22 U.S.C. § 8412 — Findings

Congress finds the following: (1) The people of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United States share a long history of friendship and comity, and the interests of both nations are well-served by strengthening and deepening this friendship. (2) Since 2001, the United States has contributed more than $15,000,000,000 to Pakistan, of which more than $10,000,000,000 has been security-related assistance and direct payments. (3) With the free and fair election of February 18, 2008, Pakistan returned to civilian rule, reversing years of political tension and mounting popular concern over military rule and Pakistan’s own democratic reform and political development. (4) Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally of the United States and has been a valuable partner in the battle against al Qaeda and the Taliban, but much more remains to be accomplished by both nations. (5) The struggle against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated terrorist groups has led to the deaths of several thousand Pakistani civilians and members of the security forces of Pakistan over the past seven years. (6) Despite killing or capturing hundreds of al Qaeda operatives and other terrorists—including major al Qaeda leaders, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Abu Faraj al-Libi—the FATA, parts of the NWFP, Quetta in Balochistan, and Muridke in Punjab remain a sanctuary for al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Terikh-e Taliban and affiliated groups from which these groups organize terrorist actions against Pakistan and other countries. (7) The security forces of Pakistan have struggled to contain a Taliban-backed insurgency, recently taking direct action against those who threaten Pakistan’s security and stability, including military operations in the FATA and the NWFP. (8) On March 27, 2009, President Obama noted, “Multiple intelligence estimates have warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its safe-haven in Pakistan.”. (9) According to a Government Accountability Office report (GAO–08–622), “since 2003, the [A]dministration’s national security strategies and Congress have recognized that a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—was needed to address the terrorist threat emanating from the FATA” and that such a strategy was also mandated by section 7102(b)(3) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–458; [22 U.S.C. 2656f](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section2656f&num=0&edition=prelim) note) and section 2042(b)(2) of the Implementing the 11 So in original. The word “the” probably should not appear. Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110–53; [22 U.S.C. 2375](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title22-section2375&num=0&edition=prelim) note). (10) During 2008 and 2009, the people of Pakistan have been especially hard hit by rising food and commodity prices and severe energy shortages, with ⅔ of the population living on less than $2 a day and ⅕ of the population living below the poverty line according to the United Nations Development Program. (11) Economic growth is a fundamental foundation for human security and national stability in Pakistan, a country with more than 175,000,000 people, an annual population growth rate of two percent, and a ranking of 136 out of 177 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index. (12) The 2009 Pakistani military offensive in the NWFP and the FATA displaced millions of residents in one of the gravest humanitarian crises Pakistan has faced, and despite the heroic efforts of Pakistanis to respond to the needs of the displaced millions and facilitate the return of many, it has highlighted the need for Pakistan to develop an effective national counterinsurgency strategy.