6 U.S.C. § 592 — Responsibilities

Page 293 TITLE 6—DOMESTIC SECURITY § 592 Act, except for the functions, personnel, budget au- thority, and assets of such office necessary to per- form the functions specified in section 710 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 [6 U.S.C. 350] (relat- ing to workforce health and medical support), as added by this Act; and ‘‘(B) the Management Directorate of the Depart- ment of Homeland Security all functions, personnel, budget authority, and assets of the Office of Health Affairs, as in existence on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act, that are necessary to per- form the functions of such section 710. ‘‘(2) ABOLISHMENT.—Upon completion of all transfers pursuant to paragraph (1)— ‘‘(A) the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office of the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of Health Affairs of the Department of Homeland Secu- rity are abolished; and ‘‘(B) the positions of Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs and Director for Domestic Nuclear Detection are abolished.’’ DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES Pub. L. 115–387, § 2(g), Dec. 21, 2018, 132 Stat. 5169, pro- vided that: ‘‘Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 21, 2018], and annually thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall provide a briefing and report to the appropriate con- gressional committees (as defined in section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101)) on— ‘‘(1) the organization and management of the chem- ical, biological, radiological, and nuclear activities of the Department of Homeland Security, including re- search and development activities, and the location of each activity under the organizational structure of the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office; ‘‘(2) a comprehensive inventory of chemical, bio- logical, radiological, and nuclear activities, including research and development activities, of the Depart- ment of Homeland Security, highlighting areas of collaboration between components, coordination with other agencies, and the effectiveness and accomplish- ments of consolidated chemical, biological, radio- logical, and nuclear activities of the Department of Homeland Security, including research and develop- ment activities; ‘‘(3) information relating to how the organizational structure of the Countering Weapons of Mass De- struction Office will enhance the development of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear prior- ities and capabilities across the Department of Home- land Security; ‘‘(4) a discussion of any resulting cost savings and efficiencies gained through activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2); ‘‘(5) information on how the Assistant Secretary for the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office is coordinating with the Under Secretary of Science and Technology of the Department of Homeland Security on research and development activities; and ‘‘(6) recommendations for any necessary statutory changes, or, if no statutory changes are necessary, an explanation of why no statutory or organizational changes are necessary.’’ PART B—MISSION OF THE OFFICE § 591g. Mission of the Office The Office shall be responsible for coordi- nating with other Federal efforts and developing a strategy and policy for the Department to plan for, detect, and protect against the importation, possession, storage, transportation, develop- ment, or use of unauthorized chemical, biologi- cal, radiological, or nuclear materials, devices, or agents in the United States and to protect against an attack using such materials, devices, or agents against the people, territory, or inter- ests of the United States. (Pub. L. 107–296, title XIX, § 1921, as added Pub. L. 115–387, § 2(a)(3), Dec. 21, 2018, 132 Stat. 5163.) § 591h. Relationship to other Department compo- nents and Federal agencies (a) In general The authority of the Assistant Secretary under this subchapter shall not affect or dimin- ish the authority or the responsibility of any of- ficer of the Department or any officer of any other Federal agency with respect to the com- mand, control, or direction of the functions, per- sonnel, funds, assets, or liabilities of any compo- nent of the Department or any other Federal agency. (b) Office for Strategy, Policy, and Plans Not later than one year after December 21, 2018, the Assistant Secretary shall, in coordina- tion with the Under Secretary for Strategy, Pol- icy, and Plans, submit to the appropriate con- gressional committees a strategy and implemen- tation plan to direct programs within the Office and to integrate those programs with other pro- grams and activities of the Department. (c) Federal Emergency Management Agency Nothing in this subchapter or any other provi- sion of law may be construed to affect or reduce the responsibilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency or the Administrator of the Agency, including the diversion of any asset, function, or mission of the Agency or the Ad- ministrator of the Agency. (Pub. L. 107–296, title XIX, § 1922, as added Pub. L. 115–387, § 2(a)(3), Dec. 21, 2018, 132 Stat. 5163.) § 592. Responsibilities (a) Mission The Office shall be responsible for coordi- nating Federal efforts to detect and protect against the unauthorized importation, posses- sion, storage, transportation, development, or use of a nuclear explosive device, fissile mate- rial, or radiological material in the United States, and to protect against attack using such devices or materials against the people, terri- tory, or interests of the United States and, to this end, shall— (1) serve as the primary entity of the United States Government to further develop, ac- quire, and support the deployment of an en- hanced domestic system to detect and report on attempts to