22 U.S.C. § 7801 — Findings

Page 2009 TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE § 7801 (1) the term ‘‘agency’’ means an executive agency, as defined by section 105 of title 5; and (2) the term ‘‘detail’’ means the assignment or loan of an employee, without a change of position, from the agency by which such em- ployee is employed to the Corporation. (Pub. L. 108–199, div. D, title VI, § 617, Jan. 23, 2004, 118 Stat. 224.) § 7717. Personnel outside the United States (a) Assignment to United States embassies An employee of the Corporation, including an individual detailed to or contracted by the Cor- poration, may be assigned to a United States diplomatic mission or consular post or a United States Agency for International Development field mission. (b) Privileges and immunities The Secretary of State shall seek to ensure that an employee of the Corporation, including an individual detailed to or contracted by the Corporation, and the members of the family of such employee, while the employee is per- forming duties in any country or place outside the United States, enjoy the privileges and im- munities that are enjoyed by a member of the Foreign Service, or the family of a member of the Foreign Service, as appropriate, of com- parable rank and salary of such employee, if such employee or a member of the family of such employee is not a national of or perma- nently resident in such country or place. (c) Responsibility of chief of mission An employee of the Corporation, including an individual detailed to or contracted by the Cor- poration, and a member of the family of such employee, shall be subject to section 3927 of this title in the same manner as United States Gov- ernment employees while the employee is per- forming duties in any country or place outside the United States if such employee or member of the family of such employee is not a national of or permanently resident in such country or place. (Pub. L. 108–199, div. D, title VI, § 618, Jan. 23, 2004, 118 Stat. 225.) § 7718. Authorization of appropriations (a) Authorization of appropriations There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this chapter such sums as may be nec- essary for each of the fiscal years 2004 and 2005. (b) Allocation of funds (1) In general The Corporation may allocate or transfer to any agency of the United States Government any of the funds available for carrying out this chapter. Such funds shall be available for obli- gation and expenditure for the purposes for which the funds were authorized, in accord- ance with authority granted in this chapter or under authority governing the activities of the United States Government agency to which such funds are allocated or transferred. (2) Notification The Corporation shall notify the appropriate congressional committees not less than 15 days prior to an allocation or transfer of funds pursuant to paragraph (1). (Pub. L. 108–199, div. D, title VI, § 619, Jan. 23, 2004, 118 Stat. 225.) Editorial Notes REFERENCES IN TEXT This chapter, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (b)(1), was in the original ‘‘this title’’, meaning title VI of Pub. L. 108–199, div. D, Jan. 23, 2004, 118 Stat. 211, which is clas- sified generally to this chapter. For complete classi- fication of this title to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 7701 of this title and Tables. CHAPTER 85—NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS Sec. 7801. Findings. 7802. Purposes. 7803. Definitions. SUBCHAPTER I—PROMOTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF NORTH KOREANS 7811. Sense of Congress regarding negotiations with North Korea. 7812. Support for human rights and democracy pro- grams. 7813. Radio broadcasting to North Korea. 7814. Actions to promote freedom of information. 7815. United Nations Commission on Human Rights. 7816. Establishment of regional framework. 7817. Special Envoy on North Korean human rights issues. SUBCHAPTER II—ASSISTING NORTH KOREANS IN NEED 7831. Report on United States humanitarian assist- ance. 7832. Assistance provided inside North Korea. 7833. Assistance provided outside of North Korea. 7834. Briefings on the welfare of North Korean chil- dren. SUBCHAPTER III—PROTECTING NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES 7841. United States policy toward refugees and de- fectors. 7842. Eligibility for refugee or asylum consider- ation. 7843. Facilitating submission of applications for admission as a refugee. 7844. United Nations High Commissioner for Refu- gees. 7845. Annual reports. 7846. Sense of Congress on humanitarian coordina- tion related to the Korean Peninsula. § 7801. Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) According to the Department of State, the Government of North Korea is ‘‘a dictator- ship under the absolute rule of Kim Jong Il’’ that continues to commit numerous, serious human rights abuses. (2) The Government of North Korea attempts to control all information, artistic expression, academic works, and media activity inside North Korea and strictly curtails freedom of speech and access to foreign broadcasts. (3) The Government of North Korea subjects all its citizens to systematic, intensive polit- ical and ideological indoctrination in support of the cult of personality glorifying Kim Jong Page 2010 TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE § 7801 Il and the late Kim Il Sung that approaches the level of a state religion. (4) The Government of North Korea divides its population into categories, based on per- ceived loyalty to the leadership, which deter- mines access to food, employment, higher edu- cation, place of residence, medical facilities, and other resources. (5) According to the Department of State, ‘‘[t]he [North Korean] Penal Code is [d]raconian, stipulating capital punishment and confiscation of assets for a wide variety of ‘crimes against the revolution,’ including de- fection, attempted defection, slander of the policies of the Party or State, listening to for- eign broadcasts, writing ‘reactionary’ letters, and possessing reactionary printed matter’’. (6) The Government of North Korea executes political prisoners, opponents of the regime, some repatriated defectors, some members of underground churches, and others, sometimes at public meetings attended by workers, stu- dents, and schoolchildren. (7) The Government of North Korea holds an estimated 200,000 political prisoners in camps that its State Security Agency manages through the use of forced labor, beatings, tor- ture, and executions, and in which many pris- oners also die from disease, starvation, and ex- posure. (8) According to eyewitness testimony pro- vided to the United States Congress by North Korean camp survivors, camp inmates have been used as sources of slave labor for the pro- duction of export goods, as targets for martial arts practice, and as experimental victims in the testing of chemical and biological poisons. (9) According to credible reports, including eyewitness testimony provided to the United States Congress, North Korean Government officials prohibit live births in prison camps, and forced abortion and the killing of newborn babies are standard prison practices. (10) According to the Department of State, ‘‘[g]enuine religious freedom does not exist in North Korea’’ and, according to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, ‘‘[t]he North Korean state severely represses public and private religious activi- ties’’ with penalties that reportedly include arrest, imprisonment, torture, and sometimes execution. (11) More than 2,000,000 North Koreans are estimated to have died of starvation since the early 1990s because of the failure of the cen- tralized agricultural and public distribution systems operated by the Government of North Korea. (12) According to a 2002 United Nations-Eu- ropean Union survey, nearly one out of every ten children in North Korea suffers from acute malnutrition and four out of every ten chil- dren in North Korea are chronically malnour- ished. (13) Since 1995, the United States has pro- vided more than 2,000,000 tons of humanitarian food assistance to the people of North Korea, primarily through the World Food Program. (14) Although United States food assistance has undoubtedly saved many North Korean lives and there have been minor improvements in transparency relating to the distribution of such assistance in North Korea, the Govern- ment of North Korea continues to deny the World Food Program forms of access necessary to properly monitor the delivery of food aid, including the ability to conduct random site visits, the use of native Korean-speaking em- ployees, and travel access throughout North Korea. (15) The risk of starvation, the threat of per- secution, and the lack of freedom and oppor- tunity in North Korea have caused large num- bers, perhaps even hundreds of thousands, of North Koreans to flee their homeland, pri- marily into China. (16) North Korean women and girls, particu- larly those who have fled into China, are at risk of being kidnapped, trafficked, and sexu- ally exploited inside China, where many are sold as brides or concubines, or forced to work as prostitutes. (17) The Governments of China and North Korea have been conducting aggressive cam- paigns to locate North Koreans who are in China without permission and to forcibly re- turn them to North Korea, where they rou- tinely face torture and imprisonment, and sometimes execution. (18) Despite China’s obligations as a party to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Pro- tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, China routinely classifies North Koreans seek- ing asylum in China as mere ‘‘economic mi- grants’’ and returns them to North Korea without regard to the serious threat of perse- cution they face upon their return. (19) The Government of China does not pro- vide North Koreans whose asylum requests are rejected a right to have the rejection reviewed prior to deportation despite its obligations under the 1951 United Nations Convention Re- lating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. (20) North Koreans who seek asylum while in China are routinely imprisoned and tortured, and in some cases killed, after they are re- turned to North Korea. (21) The Government of China has detained, convicted, and imprisoned foreign aid workers attempting to assist North Korean refugees in proceedings that did not comply with Chinese law or international standards. (22) In January 