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50 U.S.C. § 3525 — Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity

Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

50 U.S.C. § 3525 — Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity

**(a) Establishment** (1) **In general** — There is established in the Agency an Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity (in this section referred to as the “Office”). (2) **Appointment of Ombudsman** — The Office shall be headed by an Ombudsman, who shall be appointed by the Director from among current or former senior staff officers of the Agency. **(b) Duties and responsibilities** The Ombudsman shall— (1) on an annual basis, conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of the Agency; (2) implement a procedure by which any officer or employee of the Agency may submit to the Office a complaint alleging politicization, bias, lack of objectivity, or other issues relating to a failure of tradecraft in analysis conducted by the Agency; (3) except as provided in paragraph (4), upon receiving a complaint submitted pursuant to paragraph (2), take reasonable action to investigate the complaint, make a determination as to whether the incident described in the complaint involved politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity, and prepare a report that— (A) summarizes the facts relevant to the complaint; (B) documents the determination of the Ombudsman with respect to the complaint; and (C) contains a recommendation for remedial action; (4) if a complaint submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) alleges politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity in the collection of intelligence information, refer the complaint to the official responsible for supervising collection operations of the Agency; and (5) continuously monitor changes in areas of analysis that the Ombudsman determines involve a heightened risk of politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity, to ensure that any change in the analytic line arises from proper application of ana

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Stable record: federal_law:legal_authorities:record_usc_bb5d79a4cce415a99164ce3e
Source file: Laws/federal/codes/united-states-code/title-50/section-3525-office-of-the-ombudsman-for-analytic-objectivity--4ab6991639.md
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Source location: Title 50, Chapter 46, § 3525; chapter-046-central-intelligence-agency.md

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**(a) Establishment** (1) **In general** — There is established in the Agency an Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Objectivity (in this section referred to as the “Office”). (2) **Appointment of Ombudsman** — The Office shall be headed by an Ombudsman, who shall be appointed by the Director from among current or former senior staff officers of the Agency. **(b) Duties and responsibilities** The Ombudsman shall— (1) on an annual basis, conduct a survey of analytic objectivity among officers and employees of the Agency; (2) implement a procedure by which any officer or employee of the Agency may submit to the Office a complaint alleging politicization, bias, lack of objectivity, or other issues relating to a failure of tradecraft in analysis conducted by the Agency; (3) except as provided in paragraph (4), upon receiving a complaint submitted pursuant to paragraph (2), take reasonable action to investigate the complaint, make a determination as to whether the incident described in the complaint involved politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity, and prepare a report that— (A) summarizes the facts relevant to the complaint; (B) documents the determination of the Ombudsman with respect to the complaint; and (C) contains a recommendation for remedial action; (4) if a complaint submitted pursuant to paragraph (2) alleges politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity in the collection of intelligence information, refer the complaint to the official responsible for supervising collection operations of the Agency; and (5) continuously monitor changes in areas of analysis that the Ombudsman determines involve a heightened risk of politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity, to ensure that any change in the analytic line arises from proper application of analytic tradecraft and not as a result of politicization, bias, or lack of objectivity. **(c) Reports** (1) On an annual basis, the Ombudsman shall submit to the intelligence committees a report on the results of the survey conducted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) with respect to the most recent fiscal year. (2) On an annual basis, the Ombudsman shall submit to the intelligence committees a report that includes— (A) the number of complaints of submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(2) during the most recent fiscal year; and (B) a description of the nature of such complaints, the actions taken by the Office or any other relevant element or component of the Agency with respect to such complaints, and the resolution of such complaints. (3) On a quarterly basis, the Ombudsman shall submit to the intelligence committees a report that includes— (A) a list of the areas of analysis monitored during the most recent calendar quarter pursuant to subsection (b)(5); and (B) a brief description of the methods by which the Office has conducted such monitoring. **(d) Intelligence committees defined** In this section, the term “intelligence committees” means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

50 U.S.C. § 3501 — Definitions

When used in this chapter, the term— (1) “Agency” means the Central Intelligence Agency; (2) “Director” means the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (3) “Government agency” means any executive department, commission, council, independent establishment, corporation wholly or partly owned by the United States which is an instrumentality of the United States, board, bureau, division, service, office, officer, authority, administration, or other establishment, in the executive branch of the Government.

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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

50 U.S.C. § 3525 — Office of the Ombudsman for Analytic Ob-

Page 915 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 3525 1 See Change of Name note below. this subsection. The procedures shall be sub- ject to periodic review by the Internal Rev- enue Service. (i) Regulations The Director of the Central Intelligence Agen- cy shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section. The regulations shall ensure that the combination of salary, allowances, and benefits that an employee designated under this section may retain does not significantly exceed, except to the extent determined by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to be necessary to exercise the authority in subsection (b), the combination of salary, allowances, and benefits otherwise received by Federal employees not designated under this section. (j) Finality of decisions Any determinations authorized by this section to be made by the Director of the Central Intel- ligence Agency or the Director’s designee shall be final and conclusive and shall not be subject to review by any court. (k) Subsequently enacted laws No law enacted after the effective date of this section shall affect the authorities and provi- sions of this section unless such law specifically refers to this section. (June 20, 1949, ch. 227, § 23, as added Pub. L. 108–487, title IV, § 402, Dec. 23, 2004, 118 Stat. 3946.) Editorial Notes REFERENCES IN TEXT The effective date of this section, referred to in sub- sec. (k), is the date of enactment of Pub. L. 108–487, which was approved December 23, 2004. See section 801 of Pub. L. 108–487, set out as an Effective Date of 2004 Amendments note under section 2656f of Title 22, For- eign Relations and Intercourse. CODIFICATION Section was formerly classified to section 403w of this title prior to editorial reclassification and renum

Source: Supplied 2024 U.S. Code historical extraction · 50 U.S.C. § 3525

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