import, possess, store, trans- port, develop, or use an unauthorized nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radio- logical material in the United States, and im- prove that system over time; (2) enhance and coordinate the nuclear de- tection efforts of Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector to ensure a managed, coordinated response; (3) establish, with the approval of the Sec- retary and in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy, additional protocols and procedures for use within the United States to Page 294 TITLE 6—DOMESTIC SECURITY § 592 ensure that the detection of unauthorized nu- clear explosive devices, fissile material, or ra- diological material is promptly reported to the Attorney General, the Secretary, the Sec- retary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and other appropriate officials or their respec- tive designees for appropriate action by law enforcement, military, emergency response, or other authorities; (4) develop, with the approval of the Sec- retary and in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy, an enhanced global nuclear detection architec- ture with implementation under which— (A) the Office will be responsible for the implementation of the domestic portion of the global architecture; (B) the Secretary of Defense will retain re- sponsibility for implementation of Depart- ment of Defense requirements within and outside the United States; and (C) the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Energy will maintain their respective responsibilities for policy guidance and implementation of the portion of the global architecture outside the United States, which will be imple- mented consistent with applicable law and relevant international arrangements; (5) ensure that the expertise necessary to ac- curately interpret detection data is made available in a timely manner for all tech- nology deployed by the Office to implement the global nuclear detection architecture; (6) conduct, support, coordinate, and encour- age an aggressive, expedited, evolutionary, and transformational program of research and development to generate and improve tech- nologies to detect and prevent the illicit entry, transport, assembly, or potential use within the United States of a nuclear explo- sive device or fissile or radiological material, and coordinate with the Under Secretary for Science and Technology on basic and advanced or transformational research and development efforts relevant to the mission of both organi- zations; (7) carry out a program to test and evaluate technology for detecting a nuclear explosive device and fissile or radiological material, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, as appropriate, and establish performance metrics for evalu- ating the effectiveness of individual detectors and detection systems in detecting such de- vices or material— (A) under realistic operational and envi- ronmental conditions; and (B) against realistic adversary tactics and countermeasures; (8) support and enhance the effective sharing and use of appropriate information generated by the intelligence community, law enforce- ment agencies, counterterrorism community, other government agencies, and foreign gov- ernments, as well as provide appropriate infor- mation to such entities; (9) further enhance and maintain continuous awareness by analyzing information from all Office mission-related detection systems; (10) lead the development and implementa- tion of the national strategic five-year plan for improving the nuclear forensic and attri- bution capabilities of the United States re- quired under section 1036 of the National De- fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010; (11) establish, within the Office, the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center to provide centralized stewardship, planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, improvement, and in- tegration for all Federal nuclear forensics and attribution activities— (A) to ensure an enduring national tech- nical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen the collective response of the United States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear attacks; and (B) to coordinate and implement the na- tional strategic five-year plan referred to in paragraph (10); (12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program, which— (A) is devoted to developing and maintain- ing a vibrant and enduring academic path- way from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in nuclear and geochemical science specialties directly relevant to technical nu- clear forensics, including radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear physics, nuclear engi- neering, materials science, and analytical chemistry; (B) shall— (i) make available for undergraduate study student scholarships, with a dura- tion of up to 4 years per student, which shall include, if possible, at least 1 summer internship at a national laboratory or ap- propriate Federal agency in the field of technical nuclear forensics during the course of the student’s undergraduate ca- reer; (ii) make available for doctoral study student fellowships, with a duration of up to 5 years per student, which shall— (I) include, if possible, at least 2 sum- mer internships at a national laboratory or appropriate Federal agency in the field of technical nuclear forensics dur- ing the course of the student’s graduate career; and (II) require each recipient to commit to serve for 2 years in a post-doctoral po- sition in a technical nuclear forensics-re- lated specialty at a national laboratory or appropriate Federal agency after graduation; (iii) make available to faculty awards, with a duration of 3 to 5 years each, to en- sure faculty and their graduate students have a sustained funding stream; and (iv) place a particular emphasis on rein- vigorating technical nuclear