 180 days after
Dec. 31, 2011, and applicable with respect to offenses
committed on or after such effective date, see section
541(f) of Pub. L. 112–81, set out as a note under section
843 of this title.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2006 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 109–163 effective on Oct. 1,
2007, see section 552(f) of Pub. L. 109–163, set out as a
note under section 843 of this title.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1992 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 102–484 effective Oct. 23, 1992,
and applicable with respect to offenses committed on
or after that date, see section 1067 of Pub. L. 102–484, set
out as a note under section 803 of this title.
§ 919. Art. 119. Manslaughter
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who,
with an intent to kill or inflict great bodily
harm, unlawfully kills a human being in the
heat of sudden passion caused by adequate prov-
ocation is guilty of voluntary manslaughter and
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who,
without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily
harm, unlawfully kills a human being—
(1) by culpable negligence; or
(2) while perpetrating or attempting to per-
petrate an offense, other than those named in
clause (4) of section 918 of this title (article
118), directly affecting the person;
is guilty of involuntary manslaughter and shall
be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 73.)
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
Revised
section
Source (U.S. Code)
Source (Statutes at Large)
919(a) ......
919(b) ......
50:713(a).
50:713(b).
May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1
(Art. 119), 64 Stat. 140.
The word ‘‘named’’ is substituted for the word ‘‘speci-
fied’’.
§ 919a. Art. 119a. Death or injury of an unborn
child
(a)(1) Any person subject to this chapter who
engages in conduct that violates any of the pro-
visions of law listed in subsection (b) and there-
by causes the death of, or bodily injury (as de-
fined in section 1365 of title 18) to, a child, who
is in utero at the time the conduct takes place,
is guilty of a separate offense under this section
and shall, upon conviction, be punished by such
punishment, other than death, as a court-mar-
tial may direct, which shall be consistent with
the punishments prescribed by the President for
that conduct had that injury or death occurred
to the unborn child’s mother.
(2) An offense under this section does not re-
quire proof that—
(i) the person engaging in the conduct had
knowledge or should have had knowledge that
the victim of the underlying offense was preg-
nant; or
(ii) the accused intended to cause the death
of, or bodily injury to, the unborn child.
(3) If the person engaging in the conduct
thereby intentionally kills or attempts to kill
the unborn child, that person shall, instead of
being punished under paragraph (1), be punished
as provided under sections 880, 918, and 919(a) of
this title (articles 80, 118, and 119(a)) for inten-
tionally killing or attempting to kill a human
being.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the death penalty shall not be imposed for
an offense under this section.
(b) The provisions referred to in subsection (a)
are sections 918, 919(a), 919(b)(2), 920(a), 922, 926,
928, and 928a of this title (articles 118, 119(a),
119(b)(2), 120(a), 122, 126, 128, and 128a).
(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed
to permit the prosecution—
(1) of any person for conduct relating to an
abortion for which the consent of the pregnant
woman, or a person authorized by law to act
on her behalf, has been obtained or for which
such consent is implied by law;
(2) of any person for any medical treatment
of the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or
(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn
child.
(d) In this section, the term ‘‘unborn child’’
means a child in utero, and the term ‘‘child in
utero’’ or ‘‘child, who is in utero’’ means a mem-
ber of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of
development, who is carried in the womb.
(Added Pub. L. 108–212, § 3(a), Apr. 1, 2004, 118
Stat. 569; amended Pub. L. 114–328, div. E, title
LX, § 5401(13)(B), Dec. 23, 2016, 130 Stat. 2939; Pub.
L. 115–91, div. A, title X, § 1081(c)(1)(N), Dec. 12,
2017, 131 Stat. 1598.)
Editorial Notes
AMENDMENTS
2017—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 115–91 substituted ‘‘926, 928,
and 928a’’ for ‘‘928a, 926, and 928’’ and ‘‘126, 128, and
128a’’ for ‘‘128a 126, and 128’’.
2016—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 114–328 substituted ‘‘928a,’’
for ‘‘924,’’ and ‘‘128a’’ for ‘‘124,’’.
Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2017 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 115–91 effective immediately
after the amendments made by div. E (§§ 5001–5542) of
Pub. L. 114–328 take effect as provided for in section
5542 of that Act (10 U.S.C. 801 note), see section
1081(c)(4) of Pub. L. 115–91, set out as a note under sec-
tion 801 of this title.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2016 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 114–328 effective on Jan. 1,
2019, as designated by the President, with imple-
menting regulations and provisions relating to applica-
bility to various situations, see section 5542 of Pub. L.
