50 U.S.C. § 3369 — Cooperative actions to detect and counter

Page 849 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 3369 tion 7002 of Pub. L. 118–31, set out as a note under sec- tion 3003 of this title.] ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OPEN-SOURCE SUPPORT FOR EXPORT CONTROLS AND FOREIGN IN- VESTMENT SCREENING Pub. L. 117–263, div. F, title LXIII, § 6311, Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3508, provided that: ‘‘(a) PILOT PROGRAM TO ASSESS OPEN SOURCE SUPPORT FOR EXPORT CONTROLS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT SCREENING.— ‘‘(1) PILOT PROGRAM AUTHORIZED.—The Director of National Intelligence shall designate an element of the intelligence community to carry out a pilot pro- gram to assess the feasibility and advisability of pro- viding enhanced intelligence support, including intel- ligence derived from open source, publicly and com- mercially available information— ‘‘(A) to the Department of Commerce to support the export control and investment screening func- tions of the Department; and ‘‘(B) to the Department of Homeland Security to support the export control functions of the Depart- ment. ‘‘(2) AUTHORITY.—In carrying out the pilot program required by paragraph (1), the element designated by the Director under such paragraph— ‘‘(A) shall establish a process for the provision of information as described in such paragraph; and ‘‘(B) may— ‘‘(i) acquire and prepare data, consistent with applicable provisions of law and Executive orders; ‘‘(ii) modernize analytic systems, including through the acquisition, development, or applica- tion of automated tools; and ‘‘(iii) establish standards and policies regarding the acquisition, treatment, and sharing of open source, publicly and commercially available in- formation. ‘‘(3) DURATION.—The pilot program required by paragraph (1) shall be carried out during a 3-year pe- riod. ‘‘(b) PLAN AND REPORT REQUIRED.— ‘‘(1) DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON- GRESS.—In this subsection, the term ‘appropriate committees of Congress’ means— ‘‘(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af- fairs, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on Ap- propriations of the Senate; and ‘‘(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel- ligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Committee on Ap- propriations of the House of Representatives. ‘‘(2) PLAN.— ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 23, 2022], the Director shall, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Secu- rity, submit to the appropriate committees of Con- gress a plan to carry out the pilot program required by subsection (a)(1). ‘‘(B) CONTENTS.—The plan submitted under sub- paragraph (A) shall include the following: ‘‘(i) A list, developed in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, of the activities of the De- partment of Commerce and the Department of Homeland Security that will be supported by the pilot program. ‘‘(ii) A plan for measuring the effectiveness of the pilot program and the value of open source, publicly and commercially available information to the export control and investment screening missions. ‘‘(3) REPORT.— ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 540 days after the date on which the Director submits the plan under paragraph (2)(A), the Director shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the findings of the Director with respect to the pilot program. ‘‘(B) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under sub- paragraph (A) shall include the following: ‘‘(i) An assessment of the feasibility and advis- ability of providing information as described in subsection (a)(1). ‘‘(ii) An assessment of the value of open source, publicly and commercially available information to the export control and investment screening missions, using the measures of effectiveness under paragraph (2)(B)(ii). ‘‘(iii) Identification of opportunities for and barriers to more effective use of open source, pub- licly and commercially available information by the intelligence community.’’ [For definition of ‘‘intelligence community’’ as used in section 6311 of Pub. L. 117–263, set out above, see sec- tion 6002 of Pub. L. 117–263, set out as a note under sec- tion 3003 of this title.] § 3368. Assistance for governmental entities and private entities in recognizing online violent extremist content (a) Assistance to recognize online violent extrem- ist content Not later than 180 days after May 5, 2017, and consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, the Director of National Intelligence shall publish on a publicly available Internet website a list of all logos, symbols, in- signia, and other markings commonly associ- ated with, or adopted by, an organization des- ignated by the Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization under section 1189(a) of title 8. (b) Updates The Director shall update the list published under subsection (a) every 180 days until Decem- ber 22, 2023. (Pub. L. 115–31, div. N, title IV, § 403, May 5, 2017, 131 Stat. 820; Pub. L. 118–31, div. G, title III, § 7327(d), Dec. 22, 2023, 137 Stat. 1045.) Editorial Notes AMENDMENTS 2023—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 118–31 substituted ‘‘until December 22, 2023’’ for ‘‘or more frequently as needed’’. § 3369. Cooperative actions to detect and counter foreign influence operations (a) Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Russian Federation, through mili- tary intelligence units, also known as the ‘‘GRU’’, and Kremlin-linked