50 U.S.C. § 2357a — Definitions

Page 385 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 2357a (10) Plans for studying the merits and costs of establishing a global network of means for detecting and responding to terroristic or other criminal use of biological agents against people or other forms of life in the United States or any foreign country. (c) Report (1) At the same time that the President sub- mits the budget for fiscal year 1998 to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, the Presi- dent shall submit to Congress a report that sets forth the comprehensive program developed under subsection (a). (2) The report shall include the following: (A) The specific plans for the program that are required under subsection (b). (B) Estimates of the funds necessary, by agency or department, for carrying out such plans in fiscal year 1998 and the following five fiscal years. (3) The report shall be in an unclassified form. If there is a classified version of the report, the President shall submit the classified version at the same time. (Pub. L. 104–201, div. A, title XIV, § 1443, Sept. 23, 1996, 110 Stat. 2728.) Editorial Notes REFERENCES IN TEXT This chapter, referred to in subsec. (a), was in the original ‘‘this title’’, meaning title XIV of div. A of Pub. L. 104–201, Sept. 23, 1996, 110 Stat. 2714, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of title XIV to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2301 of this title and Tables. § 2354. Termination After September 30, 1999, the President— (1) is not required to maintain a National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters under section 2351 of this title; and (2) may terminate the Committee on Non- proliferation established under section 2352 of this title. (Pub. L. 104–201, div. A, title XIV, § 1444, Sept. 23, 1996, 110 Stat. 2730; Pub. L. 105–261, div. A, title X, § 1069(c)(3), Oct. 17, 1998, 112 Stat. 2136.) Editorial Notes AMENDMENTS 1998—Pub. L. 105–261 made technical amendments to references in original act which appear in par. (1) as reference to section 2351 of this title and in par. (2) as reference to section 2352 of this title. SUBCHAPTER IV–A—NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE COORDINATION Editorial Notes CODIFICATION Subchapter was enacted as part of the Nonprolifera- tion Assistance Coordination Act of 2002, and also as part of the Security Assistance Act of 2002 and the For- eign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, and not as part of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass De- struction Act of 1996 which comprises this chapter. § 2357. Findings Congress finds that— (1) United States nonproliferation efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union have achieved important results in en- suring that weapons of mass destruction, weapons-usable material and technology, and weapons-related knowledge remain beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons-proliferating states; (2) although these efforts are in the United States national security interest, the effec- tiveness of these efforts has suffered from a lack of coordination within and among United States Government agencies; (3) increased spending and investment by the United States private sector on nonprolifera- tion efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, specifically, spending and investment by the United States private sector in job creation initiatives and proposals for unemployed Russian Federation weapons scientists and technicians, are making an im- portant contribution in ensuring that knowl- edge related to weapons of mass destruction remains beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons-proliferating states; and (4) increased spending and investment by the United States private sector on nonprolifera- tion efforts in the independent states of the former Soviet Union make advisable the es- tablishment of a coordinating body to ensure that United States public and private efforts are not in conflict, and to ensure that public spending on efforts by the independent states of the former Soviet Union is maximized to ensure efficiency and further United States national security interests. (Pub. L. 107–228, div. B, title XIII, § 1332, Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 1448.) Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries SHORT TITLE For short title of subtitle C (§§ 1331–1339) of title XIII of div. B of Pub. L. 107–228, which enacted this sub- chapter, as the ‘‘Nonproliferation Assistance Coordina- tion Act of 2002’’, see section 1331 of Pub. L. 107–228, set out as a note under section 2301 of this title. § 2357a. Definitions (a) Independent states of the former Soviet Union In this subchapter, the term ‘‘independent states of the former Soviet Union’’ has the meaning given the term in section 5801 of title 22. (b) Appropriate committees of Congress In this subchapter, the term ‘‘the appropriate committees of Congress’’ means the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Ap- propriations of the Senate and the Committees on International Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (Pub. L. 107–228, div. B, title XIII, § 1333, Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 1449.) Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries CHANGE OF NAME Committee on International Relations of House of Representatives changed to Committee on Foreign Af- Page 386 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 2357b 1 So in original. Probably should be ‘‘department’s’’. fairs of House of Representatives by House Resolution No. 6, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Jan. 5, 2007. § 2357b. Establishment of Committee on Non- proliferation Assistance (a) In general The President shall establish a mechanism to coordinate, with the maximum possible effec- tiveness and efficiency, the efforts of United States Government departments and agencies engaged in formulating policy and carrying out programs for achieving nonproliferation and threat reduction. (b) Membership The coordination mechanism established pur- suant to subsection (a) shall include— (1) representatives designated by— (A) the Secretary of State; (B) the Secretary of Defense; (C) the Secretary of Energy; (D) the Secretary of Commerce; (E) the Attorney General; and (F) the Director of the Office of Homeland Security, or the head of a successor depart- ment or agency; and (2) such other executive branch officials as the President may select. (c) Level of representation To the maximum extent possible, each depart- ment 1 or agency’s representative designated pursuant to subsection (b)(1) shall be an official of that department or agency who has been ap- pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. (d) Chair The President shall designate an official to di- rect the coordination mechanism established pursuant to subsection (a). The official so des- ignated may invite the head of any other depart- ment or agency of the United States to des- ignate a representative of that department or agency to participate from time to time in the activities of the Committee. (Pub. L. 107–228, div. B, title XIII, § 1334, Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 1449.) Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries RUSSIAN FEDERATION DEBT REDUCTION FOR NONPROLIFERATION Pub. L. 107–228, div. B, title XIII, subtitle B, Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 1442, as amended by Pub. L. 108–271, § 8(b), July 7, 2004, 118 Stat. 814; Pub. L. 112–74, div. I, title VII, § 7034(n), Dec. 23, 2011, 125 Stat. 1217, provided that: ‘‘SEC. 1311. SHORT TITLE. ‘‘This subtitle may be cited as the ‘Russian Federa- tion Debt for Nonproliferation Act of 2002’. ‘‘SEC. 1312. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES. ‘‘(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: ‘‘(1) It is in the vital security interests of the United States to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to additional states or to terrorist organizations, and to ensure that other nations’ obli- gations to modify their stockpiles of such arms in ac- cordance with treaties, executive agreements, or po- litical commitments are fulfilled. ‘‘(2) In particular, it is in the vital national secu- rity interests of the United States to ensure that— ‘‘(A) all stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons- usable nuclear material in the Russian Federation are secure and accounted for; ‘‘(B) stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usa- ble nuclear material that are excess to military needs in the Russian Federation are monitored and reduced; ‘‘(C) any chemical or biological weapons, related materials, and facilities in the Russian Federation are destroyed; ‘‘(D) the Russian Federation’s nuclear weapons complex is reduced to a size appropriate to its post- Cold War missions, and its experts in weapons of mass destruction technologies are shifted to gainful and sustainable civilian employment; ‘‘(E) the Russian Federation’s export control sys- tem blocks any proliferation of weapons of mass de- struction, the means of delivering such weapons, and materials, equipment, know-how, or technology that would be used to develop, produce, or deliver such weapons; and ‘‘(F) these objectives are accomplished with suffi- cient monitoring and transparency to provide con- fidence that they have in fact been accomplished and that the funds provided to accomplish these ob- jectives have been spent efficiently and effectively. ‘‘(3) United States programs should be designed to accomplish these vital objectives in the Russian Fed- eration as rapidly as possible, and the President should develop and present to Congress a plan for doing so. ‘‘(4) Substantial progress has been made in United States-Russian Federation cooperative programs to achieve these objectives, but much more remains to be done to reduce the urgent risks to United States national security posed by the current state of the Russian Federation’s weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and complexes. ‘‘(5) The threats posed by inadequate management of weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and com- plexes in the Russian Federation remain urgent. Inci- dents in years immediately preceding 2001, which have been cited by the Russia Task Force of the Sec- retary of Energy Advisory Board, include— ‘‘(A) a conspiracy at one of the Russian Federa- tion’s largest nuclear weapons facilities to steal nearly enough highly enriched uranium for a nu- clear bomb; ‘‘(B) an attempt by an employee of the Russian Federation’s premier nuclear weapons facility to sell nuclear weapons designs to agents of Iraq and Afghanistan; and ‘‘(C) the theft of radioactive material from a Rus- sian Federation submarine base. ‘‘(6) Addressing these threats to United States and world security will ultimately consume billions of dollars, a burden that will have to be shared by the Russian Federation, the United States, and other governments, if these threats are to be neutralized. ‘‘(7) The creation of new funding streams could ac- celerate progress in reducing these threats to United States security and help the government of the Rus- sian Federation to fulfill its responsibility for secure management of its weapons stockpiles and complexes as United States assistance phases out. ‘‘(8) The Russian Federation has a significant for- eign debt, a substantial proportion of which it inher- ited from the Soviet Union. ‘‘(9) Past debt-for-environment exchanges, in which a portion of a country’s foreign debt is canceled in re- turn for certain environmental commitments or pay- ments by that country, suggest that a debt-for-non- proliferation exchange with the Russian Federation could be designed to provide additional funding for nonproliferation and arms reduction initiatives. ‘‘(10) Most of the Russian Federation’s official bi- lateral debt is held by United States allies that are advanced industrial democracies. Since the issues de-