2000, North Korean agents in- side China allegedly abducted the Reverend Kim Dong-shik, a United States permanent resident and advocate for North Korean refu- gees, whose condition and whereabouts remain unknown. (23) Between 1994 and 2003, South Korea has admitted approximately 3,800 North Korean refugees for domestic resettlement, a number that is small in comparison with the total number of North Korean escapees but far greater than the number legally admitted in any other country. (24) Although the principal responsibility for North Korean refugee resettlement naturally falls to the Government of South Korea, the United States should play a leadership role in focusing international attention on the plight Page 2011 TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE § 7801 of these refugees, and formulating inter- national solutions to that profound humani- tarian dilemma. (25) In addition to infringing the rights of its own citizens, the Government of North Korea has been responsible in years past for the ab- duction of numerous citizens of South Korea and Japan, whose condition and whereabouts remain unknown. (Pub. L. 108–333, § 3, Oct. 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 1287.) Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries SHORT TITLE OF 2022 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 117–263, div. E, title LV, § 5580, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3371, provided that: ‘‘This subtitle [subtitle F (§§ 5580–5584) of title LV of div. E of Pub. L. 117–263, amending section 7814 of this title and enacting provi- sions set out as notes under section 7814 of this title] may be cited as the ‘Otto Warmbier Countering North Korean Censorship and Surveillance Act of 2022’.’’ SHORT TITLE OF 2018 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 115–198, § 1, July 20, 2018, 132 Stat. 1519, pro- vided that: ‘‘This Act [enacting section 7846 of this title, amending sections 7812 to 7814, 7817, 7831, 7833, and 7845 of this title, repealing section 9253 of this title, and enacting provisions set out as a note under this sec- tion] may be cited as the ‘North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2017’.’’ SHORT TITLE OF 2013 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 112–264, § 1, Jan. 14, 2013, 126 Stat. 2432, pro- vided that: ‘‘This Act [enacting section 7834 of this title and provisions set out as a note under section 7834 of this title] may be cited as the ‘North Korean Child Wel- fare Act of 2012’.’’ SHORT TITLE OF 2012 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 112–172, § 1, Aug. 16, 2012, 126 Stat. 1307, pro- vided that: ‘‘This Act [amending sections 7812, 7814, 7817, 7831, 7833, and 7845 of this title and enacting provi- sions set out as a note under this section] may be cited as the ‘Ambassador James R. Lilley and Congressman Stephen J. Solarz North Korea Human Rights Reau- thorization Act of 2012’.’’ SHORT TITLE OF 2008 AMENDMENT Pub. L. 110–346, § 1, Oct. 7, 2008, 122 Stat. 3939, provided that: ‘‘This Act [amending sections 7803, 7812, 7814, 7817, 7831, 7833, and 7845 of this title and enacting provisions set out as notes under this section] may be cited as the ‘North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008’.’’ SHORT TITLE Pub. L. 108–333, § 1, Oct. 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 1287, pro- vided that: ‘‘This Act [enacting this chapter] may be cited as the ‘North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004’.’’ FINDINGS Pub. L. 115–198, § 2, July 20, 2018, 132 Stat. 1519, pro- vided that: ‘‘Congress makes the following findings: ‘‘(1) In 2014, the United Nations Commission of In- quiry (COI) on Human Rights in the Democratic Peo- ple’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) found that the grave human rights violations still being perpetrated against the people of North Korea, due to policies es- tablished at the highest level of the state, amount to crimes against humanity. Crimes include forced star- vation, sexual violence against women and children, restrictions on freedom of movement, arbitrary de- tention, torture, executions, and enforced disappear- ances, among other hardships. ‘‘(2) The COI also noted that the Government of the People’s Republic of China is aiding and abetting in crimes against humanity by forcibly repatriating North Korean refugees back to the DPRK. Upon repa- triation, North Koreans are sent to prison camps, tor- tured, or even executed. The Government of the Peo- ple’s Republic of China’s forcible repatriation of North Korean refugees violates its obligation to up- hold the principle of non-refoulement, under the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at Geneva July 28, 1951 (as made appli- cable by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu- gees, done at New York January 31, 1967 (19 UST 6223)). ‘‘(3) Estimates from the COI suggest that between 80,000 and 120,000 people are believed to be imprisoned in political prison camps in North Korea. Another 70,000 are believed to be held at other detention facili- ties. Prisoners in both situations are subject to harsh conditions, limited food, sexual abuse, and in most cases hard labor. ‘‘(4) One of the findings