troll organiza- tions often referred to as the ‘‘Internet Re- search Agency’’, deploy information warfare operations against the United States, its allies and partners, with the goal of advancing the strategic interests of the Russian Federation. (2) One line of effort deployed as part of these information warfare operations is the weaponization of social media platforms with the goals of intensifying societal tensions, un- dermining trust in governmental institutions within the United States, its allies and part- ners in the West, and generally sowing divi- sion, fear, and confusion. Page 850 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 3369 (3) These information warfare operations are a threat to the national security of the United States and that of the allies and partners of the United States. As former Director of Na- tional Intelligence Dan Coats stated, ‘‘These actions are persistent, they are pervasive and they are meant to undermine America’s de- mocracy.’’. (4) These information warfare operations continue to evolve and increase in sophistica- tion. (5) Other foreign adversaries and hostile non-state actors are increasingly adopting similar tactics of deploying information war- fare operations against the West, such as re- cent state-backed operations from China around the Hong Kong protests identified by social media companies. (6) Technological advances, including artifi- cial intelligence, will only make it more dif- ficult in the future to detect fraudulent ac- counts, deceptive material posted on social media, and malign behavior on social media platforms. (7) Because these information warfare oper- ations are deployed within and across private social media platforms, the companies that own these platforms have a responsibility to detect and facilitate the removal or neutral- ization of foreign adversary networks oper- ating clandestinely on their platforms. (8) The social media companies are inher- ently technologically sophisticated and adept at rapidly analyzing large amounts of data and developing software-based solutions to diverse and ever-changing challenges on their plat- forms, which makes them well-equipped to ad- dress the threat occurring on their platforms. (9) Independent analyses confirmed Kremlin- linked threat networks, based on data pro- vided by several social media companies to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Sen- ate, thereby demonstrating that it is possible to discern both broad patterns of cross-plat- form information warfare operations and spe- cific fraudulent behavior on social media plat- forms. (10) General Paul Nakasone, Director of the National Security Agency, emphasized the im- portance of these independent analyses to the planning and conducting of military cyber op- erations to frustrate Kremlin-linked informa- tion warfare operations against the 2018 mid- term elections. General Nakasone stated that the reports ‘‘were very, very helpful in terms of being able to understand exactly what our adversary was trying to do to build dissent within our nation.’’. (11) Institutionalizing ongoing robust, inde- pendent, and vigorous analysis of data related to foreign threat networks within and across social media platforms will help counter ongo- ing information warfare operations against the United States, its allies, and its partners. (12) Archiving and disclosing to the public the results of these analyses by the social media companies and trusted third-party ex- perts in a transparent manner will serve to demonstrate that the social media companies are detecting and removing foreign malign ac- tivities from their platforms while protecting the privacy of the people of the United States and will build public understanding of the scale and scope of these foreign threats to our democracy, since exposure is one of the most effective means to build resilience. (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the social media companies should co- operate among themselves and with inde- pendent organizations and researchers on a sustained and regular basis to share and ana- lyze data and indicators relevant to foreign in- formation warfare operations within and across their platforms in order to detect and counter foreign information warfare oper- ations that threaten the national security of the United States and its allies and partners; (2) information from law enforcement and the intelligence community is also important in assisting efforts by these social media com- panies to identify foreign information warfare operations; (3) these analytic efforts should be organized in such a fashion as to meet the highest stand- ards of ethics, confidentiality, and privacy protection of the people of the United States, while still allowing timely research access to relevant data; (4) these analytic efforts should be under- taken as soon as possible to facilitate coun- tering ongoing state or state-backed foreign information warfare operations and to aid in preparations for the United States Presi- dential and congressional elections in 2020 and beyond; (5) the structure and operations of social media companies make them well positioned to work with independent organizations and researchers to address foreign adversary threat networks within and across their plat- forms, and these efforts could be conducted without direct Government involvement, di- rection, or regulation; and (6) if the social media industry fails to take sufficient action to address foreign adversary threat networks operating within or across their platforms, Congress would