114–328 and Ex. Ord. No. 13825, set out as notes under
section 801 of this title.
§ 919b. Art. 119b. Child endangerment
Any person subject to this chapter—
(1) who has a duty for the care of a child
under the age of 16 years; and
(2) who, through design or culpable neg-
ligence, endangers the child’s mental or phys-
ical health, safety, or welfare;
Cross-references
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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
In this chapter (the Uniform Code of Military Justice):
(1) The term “Judge Advocate General” means, severally, the Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and, except when the Coast Guard is operating as a service in the Navy, an official designated to serve as Judge Advocate General of the Coast Guard by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(2) The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard when it is operating as a service in the Navy, shall be considered as one armed force.
(3) The term “commanding officer” includes only commissioned officers.
(4) The term “officer in charge” means a member of the Navy, the Marine Corps, or the Coast Guard designated as such by appropriate authority.
(5) The term “superior commissioned officer” means a commissioned officer superior in rank or command.
(6) The term “cadet” means a cadet of the United States Military Academy, the United States Air Force Academy, or the United States Coast Guard Academy.
(7) The term “midshipman” means a midshipman of the United States Naval Academy and any other midshipman on active duty in the naval service.
(8) The term “military” refers to any or all of the armed forces.
(9) The term “accuser” means a person who signs and swears to charges, any person who directs that charges nominally be signed and sworn to by another, and any other person who has an interest other than an official interest in the prosecution of the accused.
(10) The term “military judge” means a judge advocate designated under [section 826(c) of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section826/c&num=0&edition=prelim) (article 26(c)) who is detailed under section 826(a) or [section 830a of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 10 U.S.C. § 801
Stored review status: release_metadata_unconfirmed. The source passage cites 10 U.S.C. § 801. This identifies an authority to review, not proof of applicability.
Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
Page 695
TITLE 10—ARMED FORCES
§ 801
authorized, under regulations and policies of the
Department of Defense and subject to subsection
(b), to wear the insignia for that higher grade
for a period of up to 14 days before assuming the
duties of a position for which the higher grade is
authorized. An officer who is so authorized to
wear the insignia of a higher grade is said to be
‘‘frocked’’ to that grade.
(b) RESTRICTIONS.—An officer may not be au-
thorized to wear the insignia for a grade as de-
scribed in subsection (a) unless—
(1) the Senate has given its advice and con-
sent to the appointment of the officer to that
grade;
(2) the officer has received orders to serve in
a position outside the military department of
that officer for which that grade is authorized;
(3) the Secretary of Defense (or a civilian of-
ficer within the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense whose appointment was made with the
advice and consent of the Senate and to whom
the Secretary delegates such approval author-
ity) has given approval for the officer to wear
the insignia for that grade before assuming
the duties of a position for which that grade is
authorized; and
(4) the Secretary of Defense has submitted
to Congress a written notification of the in-
tent to authorize the officer to wear the insig-
nia for that grade.
(c) BENEFITS NOT TO BE CONSTRUED AS ACCRU-
ING.—(1) Authority provided to an officer as de-
scribed in subsection (a) to wear the insignia of
a higher grade may not be construed as confer-
ring authority for that officer to—
(A) be paid the rate of pay provided for an
officer in that grade having the same number
of years of service as that officer; or
(B) assume any legal authority associated
with that grade.
(2) The period for which an officer wears
Source: Supplied 2024 U.S. Code historical extraction · 10 U.S.C. § 801
Stored review status: historical_2024_not_currentness_verified. The source passage cites 10 U.S.C. § 801. This identifies an authority to review, not proof of applicability.
Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities
Any person subject to this chapter who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being, when such person—
(1) has a premeditated design to kill;
(2) intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm;
(3) is engaged in an act which is inherently dangerous to another and evinces a wanton disregard of human life; or
(4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, rape, rape of a child, sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, sexual abuse of a child, robbery, or aggravated arson;
is guilty of murder, and shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), such person shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct, unless such person is otherwise sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement entered into between the parties under [section 853a of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section853a&num=0&edition=prelim) (article 53a).
Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 10 U.S.C. § 918
Stored review status: release_metadata_unconfirmed. Same stored citation; legal effect and authority still require review.