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6 U.S.C. § 673 — CyberSentry program

Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

6 U.S.C. § 673 — CyberSentry program

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Stable record: federal_law:legal_authorities:record_usc_0a1b89bdb2e9a50f3edc9c56
Source file: Laws/federal/codes/united-states-code/title-6/section-673-cybersentry-program--56f0bf619b.md
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Source location: Title 6, Chapter 1, § 673; chapter-001-homeland-security-organization.md

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**(a) Establishment** There is established in the Agency a program, to be known as “CyberSentry”, to provide continuous monitoring and detection of cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure entities that own or operate industrial control systems that support national critical functions, upon request and subject to the consent of such owner or operator. **(b) Activities** The Director, through CyberSentry, shall— (1) enter into strategic partnerships with critical infrastructure owners and operators that, in the determination of the Director and subject to the availability of resources, own or operate regionally or nationally significant industrial control systems that support national critical functions, in order to provide technical assistance in the form of continuous monitoring of industrial control systems and the information systems that support such systems and detection of cybersecurity risks to such industrial control systems and other cybersecurity services, as appropriate, based on and subject to the agreement and consent of such owner or operator; (2) leverage sensitive or classified intelligence about cybersecurity risks regarding particular sectors, particular adversaries, and trends in tactics, techniques, and procedures to advise critical infrastructure owners and operators regarding mitigation measures and share information as appropriate; (3) identify cybersecurity risks in the information technology and information systems that support industrial control systems which could be exploited by adversaries attempting to gain access to such industrial control systems, and work with owners and operators to remediate such vulnerabilities; (4) produce aggregated, anonymized analytic products, based on threat hunting and continuous monitoring and detection activities and partnerships, with findings and recommendations that can be disseminated to critical infrastructure owners and operators; and (5) support activities authorized in accordance with section 1501 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022. **(c) Privacy review** Not later than 180 days after December 27, 2021, the Privacy Officer of the Agency under [section 652(h) of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title6-section652/h&num=0&edition=prelim) shall— (1) review the policies, guidelines, and activities of CyberSentry for compliance with all applicable privacy laws, including such laws governing the acquisition, interception, retention, use, and disclosure of communities; and (2) submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report certifying compliance with all applicable privacy laws as referred to in paragraph (1), or identifying any instances of noncompliance with such privacy laws. **(d) Report to Congress** Not later than one year after December 27, 2021, the Director shall provide to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a briefing and written report on implementation of this section. **(e) Savings** Nothing in this section may be construed to permit the Federal Government to gain access to information of a remote computing service provider to the public or an electronic service provider to the public, the disclosure of which is not permitted under [section 2702 of title 18](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title18-section2702&num=0&edition=prelim). **(f) Definition** In this section, the term “industrial control system” means an information system used to monitor and/or control industrial processes such as manufacturing, product handling, production, and distribution, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems used to monitor and/or control geographically dispersed assets, distributed control systems (DCSs), Human-Machine Interfaces (HMIs), and programmable logic controllers that control localized processes. **(g) Termination** The authority to carry out a program under this section shall terminate on the date that is seven years after December 27, 2021.

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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

18 U.S.C. § 2702 — Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records

**(a) Prohibitions.—** Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c)— (1) a person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service; and (2) a person or entity providing remote computing service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of any communication which is carried or maintained on that service— (A) on behalf of, and received by means of electronic transmission from (or created by means of computer processing of communications received by means of electronic transmission from), a subscriber or customer of such service; (B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber or customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing any services other than storage or computer processing; and (3) a provider of remote computing service or electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications covered by paragraph (1) or (2)) to any governmental entity. **(b) Exceptions for disclosure of communications.—** A provider described in subsection (a) may divulge the contents of a communication— (1) to an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or intended recipient; (2) as otherwise authorized in section 2517, 2511(2)(a), or 2703 of this title; (3) with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or the subscriber in the case

Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 18 U.S.C. § 2702

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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

6 U.S.C. § 124c — Information and Analysis

**(a) Intelligence and analysis** There shall be in the Department an Office of Intelligence and Analysis. **(b) Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis** (1) **Office of Intelligence and Analysis** — The Office of Intelligence and Analysis shall be headed by an Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) **Chief Intelligence Officer** — The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall serve as the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department. **(c) Discharge of responsibilities** The Secretary shall ensure that the responsibilities of the Department relating to information analysis, including those described in subsection (d), are carried out through the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. **(d) Responsibilities of Secretary relating to intelligence and analysis** The responsibilities of the Secretary relating to intelligence and analysis shall be as follows: (1) To access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies (including law enforcement agencies), and private sector entities, and to integrate such information, in support of the mission responsibilities of the Department and the functions of the National Counterterrorism Center established under section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 [[50 U.S.C. 3056](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title50-section3056&num=0&edition=prelim)], in order to— (A) identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland; (B) detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States; and (C) understand su

Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 6 U.S.C. § 124c

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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