have to con- sider additional safeguards for ensuring that this threat is effectively mitigated. (c) Requirement to facilitate establishment of So- cial Media Data and Threat Analysis Center (1) Requirement Not later than June 1, 2021, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall facilitate, by grant or contract or under an existing author- ity of the Director, the establishment of a So- cial Media Data and Threat Analysis Center with the functions described in paragraph (2) at an independent, nonprofit organization. (2) Functions The functions described in this paragraph are the following: (A) Acting as a convening and sponsoring authority for cooperative social media data analysis of foreign threat networks involv- ing social media companies and third-party experts, nongovernmental organizations, data journalists, Federally funded research Page 851 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 3369 and development centers, academic re- searchers, traditional media, and inter- national counterparts, as appropriate. (B) Facilitating analysis of foreign influ- ence operation, within and across the indi- vidual social media platforms as well as hacking and leaking campaigns, and other tactics, and related unlawful activities that fund or subsidize such operations. (C) Developing processes to share informa- tion from government entities on foreign in- fluence operations with the individual social media companies to inform threat analysis, and working with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as appropriate. (D) Determining and making public cri- teria for identifying which companies, orga- nizations, or researchers qualify for inclu- sion in the activities of the Center, and in- viting entities that fit the criteria to join. (E) Determining jointly with the social media companies what data and metadata related to indicators of foreign adversary threat networks from their platforms and business operations will be made available for access and analysis. (F) Developing and making public the cri- teria and standards that must be met for companies, other organizations, and indi- vidual researchers to access and analyze data relating to foreign adversary threat networks within and across social media platforms and publish or otherwise use the results. (G) Developing and making public the eth- ical standards for investigation of foreign threat networks and use of analytic results and for protection of the privacy of the cus- tomers and users of the social media plat- forms and of the proprietary information of the social media companies. (H) Developing technical, contractual, and procedural controls to prevent misuse of data, including any necessary auditing pro- cedures, compliance checks, and review mechanisms. (I) Developing and making public criteria and conditions under which the Center shall share information with the appropriate Gov- ernment agencies regarding threats to na- tional security from, or violations of the law involving, foreign activities on social media platforms. (J) Hosting a searchable archive aggre- gating information related to foreign influ- ence and disinformation operations to build a collective understanding of the threats and facilitate future examination consistent with privacy protections. (K) Developing data standards to har- monize the sharing of information pursuant to this paragraph. (d) Reporting and notifications The Director of the Center shall— (1) not later than August 1, 2021, submit to appropriate congressional committees a report on— (A) the estimated funding needs of the Center for fiscal year 2021 and for subsequent years; (B) such statutory protections from liabil- ity as the Director considers necessary for the Center, participating social media com- panies, and participating third-party analyt- ical participants; (C) such statutory penalties as the Direc- tor considers necessary to ensure against misuse of data by researchers; and (D) such changes to the Center’s mission to fully capture broader unlawful activities that intersect with, complement, or support information warfare tactics; and (2) not less frequently than once each year, submit to the Director of National Intel- ligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the ap- propriate congressional committees a report— (A) that assesses— (i) degree of cooperation and commit- ment from the social media companies to the mission of the Center; and (ii) effectiveness of the Center in detect- ing and facilitating the removal or neu- tralization of clandestine foreign informa- tion warfare operations from social media platforms; and (B) includes such recommendations for leg- islative or administrative action as the Cen- ter considers appropriate to carry out the functions of the Center. (e) Periodic reporting to the public The Director of the Center shall— (1) once each quarter, make available to the public a report on key trends in foreign influ- ence and disinformation operations, including any threats to campaigns and elections, to in- form the public of the United States; and (2) as the Director considers necessary, pro- vide more timely assessments relating to on- going disinformation campaigns. (f) Foreign malign influence campaigns on social media platforms targeting elections for Fed- eral office (1) Reports (A) Requirement Not later than 90 days before the date of each regularly scheduled general election for Federal office, the Director of the Center shall submit to the appropriate congres- sional committees a report on foreign ma- lign influence campaigns on and across