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50 U.S.C. § 2351 — Strengthened international security for nuclear materials and security of nuclear operations

Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

50 U.S.C. § 2351 — Strengthened international security for nuclear materials and security of nuclear operations

**(a) Report on options for international program to strengthen security** (1) Not later than 270 days after December 2, 2002, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report on options for an international program to develop strengthened security for nuclear reactors and associated materials outside the United States. (2) In evaluating options for purposes of the report, the Secretary shall consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the feasibility and advisability of actions to reduce the risks associated with terrorist attacks on nuclear reactors outside the United States. **(b) Joint programs with Russia on proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technologies** (1) The Secretary shall pursue with the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation joint programs between the United States and the Russian Federation on the development of proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technologies, including advanced fuel cycles. (2) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) 11 See References in Text note below. for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $10,000,000 may be available for carrying out the joint programs referred to in paragraph (1). **(c) Assistance regarding hostile insiders** The Secretary may, utilizing appropriate expertise of the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provide technical assistance to nuclear reactor facilities outside the United States with respect to the interdiction of hostile insiders at such facilities in order to prevent incidents arising from the disablement of the vital systems of such facilities.

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Source file: Laws/federal/codes/united-states-code/title-50/section-2351-strengthened-international-security-for-nuclear-materials-and-security-o--11c28853bc.md
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Source location: Title 50, Chapter 40, § 2351; chapter-040-defense-against-weapons-of-mass-destruction.md

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**(a) Report on options for international program to strengthen security** (1) Not later than 270 days after December 2, 2002, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report on options for an international program to develop strengthened security for nuclear reactors and associated materials outside the United States. (2) In evaluating options for purposes of the report, the Secretary shall consult with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency on the feasibility and advisability of actions to reduce the risks associated with terrorist attacks on nuclear reactors outside the United States. **(b) Joint programs with Russia on proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technologies** (1) The Secretary shall pursue with the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation joint programs between the United States and the Russian Federation on the development of proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technologies, including advanced fuel cycles. (2) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) 11 See References in Text note below. for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security Administration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $10,000,000 may be available for carrying out the joint programs referred to in paragraph (1). **(c) Assistance regarding hostile insiders** The Secretary may, utilizing appropriate expertise of the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, provide technical assistance to nuclear reactor facilities outside the United States with respect to the interdiction of hostile insiders at such facilities in order to prevent incidents arising from the disablement of the vital systems of such facilities.

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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

50 U.S.C. § 2311 — Findings

Congress makes the following findings: (1) Weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies are increasingly available from worldwide sources. Technical information relating to such weapons is readily available on the Internet, and raw materials for chemical, biological, and radiological weapons are widely available for legitimate commercial purposes. (2) The former Soviet Union produced and maintained a vast array of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction. (3) Many of the states of the former Soviet Union retain the facilities, materials, and technologies capable of producing additional quantities of weapons of mass destruction. (4) The disintegration of the former Soviet Union was accompanied by disruptions of command and control systems, deficiencies in accountability for weapons, weapons-related materials and technologies, economic hardships, and significant gaps in border control among the states of the former Soviet Union. The problems of organized crime and corruption in the states of the former Soviet Union increase the potential for proliferation of nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons and related materials. (5) The conditions described in paragraph (4) have substantially increased the ability of potentially hostile nations, terrorist groups, and individuals to acquire weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies from within the states of the former Soviet Union and from unemployed scientists who worked on those programs. (6) As a result of such conditions, the capability of potentially hostile nations and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is greater than at any time in history. (7) The President has identified North Korea,

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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

50 U.S.C. § 2357a — Termination

After September 30, 1999, the President— (1) is not required to maintain a National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters under [section 2351 of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section2351&num=0&edition=prelim); and (2) may terminate the Committee on Nonproliferation established under [section 2352 of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section2352&num=0&edition=prelim).

Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 50 U.S.C. § 2357a

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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

50 U.S.C. § 2351 — National coordinator on nonproliferation

Page 383 TITLE 50—WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE § 2352 1 See References in Text note below. 1 See References in Text note below. CODIFICATION Section was enacted as part of the Bob Stump Na- tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, and not as part of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 which comprises this chapter. § 2345. Export control programs (a) Authority to pursue options for strengthening export control programs The Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Secretary of State, may pursue in the region of the former Soviet Union and other regions of concern options for accelerating programs that assist the countries in such regions in improving their domestic export control programs for ma- terials, technologies, and expertise relevant to the construction or use of a nuclear or radio- logical dispersal device. (b) Amount for activities Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 3101(a)(2) 1 for the Department of En- ergy for the National Nuclear Security Adminis- tration for defense nuclear nonproliferation, up to $5,000,000 may be available for carrying out this section. (Pub. L. 107–314, div. C, title XXXI, § 3159, Dec. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 2741.) Editorial Notes REFERENCES IN TEXT Section 3101(a)(2), referred to in subsec. (b), is section 3101(a)(2) of Pub. L. 107–314, div. C, title XXXI, Dec. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 2729, which is not classified to the Code. CODIFICATION Section was enacted as part of the Bob Stump Na- tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, and not as part of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 which comprises this chapter. SUBCHAPTER IV—COORDINATION OF POL- ICY AND COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTI

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