forensics pro- grams while encouraging the participation of undergraduate students, graduate stu- dents, and university faculty from histori- cally Black colleges and universities, His- panic-serving institutions, Tribal Colleges and Universities, Asian American and Na- tive American Pacific Islander-serving in- stitutions, Alaska Native-serving institu- Page 295 TITLE 6—DOMESTIC SECURITY § 592 1 So in original. Section 1059d of title 20 defines ‘‘Native Hawai- ian-serving institution’’. tions, and Hawaiian Native-serving insti- tutions; and (C) shall— (i) provide for the selection of individ- uals to receive scholarships or fellowships under this section through a competitive process primarily on the basis of academic merit and the nuclear forensics and attri- bution needs of the United States Govern- ment; (ii) provide for the setting aside of up to 10 percent of the scholarships or fellow- ships awarded under this section for indi- viduals who are Federal employees to en- hance the education of such employees in areas of critical nuclear forensics and at- tribution needs of the United States Gov- ernment, for doctoral education under the scholarship on a full-time or part-time basis; (iii) provide that the Secretary may enter into a contractual agreement with an institution of higher education under which the amounts provided for a scholar- ship under this section for tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses are paid di- rectly to the institution with respect to which such scholarship is awarded; (iv) require scholarship recipients to maintain satisfactory academic progress; and (v) require that— (I) a scholarship recipient who fails to maintain a high level of academic stand- ing, as defined by the Secretary, who is dismissed for disciplinary reasons from the educational institution such recipi- ent is attending, or who voluntarily ter- minates academic training before grad- uation from the educational program for which the scholarship was awarded shall be liable to the United States for repay- ment within 1 year after the date of such default of all scholarship funds paid to such recipient and to the institution of higher education on the behalf of such recipient, provided that the repayment period may be extended by the Secretary if the Secretary determines it necessary, as established by regulation; and (II) a scholarship recipient who, for any reason except death or disability, fails to begin or complete the post-doc- toral service requirements in a technical nuclear forensics-related specialty at a national laboratory or appropriate Fed- eral agency after completion of academic training shall be liable to the United States for an amount equal to— (aa) the total amount of the scholar- ship received by such recipient under this section; and (bb) the interest on such amounts which would be payable if at the time the scholarship was received such scholarship was a loan bearing interest at the maximum legally prevailing rate; (13) provide an annual report to Congress on the activities carried out under paragraphs (10), (11), and (12); and (14) perform other duties as assigned by the Secretary. (b) Definitions In this section: (1) Alaska Native-serving institution The term ‘‘Alaska Native-serving institu- tion’’ has the meaning given the term in sec- tion 1059d of title 20. (2) Asian American and Native American Pa- cific Islander-serving institution The term ‘‘Asian American and Native American Pacific Islander-serving institution’’ has the meaning given the term in section 1059g of title 20. (3) Hawaiian native-serving institution The term ‘‘Hawaiian native-serving institu- tion’’ 1 has the meaning given the term in sec- tion 1059d of title 20. (4) Hispanic-serving institution The term ‘‘Hispanic-serving institution’’ has the meaning given that term in section 1101a of title 20. (5) Historically Black college or university The term ‘‘historically Black college or uni- versity’’ has the meaning given the term ‘‘part B institution’’ in section 1061(2) of title 20. (6) Tribal College or University The term ‘‘Tribal College or University’’ has the meaning given that term in section 1059c(b) of title 20. (Pub. L. 107–296, title XIX, § 1923, formerly title XVIII, § 1802, as added Pub. L. 109–347, title V, § 501(a), Oct. 13, 2006, 120 Stat. 1932; renumbered title XIX, § 1902, Pub. L. 110–53, title I, § 104(a)(1), (2), Aug. 3, 2007, 121 Stat. 294; amended Pub. L. 111–140, § 4(a), Feb. 16, 2010, 124 Stat. 32; renum- bered § 1923 and amended Pub. L. 115–387, § 2(a)(5), (6), Dec. 21, 2018, 132 Stat. 5163, 5164.) Editorial Notes REFERENCES IN TEXT Section 1036 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, referred to in subsec. (a)(10), is section 1036 of Pub. L. 111–84, Oct. 28, 2009, 123 Stat. 2190, which is not classified to the Code. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables. AMENDMENTS 2018—Pub. L. 115–387, § 2(a)(6)(A), substituted ‘‘Re- sponsibilities’’ for ‘‘Mission of Office’’ in section catch- line. Subsec. (a)(11). Pub. L. 115–387, § 2(a)(6)(B), substituted ‘‘Office’’ for ‘‘Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’’ in in- troductory provisions. 2010—Subsec. (a)(10) to (14). Pub. L. 111–140, § 4(a)(1), added pars. (10) to (13) and redesignated former par. (10) as (14). Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 111–140, § 4(a)(2), added subsec. (b). Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries FINDINGS Pub. L. 111–140, § 2, Feb. 16, 2010, 124 Stat. 31, provided that: ‘‘Congress finds the following: Page 296 TITLE 6—DOMESTIC SECURITY § 592a 1 See References in Text note below. 