so- cial media platforms targeting such elec- tion. (B) Matters included Each report under subparagraph (A) shall include an analysis of the following: (i) The patterns, tools, and techniques of foreign malign influence campaigns across all platforms on social media by a covered foreign country targeting a regularly scheduled general election for Federal of- fice. (ii) Inauthentic accounts and ‘‘bot’’ net- works across platforms, including the scale to which such accounts or networks exist, how platforms currently act to re- move such accounts or networks, and what percentage of such accounts or networks Page 852 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 3369 1 See References in Text note below. have been removed during the period cov- ered by the report. (iii) The estimated reach and impact of intentional or weaponized disinformation by inauthentic accounts and ‘‘bot’’ net- works, including an analysis of amplifi- cation by users and algorithmic distribu- tion. (iv) The trends of types of media that are being used for dissemination through for- eign malign influence campaigns, includ- ing machine-manipulated media, and the intended targeted groups. (C) Initial report Not later than August 1, 2021, the Director of the Center shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report under subparagraph (A) addressing the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office occurring during 2020. (D) Form Each report under this paragraph shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (2) Briefings (A) Requirement Not later than 30 days after the date on which the Director submits to the appro- priate congressional committees a report under paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Sec- retary of Defense, the Secretary of Home- land Security, and the Director of the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation, shall provide to such committees a briefing assessing threats from foreign malign influence cam- paigns on social media from covered coun- tries to the regularly scheduled general elec- tion for Federal office covered by the report. (B) Matters to be included Each briefing under subparagraph (A) shall include the following: (i) The patterns, tools, and techniques of foreign malign influence campaigns across all platforms on social media by a covered foreign country targeting a regularly scheduled general election for Federal of- fice. (ii) An assessment of the findings from the report for which the briefing is pro- vided. (iii) The activities and methods used to mitigate the threats associated with such findings by the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, or other relevant departments or agencies of the Federal Government. (iv) The steps taken by departments or agencies of the Federal Government to co- operate with social media companies to mitigate the threats identified. (g) Funding Of the amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the National Intelligence Pro- gram (as defined in section 3003 of this title) in fiscal year 2021 and 2022, the Director of Na- tional Intelligence may use up to $30,000,000 to carry out this section. (h) Definitions (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com- mittees’’ means— (A) the congressional intelligence commit- tees; (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Com- mittee on Homeland Security, the Com- mittee on Foreign Affairs, and the Com- mittee on the Judiciary of the House of Rep- resentatives; and (C) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, the Com- mittee on Homeland Security and Govern- ment Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Re- lations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. (2) Covered foreign country and foreign malign influence The terms ‘‘covered foreign country’’ and ‘‘foreign malign influence’’ have the meanings given those terms in section 3059 of this title. (3) Machine-manipulated media The term ‘‘machine-manipulated media’’ has the meaning given that term in section 5724.1 (Pub. L. 116–92, div. E, title LIII, § 5323, Dec. 20, 2019, 133 Stat. 2130; Pub. L. 116–283, div. H, title XCIII, § 9301, Jan. 1, 2021, 134 Stat. 4801.) Editorial Notes REFERENCES IN TEXT Section 5724, referred to in subsec. (h)(3), is section 5724 of Pub. L. 116–92, which is set out as a note under section 3024 of this title. AMENDMENTS 2021—Pub. L. 116–283, § 9301(d)(3)(A), struck out ‘‘En- couragement of’’ before ‘‘Cooperative’’ in section catchline. Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 116–283, 9301(d)(3)(B)(i), sub- stituted ‘‘Requirement’’ for ‘‘Authority’’ in heading. Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 116–283, § 9301(a), (d)(3)(B)(ii), in heading, substituted ‘‘Requirement’’ for ‘‘Authority’’ and, in text, substituted ‘‘Not later than June 1, 2021, the Director’’ for ‘‘The Director’’ and ‘‘shall’’ for ‘‘may’’. Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 116–283, § 9301(d)(1)(A), substituted ‘‘The’’ for ‘‘If the Director of National Intelligence chooses to use funds under subsection (c)(1) to facili- tate the establishment of the Center, the’’ in introduc- tory provisions. Subsec. (d)(1). Pub. L. 116–283, § 9301(d)(1)(B), sub- stituted ‘‘August 1, 2021’’ for ‘‘180 days after December 20, 2019’’. Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 116–283, § 9301(b)(2), added subsec. (f). Former subsec. (f) redesignated (g). Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 116–283, § 9301(d)(2), substituted ‘‘fiscal year 2021 and 2022’’ for ‘‘fiscal year 2020 and 2021’’. Pub. L. 116–283, § 9301(b)(1), redesignated subsec. (f) as (g). Former subsec. (g) redesignated (h). Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 116–283, § 9301(c), amended subsec. (h) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (h) defined ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’. Pub. L. 116–283, § 9301(b)(1), redesignated subsec. (g) as (h). Page 853 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 3369a Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries DEFINITIONS For definition of ‘‘intelligence community’’, referred to subsec. (b)(2), see section 5003 of div. E of Pub. L. 116–92, set out as a note under section 3003 of this title. § 3369a. Report on deepfake technology, foreign weaponization of deepfakes, and related no- tifications (a) Report on foreign weaponization of deepfakes and deepfake technology (1) Report required Not later than 180 days after December 20, 2019, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence community determined appro- priate by the Director, shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a re- port on— (A) the potential national security im- pacts of machine-manipulated media (com- monly known as ‘‘deepfakes’’); and (B) the actual or potential use of machine- manipulated media by foreign governments to spread disinformation or engage in other malign activities. (2) Matters to be included The report under subsection (a) shall include the following: (A) An assessment of the technical capa- bilities of foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign govern- ment-affiliated entities, and foreign individ- uals, with respect to machine-manipulated media, machine-generated text, generative adversarial networks, and related machine- learning technologies, including— (i) an assessment of the technical capa- bilities of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation with respect to the production and detection of ma- chine-manipulated media; and (ii) an annex describing those govern- mental elements within China and Russia known to have supported or facilitated machine-manipulated media research, de- velopment, or dissemination, as well as any civil-military fusion, private-sector, academic, or nongovernmental entities which have meaningfully participated in such activities. (B) An updated assessment of how foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services, foreign government-affiliated enti- ties, and foreign individuals, could use or are using machine-manipulated media and ma- chine-generated text to harm the national security interests of the United States, in- cluding an assessment of the historic, cur- rent, or potential future efforts of China and Russia to use machine-manipulated media, including with respect to— (i) the overseas or domestic dissemina- tion of misinformation; (ii) the attempted discrediting of polit- ical opponents or disfavored populations; and (iii) intelligence or influence operations directed against the United States, allies or partners of the United States, or other jurisdictions believed to be subject to Chi- nese or Russian interference. (C) An updated identification of the countertechnologies that have been or could be developed and deployed by the United States Government, or by the private sector with Government support, to deter, detect, and attribute the use of machine-manipu- lated media and machine-generated text by foreign governments, foreign-government af- filiates, or foreign individuals, along with an analysis of the benefits, limitations and drawbacks of such identified counter-tech- nologies, including any emerging concerns related to privacy. (D) An identification of the offices within the elements of the intelligence community that have, or should have, lead responsi- bility for monitoring the development of, use of, and response to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text, includ- ing— (i) a description of the coordination of such efforts across the intelligence com- munity; (ii) a detailed description of the existing capabilities, tools, and relevant expertise of such elements to determine whether a piece of media has been machine manipu- lated or machine generated, including the speed at which such determination can be made, the confidence level of the element in the ability to make such a determina- tion accurately, and how increasing vol- ume and improved quality of machine-ma- nipulated media or machine-generated text may negatively impact such capabili- ties; and (iii) a detailed description of planned or ongoing research and development efforts intended to improve the ability of the in- telligence community to detect machine- manipulated media and machine-generated text. (E) A description of any research and de- velopment activities carried out or under consideration to be carried out by the intel- ligence community, including the Intel- ligence Advanced Research Projects Activ- ity, relevant to machine-manipulated media and machine-generated text detection tech- nologies. (F) Updated recommendations regarding whether the intelligence community re- quires additional legal authorities, financial resources, or specialized personnel to ad- dress the national security threat posed by machine-manipulated media and machine- generated text. (G) Other additional information the Di- rector determines appropriate. (b) Form The report under subsection (a) shall be sub- mitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Requirement for notification The Director of National Intelligence, in co- operation with the heads of any other relevant