6 U.S.C. § 162 — Transferred

### Statutory Notes #### Codification Section 131, Pub. L. 107–296, title II, § 212, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2150; Pub. L. 114–113, div. N, title II, § 204, Dec. 18, 2015, 129 Stat. 2961, which related to definitions, was renumbered section 2222 of Pub. L. 107–296 by Pub. L. 115–278, § 2(g)(2)(H), Nov. 16, 2018, 132 Stat. 4178, and transferred to [section 671 of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title6-section671&num=0&edition=prelim). Section 132, Pub. L. 107–296, title II, § 213, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2152, which related to designation of critical infrastructure protection program, was renumbered section 2223 of Pub. L. 107–296 by Pub. L. 115–278, § 2(g)(2)(H), Nov. 16, 2018, 132 Stat. 4178, and transferred to [section 672 of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title6-section672&num=0&edition=prelim). Section 133, Pub. L. 107–296, title II, § 214, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2152; Pub. L. 108–271, § 8(b), July 7, 2004, 118 Stat. 814; Pub. L. 112–199, title I, § 111, Nov. 27, 2012, 126 Stat. 1472, which related to protection of voluntarily shared critical infrastructure information, was renumbered section 2224 of Pub. L. 107–296 by Pub. L. 115–278, § 2(g)(2)(H), Nov. 16, 2018, 132 Stat. 4178, and transferred to [section 673 of this title](https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title6-section673&num=0&edition=prelim). Section 134, Pub. L. 107–296, title II, § 215, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2155, which prohibited the construction of former part B as creating a private right of action for enforcement of any provision of this chapter, was renumbered section 2225 of Pub. L. 107–296 by Pub. L. 115–278, § 2(g)(2)(H), Nov. 16, 2018, 132 Stat. 4178, and transferred to [section

Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 6 U.S.C. § 162

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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

6 U.S.C. § 204 — EMP and GMD mitigation research and development and threat assessment, response, and recovery

**(a) In general** In furtherance of domestic preparedness and response, the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, and in consultation with other relevant executive agencies, relevant State, local, and tribal governments, and relevant owners and operators of critical infrastructure, shall, to the extent practicable, conduct research and development to mitigate the consequences of threats of EMP and GMD. **(b) Scope** The scope of the research and development under subsection (a) shall include the following: (1) An objective scientific analysis— (A) evaluating the risks to critical infrastructure from a range of threats of EMP and GMD; and (B) which shall— (i) be conducted in conjunction with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis; and (ii) include a review and comparison of the range of threats and hazards facing critical infrastructure of the electrical grid. (2) Determination of the critical utilities and national security assets and infrastructure that are at risk from threats of EMP and GMD. (3) An evaluation of emergency planning and response technologies that would address the findings and recommendations of experts, including those of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, which shall include a review of the feasibility of rapidly isolating one or more portions of the electrical grid from the main electrical grid. (4) An analysis of technology options that are available to improve the resiliency of critical infrastructure to threats of EMP and GMD, including an analysis of neutral current blocking devices that may protect high-voltage transmission lines. (5) The restoration and recovery capabilities of critical infrastructure under differing levels of d

Source: Supplied U.S. Code snapshot — release unconfirmed · 6 U.S.C. § 204

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Federal law — U.S. Code and appendices · legal_authorities

6 U.S.C. § 673 — Protection of voluntarily shared critical in-

Page 379 TITLE 6—DOMESTIC SECURITY § 673 or materials filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or with Fed- eral banking regulators, pursuant to sec- tion 78l(i) of title 15; and (II) with respect to the submittal of critical infrastructure information, does not include any disclosure or writing that when made accompanied the solici- tation of an offer or a sale of securities; and (ii) does not include information or statements submitted or relied upon as a basis for making licensing or permitting determinations, or during regulatory pro- ceedings. (Pub. L. 107–296, title XXII, § 2222, formerly title II, § 212, Nov. 25, 2002, 116 Stat. 2150; Pub. L. 114–113, div. N, title II, § 204, Dec. 18, 2015, 129 Stat. 2961; renumbered title XXII, § 2222, and amended Pub. L. 115–278, § 2(g)(2)(H), (9)(B)(i), Nov. 16, 2018, 132 Stat. 4178, 4181; Pub. L. 117–263, div. G, title LXXI, § 7143(b)(2)(M), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 3661.) Editorial Notes CODIFICATION Section was formerly classified to section 131 of this title prior to renumbering by Pub. L. 115–278. AMENDMENTS 2022—Par. (3). Pub. L. 117–263, § 7143(b)(2)(M)(i), added par. (3) and struck out former par. (3) which defined critical infrastructure information. Pars. (5) to (8). Pub. L. 117–263, § 7143(b)(2)(M)(ii), (iii), redesignated pars. (6) and (7) as (5) and (6), respectively, and struck out former pars. (5) and (8) which defined In- formation Sharing and Analysis Organization and cybersecurity risk and incident, respectively. 2018—Par. (8). Pub. L. 115–278, § 2(g)(9)(B)(i), sub- stituted ‘‘section 659 of this title’’ for ‘‘section 148 of this title’’. 2015—Par. (5)(A). Pub. L. 114–113, § 204(1)(A), inserted ‘‘, including information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents,’’

Source: Supplied 2024 U.S. Code historical extraction · 6 U.S.C. § 673

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