of the COI report was the persecution of religious minorities, especially Chris- tians. There is effectively no freedom of religion in North Korea, only worship of the Kim family. Chris- tians are subjected to particularly acute persecution. It has been reported that Christians in North Korea have been tortured, forcibly detained, and even exe- cuted for possessing a Bible or professing Christi- anity. ‘‘(5) North Korea profits from its human rights abuses. A 2014 report from the Asian Institute for Pol- icy Studies suggests that there are nearly 50,000 North Korean workers forced to labor overseas, some- times without compensation, and for as much as 20 hours at a time. Workers that received compensation were not to be paid more than $150 per month, which is between 10 to 20 percent of the value of the labor they performed. Based on this report, the regime may profit as much as $360,000,000 annually from just 50,000 laborers. ‘‘(6) On July 6, 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and other senior North Korean officials for human rights violations as required by the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–122) [22 U.S.C. 9201 et seq.]. This was the first time that the United States had designated North Korean officials for human rights abuses. ‘‘(7) The North Korea Sanctions and Policy En- hancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–122) requires the President to impose mandatory penalties under United States law on any person that ‘knowingly en- gages in, is responsible for, or facilitates serious human rights abuses by the Government of North Korea’. ‘‘(8) Although the United States Refugee Admis- sions Program remains the largest in the world by far, the United States has only resettled 212 refugees from North Korea since the date of the enactment of the North Korea[n] Human Rights Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–333) [Oct. 18, 2004].’’ Pub. L. 112–172, § 2, Aug. 16, 2012, 126 Stat. 1307, pro- vided that: ‘‘Congress finds the following: ‘‘(1) The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–333; 22 U.S.C. 7801 et seq.) and the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Public Law 110–346) [see Short Title of 2008 Amendment note above] were the product of broad, bipartisan consensus regarding the promotion of human rights, transparency in the delivery of human- itarian assistance, and the importance of refugee pro- tection. ‘‘(2) In addition to the longstanding commitment of the United States to refugee and human rights advo- cacy, the United States is home to the largest Korean population outside of northeast Asia, and many in the two-million strong Korean-American community have family ties to North Korea. ‘‘(3) Although the transition to the leadership of Kim Jong-Un after the death of Kim Jong-Il has in- troduced new uncertainties and possibilities, the fun- Page 2012 TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE § 7801 damental human rights and humanitarian conditions inside North Korea remain deplorable, North Korean refugees remain acutely vulnerable, and the findings in the 2004 Act and 2008 Reauthorization remain sub- stantially accurate today. ‘‘(4) Media and nongovernmental organizations have reported a crackdown on unauthorized border crossing during the North Korean leadership transi- tion, including authorization for on-the-spot execu- tion of attempted defectors, as well as an increase in punishments during the 100-day official mourning pe- riod after the death of Kim Jong-Il. ‘‘(5) Notwithstanding high-level advocacy by the United States, the Republic of Korea, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, China has continued to forcibly repatriate North Koreans, in- cluding dozens of presumed refugees who were the subject of international humanitarian appeals during February and March of 2012. ‘‘(6) The United States, which has the largest inter- national refugee resettlement program in the world, has resettled 128 North Koreans since passage of the 2004 Act, including 23 North Koreans in fiscal year 2011. ‘‘(7) In a career of Asia-focused public service that spanned more than half a century, including service as a senior United States diplomat in times and places where there were significant challenges to human rights, Ambassador James R. Lilley also served as a director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea until his death in 2009. ‘‘(8) Following his 18 years of service in the House of Representatives, including as Chairman of the For- eign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Stephen J. Solarz committed himself to, in his words, highlighting ‘the plight of ordinary North Koreans who are denied even the most basic human rights, and the dramatic and heart-rending stories of those who risk their lives in the struggle to escape what is certainly the world’s worst nightmare’, and served as co-chairman of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea until his death in 2010.’’ Pub. L. 110–346, § 2, Oct. 7, 2008, 122 Stat. 3939, provided that: ‘‘Congress finds the following: ‘‘(1) The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–333; 22 U.S.C. 7801 et seq.) (in this sec- tion referred to as ‘the Act’) was the product of broad, bipartisan consensus in Congress regarding the promotion of human rights, transparency in the de- livery of humanitarian assistance, and refugee pro- tection. ‘‘(2) In addition to the longstanding commitment of the United States to refugee and human rights advo- cacy, the United States is home to the largest Korean population outside of northeast Asia, and many in the two-million strong Korean-American community have family ties to North Korea. ‘‘(3) Human rights and humanitarian conditions in- side North Korea are deplorable, North Korean refu- gees remain acutely vulnerable, and the findings in section 3 of the Act [22 U.S.C. 7801] remain accurate today. ‘‘(4) The Government of China is conducting an in- creasingly aggressive campaign to locate and forcibly return border-crossers to North Korea, where they routinely face torture and imprisonment, and some- times execution. According to recent reports, the Chinese Government is shutting down Christian churches and imprisoning people who help North Ko- rean defectors and has increased the bounty paid for turning in North Korean refugees. ‘‘(5) In an attempt to deter escape attempts, the Government of North Korea has reportedly stepped up its public execution of border-crossers and those who help others cross into China. ‘‘(6) In spite of the requirement of the Act that the Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea (the ‘Special Envoy’) report to the Congress no later than April 16, 2005, a Special Envoy was not appointed until August 19, 2005, more than four months after the reporting deadline. ‘‘(7) The Special Envoy appointed by the President has filled that position on a part-time basis only. ‘‘(8) Since the passage of the North Korean Human Rights Act, Congress has on several occasions ex- pressed interest in the status of North Korean refu- gees, and on February 21, 2006, a bipartisan group of senior Members of the House and Senate wrote Sec- retary of State Condoleezza Rice ‘to express [their] deep concern for the lack of progress in funding and implementing the key provisions of the North Korean Human Rights Act’, particularly the lack of North Korean refugee admissions to the United States. ‘‘(9) Although the United States refugee resettle- ment program remains the largest in the world by far, the United States has resettled only 37 North Ko- reans in the period from 2004 through 2007. ‘‘(10) From the end of 2004 through 2007, the Repub- lic of Korea resettled 5,961 North Koreans. ‘‘(11) Extensive delays in assessment and processing have led numerous North Korean refugees to abandon their quest for United States resettlement, and long waits (of more than a year in some cases) have been the source of considerable discouragement and frus- tration among refugees, many of whom are awaiting United States resettlement in circumstances that are unsafe and insecure. ‘‘(12) From 2000 through 2006, the United States granted asylum to 15 North Koreans, as compared to 60 North Korean asylum grantees in the United King- dom, and 135 in Germany during that same period.’’ SENSE OF CONGRESS Pub. L. 110–346, § 3, Oct. 7, 2008, 122 Stat. 3940, provided that: ‘‘It is the sense of Congress that— ‘‘(1) the United States should continue to make it a priority to seek broader permission and greater co- operation from foreign governments to allow the United States to process North Korean refugees over- seas for resettlement in the United States, through persistent diplomacy by senior officials of the United States, including United States ambassadors to Asia- Pacific nations; ‘‘(2) at the same time that careful screening of in- tending refugees is important, the United States also should make every effort to ensure that its screening, processing, and resettlement of North Korean refu- gees are as efficient and expeditious as possible; ‘‘(3) the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues should be a full-time position within the Department of State in order to properly promote and coordinate North Korean human rights and hu- manitarian issues, and to participate in policy plan- ning and implementation with respect to refugee issues, as intended by the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–333; 22 U.S.C. 7801 et seq.); ‘‘(4) in an effort to more efficiently and actively participate in humanitarian burden-sharing, the United States should approach our ally, the Republic of Korea, to revisit and explore new opportunities for coordinating efforts to screen and resettle North Ko- reans who have expressed a wish to pursue resettle- ment in the United States and have not yet availed themselves of any right to citizenship they may enjoy under the Constitution of the Republic of Korea; and ‘‘(5) because there are genuine refugees among North Koreans fleeing into China who face severe punishments upon their forcible return, the United States should urge the Government of China to— ‘‘(A) immediately halt its forcible repatriation of North Koreans; ‘‘(B) fulfill its obligations pursuant to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Sta- tus of Refugees, and the 1995 Agreement on the Up- grading of the UNHCR Mission in the People’s Re- public of China to UNHCR Branch Office in the Peo- ple’s Republic of China; and ‘‘(C) allow the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) unimpeded access to North Page 2013 TITLE 22—FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE § 7813 Koreans inside China to determine whether they are refugees and whether they require assistance.’’ § 7802. Purposes The purposes of this chapter are— (1) to promote respect for and protection of fundamental human rights in North Korea; (2) to promote a more durable humanitarian solution to the plight of North Korean refu- gees; (3) to promote increased monitoring, access, and transparency in the provision of humani- tarian assistance inside North Korea; (4) to promote the free flow of information into and out of North Korea; and (5) to promote progress toward the peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula under a democratic system of government. (Pub. L. 108–333, § 4, Oct. 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 1290.) § 7803. Definitions In this chapter: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com- mittees’’ means— (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (2) China The term ‘‘China’’ means the People’s Re- public of China. (3) Humanitarian assistance The term ‘‘humanitarian assistance’’ means assistance to meet humanitarian needs, in- cluding needs for food, medicine, medical sup- plies, clothing, and shelter. (4) North Korea The term ‘‘North Korea’’ means the Demo- cratic People’s Republic of Korea. (5) North Koreans The term ‘‘North Koreans’’ means persons who are citizens or nationals of North Korea. (6) South Korea The term ‘‘South Korea’’ means the Repub- lic of Korea. (Pub. L. 108–333, § 5, Oct. 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 1290; Pub. L. 110–346, § 4, Oct. 7, 2008, 122 Stat. 3941.) Editorial Notes AMENDMENTS 2008—Par. (1)(A). Pub. L. 110–346 substituted ‘‘Foreign Affairs’’ for ‘‘International Relations’’. SUBCHAPTER I—PROMOTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF NORTH KOREANS § 7811. Sense of Congress regarding negotiations with North Korea It is the sense of Congress that the human rights of North Koreans should remain a key element in future negotiations between the United States, North Korea, and other con- cerned parties in Northeast Asia. (Pub. L. 108–333, title I, § 101, Oct. 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 1290.) § 7812. Support for human rights and democracy programs (a) Support The President is authorized to provide grants to private, nonprofit organizations to support programs that promote human rights, democ- racy, rule of law, and the development of a mar- ket economy in North Korea. Such programs may include appropriate educational and cul- tural exchange programs with North Korean participants, to the extent not otherwise prohib- ited by law. The President is also authorized to provide grants to entities to undertake research on North Korea’s denial of human rights, includ- ing on the political and military chains of com- mand responsible for authorizing and imple- menting systemic human rights abuses, includ- ing at prison camps and detention facilities where political prisoners are held. (b) Authorization of appropriations (1) In general There are authorized to be appropriated to the President $2,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2005 through 2008 and $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2009 through 2022 to carry out this section. (2) Availability Amounts appropriated pursuant to the au- thorization of appropriations under paragraph (1) are authorized to remain available until ex- pended. (Pub. L. 108–333, title I, § 102, Oct. 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 1290; Pub. L. 110–346, § 5, Oct. 7, 2008, 122 Stat. 3941; Pub. L. 112–172, § 4, Aug. 16, 2012, 126 Stat. 1308; Pub. L. 115–198, § 7(a), July 20, 2018, 132 Stat. 1523.) Editorial Notes AMENDMENTS 2018—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 115–198, § 7(a)(1), inserted at end ‘‘The President is also authorized to provide grants to entities to undertake research on North Korea’s de- nial of human rights, including on the political and military chains of command responsible for authorizing and implementing systemic human rights abuses, in- cluding at prison camps and detention facilities where political prisoners are held.’’ Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 115–198, § 7(a)(2), substituted ‘‘2022’’ for ‘‘2017’’. 2012—Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 112–172 substituted ‘‘2017’’ for ‘‘2012’’. 2008—Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 110–346 inserted ‘‘and $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2009 through 2012’’ after ‘‘2008’’. § 7813. Radio broadcasting to North Korea (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the United States should— (1) facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information in North Korea by increasing its support for broadcasting, including news rebroadcasting, to North Korea, and that the Broadcasting Board of Governors should in- crease such broadcasts, including news re- broadcasts, to North Korea from current lev- els, with a goal of providing 12-hour-per-day broadcasting to North Korea, including broad-