2 See Change of Name note below. ‘‘(1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one of the most serious threats to the national security of the United States. In the wake of an attack, attri- bution of responsibility would be of utmost impor- tance. Because of the destructive power of a nuclear weapon, there could be little forensic evidence except the radioactive material in the weapon itself. ‘‘(2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using both existing techniques and those under development, it may be possible to identify the source and pathway of a weapon or material after it is interdicted or deto- nated. Though identifying intercepted smuggled ma- terial is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post- detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, and the challenges are compounded by the pressures and time constraints of performing forensics after a nuclear or radiological attack. ‘‘(3) A robust and well-known capability to identify the source of nuclear or radiological material in- tended for or used in an act of terror could also deter prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of effective attribution could compel improved security at material storage facilities, preventing the unwit- ting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials. ‘‘(4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear material and other radioactive materials confidently, it is nec- essary to have a robust capability to acquire samples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize sam- ples, and compare samples against known signatures of nuclear and radiological material. ‘‘(B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the det- onation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost importance. Over the past several decades, the ability of the United States to gather atmospheric samples— often the preferred method of sample acquisition— has diminished. This ability must be restored and modern techniques that could complement or replace existing techniques should be pursued. ‘‘(C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect tra- ditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may pro- vide the most useful tools for analysis and character- ization of samples. The number of radiochemistry programs and radiochemists in United States Na- tional Laboratories and universities has dramatically declined over the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and credible nuclear forensics program. ‘‘(5) Once samples have been acquired and charac- terized, it is necessary to compare the results against samples of known material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities, and from medical, aca- demic, commercial, and other facilities containing such materials, throughout the world. Some of these samples are available to the International Atomic Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and some countries maintain internal sample databases. Access to samples in many countries is limited by na- tional security concerns. ‘‘(6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is necessary to have the capability to positively iden- tify the source of nuclear or radiological material, and potential traffickers in nuclear or radiological material must be aware of that capability. Inter- national cooperation may be essential to catalogue all existing sources of nuclear or radiological mate- rial.’’ § 592a. Technology research and development in- vestment strategy for nuclear and radio- logical detection (a) In general Not later than 1 year after October 13, 2006, the Secretary, the Secretary of Energy, the Sec- retary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a research and development investment strategy for nu- clear and radiological detection. (b) Contents The strategy under subsection (a) shall in- clude— (1) a long term technology roadmap for nu- clear and radiological detection applicable to the mission needs of the Department, the De- partment of Energy, the Department of De- fense, and the Office of the Director of Na- tional Intelligence; (2) budget requirements necessary to meet the roadmap; and (3) documentation of how the Department, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the Office of the Director of Na- tional Intelligence will execute this strategy. (c) Initial report Not later than 1 year after October 13, 2006, the Secretary shall submit a report to the ap- propriate congressional committees on— (1) the impact of this title,1 and the amend- ments made by this title, on the responsibil- ities under section 182 of this title; and (2) the efforts of the Department to coordi- nate, integrate, and establish priorities for conducting all basic and applied research, de- velopment, testing, and evaluation of tech- nology and systems to detect, prevent, pro- tect, and respond to chemical, biological, radi- ological, and nuclear terrorist attacks. (d) Annual report The Director for Domestic Nuclear Detection 2 and the Under Secretary for Science and Tech- nology shall jointly and annually notify Con- gress that the strategy and technology road map for nuclear and radiological detection developed under subsections (a) and (b) is consistent with the national policy and strategic plan for identi- fying priorities, goals, objectives, and policies for coordinating the Federal Government’s civil- ian efforts to identify and develop counter- measures to terrorist threats from weapons of mass destruction that are required under sec- tion 182(2) of this title. (Pub. L. 109–347, title V, § 502, Oct. 13, 2006, 120 Stat. 1935.) Editorial Notes REFERENCES IN TEXT This title, referred to in subsec. (c)(1), is title V of Pub. L. 109–347, Oct. 13, 2006, 120 Stat. 1932, which en- acted this subchapter and this section and amended sections 113 and 182 of this title. For complete classi- fication of title V to the Code, see Tables. CODIFICATION Section was enacted as part of the Security and Ac- countability For Every Port Act of 2006, also known as the SAFE Port Act, and not as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 which comprises this chapter.